# Rd 2 Neg v UTSA

## 1nc

### T

#### The aff should advocate increasing energy production

#### The subject: central government- the USFG.

#### The verb: increase- to make greater. Or reduce, to make smaller

#### The objects -"Financial incentives for energy production" involve the exchange of money for production.

Book 11 [Managing Director, ClearView Energy Partners, LLC]

Kevin, Testimony before U.S. HOUSE COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS,

SUBCOMMITTEES ON SELECT REVENUE MEASURES AND OVERSIGHT, SEPTEMBER 22, http://waysandmeans.house.gov/UploadedFiles/Booktestimony922.pdf

Incentive cost ratios, implied abatement costs and implied displacement costs offer three possible ways to measure the performance of **federal financial incentives for energy production** and consumption. Metrics of this sort could be used to prioritize spending – dynamically, perhaps through a reverse auction – or through legislated formulas **that balance incentives for high-yield, low-cost sources with high-potential, emerging sources.** Fuels or technologies that consistently fall short of established benchmarks may require a different type of government financial intervention (e**.g. manufacturing assistance or pre-competitive R&D** in place of production **tax credits**) or a different mode of financial support (e.g. loan guaranteesinstead of tax credits **or deductions)**.

#### The direct object is energy production

Is Cumulative Fossil Energy Demand a Useful Indicator for the Environmental Performance of Products? M A R K A . J . HUIJBREGTS , \* , † L I N D A J . A . R O M B O U T S , † S T E F A N I E H E L L W E G , ‡ R O L F F R I S C H K N E C H T , § A . J A N H E N D R I K S , † D I K V A N D E M E E N T , † , | A D M . J . R A G A S , † L U C A S R E I J N D E R S , ⊥ A N D J A A P S T R U I J S | Department of Environmental Science, Institute for Wetland and Water Research, Faculty of Science, Radboud University Nijmegen, P.O. Box 9010, NL-6500 GL Nijmegen, The Netherlands, Institute for Chemical- and Bioengineering, Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zu¨rich, CH-8093 Zu¨rich, Switzerland, Ecoinvent Centre, Ueberlandstrasse 129, CH-8600 Duebendorf, Switzerland, Laboratory for Ecological Risk Assessment, National Institute of Public Health and the Environment, P.O. Box 1, NL-3720 BA, Bilthoven, The Netherlands, and Institute for Biodiversity and Ecosystem Dynamics, University of Amsterdam, Nieuwe Achtergracht 166, NL-1018 WV, Amsterdam, The Netherlands 2006 American Chemical Society VOL. 40, NO. 3, 2006 / ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY 9 641 http://pubs.acs.org/doi/pdf/10.1021/es051689g

The appropriateness of the fossil Cumulative Energy Demand (CED) as an indicator for the environmental performance of products and processes is explored with a regression analysis between the environmental life-cycle impacts and fossil CEDs of 1218 products, divided into the product categories “energy production”, “material production”, “transport”, and “waste treatment”. Our results show that, for all product groups but waste treatment, the fossil CED correlates well with most impact categories, such as global warming, resource depletion, acidification, eutrophication, tropospheric ozone formation, ozone depletion, and human toxicity (explained variance between 46% and 100%). We conclude that the use of fossil fuels is an important driver of several environmental impacts and thereby indicative for many environmental problems. It may therefore serve as a screening indicator for environmental performance. However, the usefulness of fossil CED as a stand-alone indicator for environmental impact is limited by the large uncertainty in the product-specific fossil CEDbased impact scores (larger than a factor of 10 for the majority of the impact categories; 95% confidence interval). A major reason for this high uncertainty is nonfossil energy related emissions and land use, such as landfill leachates, radionuclide emissions, and land use in agriculture and forestry.

#### Links

#### 1. The SUBJECT of the action is the AFF team, not the USFG.

#### 2. The OBJECT of the action is the judge, not energy.

#### 1. Infinite regression—disregarding resolutional syntax produces an endless regression to small, trivial plans. For example, an aff only about the subject opens the door to ANY philosophy that speaks to ‘being.’

#### 2. Limits—resolutional limits encourage AFF innovation, predictive research on a designated topic, and clash—a precursor to productive education. Also, the inherent value of arguments within limits is greater, which link turns education arguments.

####  If our interpretation is net-beneficial it means there’s no reason to vote affirmative. If the case is true then it de-justifies the resolution. Teams are still signified by ‘AFF’ and ‘NEG’, so the resolution is a required measurement for ‘affirmation.’

They don’t get credit for 1AC preempts unless they’re clearly and explicitly extended in the 2AC- Our T argument is an explicit response to all of them so you should consider anything not in the 2AC dropped. Anything else places an unreasonable burden on the neg to answer 5 minutes of cards that are never explained.

### Off

#### Identity-based struggles can never come to grips with the Real of Capital because today’s global capitalism relentlessly fragments identities to ensure that capital’s homogenizing force will prevail.

Slavoj Zizek, Professor of Sociology at the Institute for Sociology, Ljubljana University, 2000, The Fragile Absolute, p. 11-15

So where are we, today, with regard to ghosts? The first paradox that strikes us, of course, is that this very process of global reflex¬ivization that mercilessly derides and chases the ghosts of the past generates not only its own immediacy but also its own ghosts, its own spectrality. The most famous ghost, which has been roaming around for the last 150 years, was not a ghost of the past, but the spectre of the (revolutionary) future — the spectre, of course, from the first sentence of The Communist Manifesto. The automatic reaction to The Manifesto of today’s enlightened liberal reader is: isn’t the text simply wrong on so many empirical accounts — with regard to its picture of the social situation, as well as the revolutionary perspective it sustains and propagates? Was there ever a political manifesto that was more clearly falsi¬fied by subsequent historical reality? Is not The Manifesto, at its best, the exaggerated extrapolation of certain tendencies dis¬cernible in the nineteenth century? So let us approach The Manifesto from the opposite end: where do we live today, in our global ‘post . . .‘ (postmodern, post-industrial) society? The slogan that is imposing itself more and more is ‘globalization’: the brutal imposition of the unified world market that threatens all local ethnic traditions, including the very form of the nation-state. And in view of this situation, is not the description of the social impact of the bourgeoisie in The Manifesto more relevant than ever? The bourgeoisie cannot exist without constantly revolution¬izing the instruments of production, and thereby the relations of production, and with them the whole relations of society. Conservation of the old modes of production in unaltered form was, on the contrary, the first condition of existence for all earlier industrial classes. Constant revolu¬tionizing of production, uninterrupted disturbance of all social conditions, everlasting uncertainty and agitation distinguish the bourgeois epoch from all earlier ones. All fixed, fast-frozen relations, with their train of ancient and venerable prejudices and opinions, are swept away, all new-formed ones become antiquated before they can ossify. All that is solid melts into air, all that is holy is profaned, and man is at last compelled to face with sober senses his real condition in life, and his relations with his kind. The need of a constantly expanding market for its products chases the bourgeoisie over the whole surface of the globe. It must nestle everywhere, settle everywhere, establish connexions everywhere. The bourgeoisie has through its exploitation of the world market given a cosmopolitan character to production and consumption in every country. To the great chagrin of Reactionists, it has drawn from under the feet of industry the national ground on which it stood. All old-established national industries have been destroyed or are daily being destroyed. They are dislodged by new industries, whose introduction becomes a life and death question for all civi¬lized nations, by industries that no longer work up indigenous raw material, but raw material drawn from the remotest zones; industries whose products are consumed, not only at home, but in every quarter of the globe. In place of the old wants, satisfied by the productions of the country, we find new wants, requiring for their satisfaction the prod¬ucts of distant lands and climes. In place of the old local and national seclusion and self-sufficiency, we have intercourse in every direction, universal inter-dependence of nations. And as in material, so also in intellectual production. The intellectual creations of individual nations become common property. National one-sidedness and narrow-mindedness becomes more and more impossible, and from the numerous national and local literatures, there arises a world literature.6 Is this not, more than ever, our reality today? Ericsson phones are no longer Swedish, Toyota cars are manufactured 60 per cent in the USA, Hollywood culture pervades the remotest parts of the globe. . . . Furthermore, does not the same go also for all forms of ethnic and sexual identities? Should we not supplement Marx’s description in this sense, adding also that sexual ‘one¬sidedness and narrow-mindedness become more and more impossible’; that concerning sexual practices also, ‘all that is solid melts into air, all that is holy is profaned’, so that capitalism tends to replace standard normative heterosexuality with a prolifera¬tion of unstable shifting identities and/or orientations? From time to time Marx himself underestimates this ability of the capitalist universe to incorporate the transgressive urge that seemed to threaten it; in his analysis of the ongoing American Civil War, for example, he claimed that since the English textile industry, the backbone of the industrial system, could not survive without the supply of cheap cotton from the American South rendered pos¬sible only by slave labour, England would be forced to intervene directly to prevent the abolition of slavery. So yes, this global dynamism described by Marx, which causes all things solid to melt into air, is our reality — on condition that we do not forget to supplement this image from The Manifesto with its inherent dialectical opposite, the ‘spiritualization’ of the very material process of production. While capitalism does suspend the power of the old ghosts of tradition, it generates its own mon¬strous ghosts. That is to say: on the one hand, capitalism entails the radical secularization of social life — it mercilessly tears apart any aura of authentic nobility, sacredness, honour, and so on: It has drowned the most heavenly ecstasies of religious fer¬vour, of chivalrous enthusiasm, of philistine sentimentalism, in the icy water of egotistical calculation. It has resolved per¬sonal worth into exchange value, and in place of the numberless indefeasible chartered freedoms, has set up that single, unconscionable freedom — Free Trade. In one word, for exploitation, veiled by religious and political illusions, it has substituted naked, shameless, direct, brutal exploitation.7 However, the fundamental lesson of the ‘critique of political econ¬omy’ elaborated by the mature Marx in the years after The Manifesto is that this reduction of all heavenly chimeras to brutal economic reality generates a spectrality of its own. When Marx describes the mad self-enhancing circulation of Capital, whose solipsistic path of self-fecundation reaches its apogee in today’s meta-reflexive speculations on futures, it is far too simplistic to claim that the spectre of this self-engendering monster that pursues its path regardless of any human or environmental concern is an ideolog¬ical abstraction, and that one should never forget that behind this abstraction there are real people and natural objects on whose productive capacities and resources Capital’s circulation is based, and on which it feeds like a gigantic parasite. The problem is that this ‘abstraction’ does not exist only in our (financial specula¬tor’s) misperception of social reality; it is ‘real’ in the precise sense of determining the very structure of material social processes: the fate of whole strata of populations, and sometimes of whole coun¬tries, can be decided by the ‘solipsistic’ speculative dance of Capital, which pursues its goal of profitability with a blessed indif¬ference to the way its movement will affect social reality. That is the fundamental systemic violence of capitalism, which is much more uncanny than direct pre-capitalist socio-ideological violence: this violence is no longer attributable to concrete individuals and their ‘evil’ intentions; it is purely ‘objective’, systemic, anonymous.

#### Capitalism’s preoccupation with endless accumulation will result in total ecological destruction and extinction

Foster 11,[John Bellamy ] Dec. 2011, Capitalism and the Accumulation of Catastrophe, Monthly Review, Vol. 63 Issue 07, <http://monthlyreview.org/2011/12/01/capitalism-and-the-accumulation-of-catastrophe> (Aug 2012)

Yet, the continued pursuit of Keynes’s convenient lie over the last eight decades has led to a world far more polarized and beset with contradictions than he could have foreseen. It is a world prey to the enormous unintended consequences of accumulation without limits: namely, global economic stagnation, financial crisis, and planetary ecological destruction. Keynes, though aware of some of the negative economic aspects of capitalist production, had no real understanding of the ecological perils—of which scientists had already long been warning. Today these perils are impossible to overlook. Faced with impending ecological catastrophe, it is more necessary than ever to abandon Keynes’s convenient lie and espouse the truth: that foul is foul and fair is fair. Capitalism, the society of “après moi le déluge!” is a system that fouls its own nest—both the human-social conditions and the wider natural environment on which it depends. The accumulation of capital is at the same time accumulation of catastrophe, not only for a majority of the world’s people, but living species generally. Hence, nothing is *fairer*—more just, more beautiful, and more necessary—today than the struggle to overthrow the regime of capital and to create a system of substantive equality and sustainable human development; a socialism for the twenty-first century.

#### The alternative is to reject capitalism through revolutionary action towards capitalism

Herod ‘4 James Herod author of several books on capitalism and social activist since 1968 Getting Free 2004 <http://site.www.umb.edu/faculty/salzman_g/Strate/GetFre/06.htm>

 It is time to try to describe, at first abstractly and later concretely, a strategy for destroying capitalism. This strategy, at its most basic, calls for pulling time, energy, and resources out of capitalist civilization and putting them into building a new civilization. The image then is one of emptying out capitalist structures, hollowing them out, by draining wealth, power, and meaning out of them until there is nothing left but shells. This is definitely an aggressive strategy. It requires great militancy, and constitutes an attack on the existing order. The strategy clearly recognizes that capitalism is the enemy and must be destroyed, but it is not a frontal attack aimed at overthrowing the system, but an inside attack aimed at gutting it, while simultaneously replacing it with something better, something we want. Thus capitalist structures (corporations, governments, banks, schools, etc.) are not seized so much as simply abandoned. Capitalist relations are not fought so much as they are simply rejected. We stop participating in activities that support (finance, condone) the capitalist world and start participating in activities that build a new world while simultaneously undermining the old. We create a new pattern of social relations alongside capitalist relations and then we continually build and strengthen our new pattern while doing every thing we can to weaken capitalist relations. In this way our new democratic, non-hierarchical, non-commodified relations can eventually overwhelm the capitalist relations and force them out of existence. This is how it has to be done. This is a plausible, realistic strategy. To think that we could create a whole new world of decent social arrangements overnight, in the midst of a crisis, during a so-called revolution, or during the collapse of capitalism, is foolhardy. Our new social world must grow within the old, and in opposition to it, until it is strong enough to dismantle and abolish capitalist relations. Such a revolution will never happen automatically, blindly, determinably, because of the inexorable, materialist laws of history. It will happen, and only happen, because we want it to, and because we know what we�re doing and know how we want to live, and know what obstacles have to be overcome before we can live that way, and know how to distinguish between our social patterns and theirs. But we must not think that the capitalist world can simply be ignored, in a live and let live attitude, while we try to build new lives elsewhere. (There is no elsewhere.) There is at least one thing, wage-slavery, that we can�t simply stop participating in (but even here there are ways we can chip away at it). Capitalism must be explicitly refused and replaced by something else. This constitutes War, but it is not a war in the traditional sense of armies and tanks, but a war fought on a daily basis, on the level of everyday life, by millions of people. It is a war nevertheless because the accumulators of capital will use coercion, brutality, and murder, as they have always done in the past, to try to block any rejection of the system. They have always had to force compliance; they will not hesitate to continue doing so. Nevertheless, there are many concrete ways that individuals, groups, and neighborhoods can gut capitalism, which I will enumerate shortly. We must always keep in mind how we became slaves; then we can see more clearly how we can cease being slaves. We were forced into wage-slavery because the ruling class slowly, systematically, and brutally destroyed our ability to live autonomously. By driving us off the land, changing the property laws, destroying community rights, destroying our tools, imposing taxes, destroying our local markets, and so forth, we were forced onto the labor market in order to survive, our only remaining option being to sell, for a wage, our ability to work. It�s quite clear then how we can overthrow slavery. We must reverse this process. We must begin to reacquire the ability to live without working for a wage or buying the products made by wage-slaves (that is, we must get free from the labor market and the way of living based on it), and embed ourselves instead in cooperative labor and cooperatively produced goods. Another clarification is needed. This strategy does not call for reforming capitalism, for changing capitalism into something else. It calls for replacing capitalism, totally, with a new civilization. This is an important distinction, because capitalism has proved impervious to reforms, as a system. We can sometimes in some places win certain concessions from it (usually only temporary ones) and win some (usually short-lived) improvements in our lives as its victims, but we cannot reform it piecemeal, as a system. Thus our strategy of gutting and eventually destroying capitalism requires at a minimum a totalizing image, an awareness that we are attacking an entire way of life and replacing it with another, and not merely reforming one way of life into something else. Many people may not be accustomed to thinking about entire systems and social orders, but everyone knows what a lifestyle is, or a way of life, and that is the way we should approach it. The thing is this: in order for capitalism to be destroyed millions and millions of people must be dissatisfied with their way of life. They must want something else and see certain existing things as obstacles to getting what they want. It is not useful to think of this as a new ideology. It is not merely a belief-system that is needed, like a religion, or like Marxism, or Anarchism. Rather it is a new prevailing vision, a dominant desire, an overriding need. What must exist is a pressing desire to live a certain way, and not to live another way. If this pressing desire were a desire to live free, to be autonomous, to live in democratically controlled communities, to participate in the self-regulating activities of a mature people, then capitalism could be destroyed. Otherwise we are doomed to perpetual slavery and possibly even to extinction. The content of this vision is actually not new at all, but quite old. The long term goal of communists, anarchists, and socialists has always been to restore community. Even the great peasant revolts of early capitalism sought to get free from external authorities and restore autonomy to villages. Marx defined communism once as a free association of producers, and at another time as a situation in which the free development of each is a condition for the free development of all. Anarchists have always called for worker and peasant self-managed cooperatives. The long term goals have always been clear: to abolish wage-slavery, to eradicate a social order organized solely around the accumulation of capital for its own sake, and to establish in its place a society of free people who democratically and cooperatively self-determine the shape of their social world.

# Case

#### Foregrounding of whiteness reinforces US exceptionalism, undermining solvency – their localization to intra-debate community issues is an exclamation mark

Carey 2009 (Jane Carey, Postcolonialism Researcher, Monach U, Leigh Boucher, School of Modern History & PLS, Marquarie U, and Katherine Ellinghaus (School of Hist Studies, Monach U), Re-Orienting Whiteness (B) 2009)

 (p3-4) Arneson was not alone, as the flurry of similarly dissatisfied reviews indicated." Although not as scathing, Peter Kolchin, for example, also expressed uneasiness at the "elusive, undefined nature of whiteness," the lack of "historical grounding" of many contemporary studies, and the "over-reliance on whiteness in explaining the American past." 2° In assigning such overarching explanatory power to whiteness, he suggested, the field is prone to overstatement and overgeneralization, coming close to "portraying race as a ubiquitous and unchanging transhistorical force rather than a shifting and contingent 'construction.'" 21 Kolchin also briefly observed that one of the "most striking features" of whiteness studies is the "assumption—sometimes asserted and sometimes unspoken—that the racism they describe is uniquely American and that American whiteness can be understood in isolation." 22 The most influential U.S. scholarship, particularly that by labor historians, locates the creation of white identity entirely within historical circumstances quite specific to the United States, namely black chattel slavery and, later, mass immigration. 23 While this narrow national focus has not emerged as a prominent concern within existing critiques of the field, we argue that it is in fact of central importance. Much historical work on whiteness is even more narrowly positioned. As John Munro has outlined, it largely represents another in the series of U.S. labor history projects that have sought to answer the question Werner Sombart posed in 1906, "Why is there no socialism in the United States?," and is primarily concerned with finding "a usable past upon which an anti-capitalist and antiracist future can be envisioned." 24 This in part explains why it has largely ignored wider scholarship that does not share these, very particular, interests, and why many objections to whiteness studies have simply joined the long history of attempts to assert the primacy of class over race. 25 Despite pretensions to an almost universal applicability, distinct U.S. academic debates, as well as specific political projects and disavowals (particularly of the settler-colonial underpinnings of the United States), silently orient the field. In many ways, debates about whiteness have primarily reflected a turf war over leadership in the field of labor history in the United States. The issues at stake are far too important to allow them to be subsumed within such parochial concerns.

#### Whiteness studies fail – US model focus – they aggravate the problem by trying to sidestep our literature bases

Jane Carey (Postcolonialism Researcher, Monach U), Leigh Boucher (School of Modern History & PLS, Marquarie U), and Katherine Ellinghaus (School of Hist Studies, Monach U), Re-Orienting Whiteness (B) 2009

(p2) This is not to say that this collection is united by an unfaltering commitment to whiteness studies. It is equally shaped by a uneasiness with the field tendencies toward ahistoricity, reification, and universalization; its ill-defined analytic vocabulary; and especially its potential simply to reinscribe white people at the center of historical narratives. And we are acutely aware that, since its emergence, the field has proven "a lightning rod for critics.' I licked, alongside its rapid growth, the apparently deserved death of the field has been simultaneously announced as the latest headstone in a graveyard of academic fads. 7 A key development that argues these dismissive predictions, however, is the degree to which the terms "white" and "whiteness" have already been adopted by historians, particularly those writing about European colonialism. These categories have recently been inserted alongside class, gender, and various "others."' This book functions in some ways simply to highlight the significance of this quite startling analytic uptake. But it also registers a profound discomfort with the ways that whiteness has snuck through the backdoor into the historian's toolkit, often with little definition or explanation. Its meanings are often taken for granted, as if they were self-evident. The nuanced, historically grounded, and theoretically broad-ranging approaches in this collection suggest a number of ways forward for scholars. As Matt Wray has recently observed, "whiteness studies has left childhood and is now enduring adolescence. It's having its identity crisis right on time." 9 The time is ripe for a major reassessment of the field. In approaching this task, we wish to foreground the limitations that have resulted from the U.S.-centered nature of most whiteness scholarship. This is clearly problematic for a field that makes broad, even universal, claims to explaining the operations of "race." Whiteness, obviously, has had far wider geographic purchase. We seek to decenter the United States in the area of whiteness studies, and in some ways to recognize that it was never central to begin with. So too, the isolationist tendencies of U.S. whiteness scholarship have produced its lack of engagement with work on race in other contexts, particularly the analytic frames that have emerged through attempts to theorize European colonialism. We contend that this nationally and theoretically limited approach represents in fact the major weakness of the field." In other words, whiteness needs to be reconciled with the major intellectual currents that have shaped research on race outside the United States.

#### Social Death is incorrect

Daniel E. Rossi-Keen ( Assistant Professor of Communication Studies at Stetson University in

DeLand, Florida) Review Essay: The Life-Giving Gift of Acknowledgment (A Philosophical and Rhetorical Inquiry). By Michael J. Hyde. West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press, 2006; pp.

xviii + 336. $34.95 paper. Rhetoric & Public Affairs, Volume 11, Number 4, Winter 2008,

pp. 659-677 (Review) – obtained via Project Muse

Emphasis on philosophy abounds in the first half of the book. This is especially so in Hyde's treatment of the relationship between acknowledgment and the origins of existence (chapter 2), his examination of the reciprocity of acknowledgment and conscience (chapter 3), his consideration of how acknowledgment transforms space and time into common dwelling places (chapter 4), his explanation of the generation of a "home" by way of such rhetorical acts of acknowledgment (chapter 5), and his suggestion that acknowledgment functions as a caress (chapters 6 and 7). Though certainly not lacking [End Page 664] philosophical depth, the remaining chapters of the text are a bit more readily accessible to the nonspecialist. Herein, Hyde explores the relationship between acknowledgment and teaching (chapter 8), social death (chapter 9), and computer mediated culture (chapter 10). The book closes with an examination of the rhetoric surrounding the terrorist attacks of 9/11 (chapter 11), explaining how the rhetor may function in society as a hero. In the process of weaving together such seemingly disparate cases, Hyde gestures toward numerous resources for considering the role of rhetoric in guiding, shaping, and challenging prevailing enactments of public life. In fact, one of the most exciting features of this book is that it lends itself to so many extensions and applications. Within this text exists a philosophy of rhetoric, an ethic of human action, an anthropology, a statement both of humankind's origin and of its telos, a critique of contemporary culture, and much more. For this reason, Hyde's writing defies either simple categorization or casual reading. And this is, I think, precisely the strength and intent of the text. The text itself acts as what Hyde (2001) labels a "rhetorical interruption" (77–78), a call to stop and reckon with the state of the world as we currently perceive it. As such, The Life-Giving Gift of Acknowledgment does not always proceed in traditional ways, and some readers may therefore find themselves wanting more careful treatments of themes raised throughout the text. The rhetorician, for example, may wish for a more focused, traditional, and systematic treatment of the relationship between rhetoric and acknowledgment. The philosopher might hope for a more sustained analysis of Heidegger and Levinas. The scientist may call for further examination of the role of acknowledgment in the origins of existence. The theologian may be somewhat disappointed by Hyde's suggestive employment of religious themes. And the student of public affairs may wish for a more explicit statement of the implications of Hyde's work for communal human existence. In one sense, each of these disciplinarians would be justified in wanting more from Hyde's text, for Hyde admittedly leaves much unsaid and unexplored. In another sense, however, it is precisely this kind of narrowness that The Life-Giving Gift of Acknowledgment sets out to avoid. What Hyde has produced is an interdisciplinary treatment of the role of acknowledgment in varied aspects of human existence, and he justifiably demands that the reader do much of his or her own work in expanding and applying this theoretical construct.

#### Racialized descriptions of society reinscribe same racial binaries- constitutes the subject around race

Hartigan 2005- prof of anthropology @ UT, PhD from University of California, Santa Cruz

(John, South Atlantic Quarterly 104.3, Summer, “Culture against Race: Reworking the Basis for Racial Analysis”)

These racial identities define the type of subjects that Visweswaran advocates bringing into view via ‘‘a conception of race which is socially dynamic but historically meaningful,’’ even though their objectification potentially risks contributing, unintentionally, to the current resurgence in sociobiological notions of race. Visweswaran’s approach brings race to the fore of critical analysis, but the problem is that it also risks reproducing racial thinking in much the way ‘‘culture’’ has been accused of perpetuating race. Herbert Lewis highlights the perils in efforts to articulate this broader sensibility concerning race.8 Where Visweswaran strives to reanimate the ‘‘richly connotative 19th century sense of ‘race,’ ’’ with its invocations of ‘‘blood’’ as a form of collectivity that encompasses ‘‘numerous elements that we would today call cultural,’’ Lewis cautions against a ‘‘return to the pre-Boasian conception that combines race, culture, language, nationality and nationality in one neat package’’ (980). And though the equation of racial identity with the forms of persecution and exploitation highlighted by Visweswaran is insightful, Lewis observes that, pursued further, this logic reactivates a concept that ‘‘indissolubly connects groups of people and their appearance with beliefs about their capacity and behavior’’ (ibid.).Given the criteria she lists, Lewis argues, ‘‘it follows presumably that we should recognize as ‘races’ all those who have suffered one or another form of ill-treatment. Certainly Jews would now return to the status of a ‘racial’ group (as the Nazis contended), as do Armenians, Gypsies (Rom), ‘Untouchables’ (Dalits) in India, East Timorese, Muslim and Croats in Bosnia and Serbs in Croatia, educated Cambodians in Pol Pot’s Cambodia, both Hutu and Tutsi in Rwanda and Burundi’’ (ibid.). Every similarly subjected group would be reinscribed and reidentified with the very terms used initially to distinguish them for exploitation and persecution. Dominguez’s concerns about culture’s propensity for ‘‘perpetuating the very terms—of hierarchies of differential values—that constitute the hegemony’’ seem equally relevant to this attempt to ensconce race at the forefront of critical social analysis. There follow interminable questions of subdividing and distinguishing such races. Visweswaran’s description of the processes that produce ‘‘Chicanos and Puerto Ricans as races’’ leads Lewis to ask, ‘‘Are these two different ‘races’ or one? Can rich, powerful, and selfassured Puerto Ricans belong to this ‘race’? Do Dominicans, Ecuadorians, and Cubans each get to be their own race, or can they all be in one race with Chicanos and Puerto Ricans because they all speak (or once spoke) Spanish? Can Spanish-speakers from Spain belong, too?’’ (980). The problem with formulating research in terms of race is that it becomes very difficult to proceed without reproducing various racialized logics that promote the notion that groups are essentially differentiated—experientially and in terms of innate capacities and dispositions—by race.9 This is a problem that Gilroy takes as a basis for his critique of ‘‘raciology,’’ which I will examine further below.

#### Totalizing critiques of whiteness commodify races- essentialisms ensure no alt solvency

Hartigan 2005- prof of anthropology @ UT, PhD from University of California, Santa Cruz

(John, South Atlantic Quarterly 104.3, Summer, “Culture against Race: Reworking the Basis for Racial Analysis”)

One might be tempted to assume that Gilroy’s stance is largely polemical, but his critique is thoroughgoing, as is his call to reject ‘‘this desire to cling on to ‘race’ and go on stubbornly and unimaginatively seeing the world on the distinctive scales that it has specified.’’ In spite of powerful, novel efforts to fundamentally transform racial analysis—such as the emergence of ‘‘whiteness studies’’ or analyses of the ‘‘new racism’’—Gilroy is emphatic in ‘‘demand[ing] liberation not from white supremacy alone, however urgently that is required, but from all racializing and raciological thought, fromracialized seeing, racialized thinking, and racialized thinking about thinking’’ (40). In contrast to Visweswaran—and, interestingly, voicing concerns over ‘‘cultural politics’’ that resonate with Dominguez’s critique—Gilroy sees a host of problems in ‘‘black political cultures’’ that rely on ‘‘essentialist approaches to building solidarity’’ (38).14 Nor does he share Harrison’s confidence in making racism the centerpiece of critical cultural analysis. Gilroy plainly asserts that ‘‘the starting point of this book is that the era of New Racism is emphatically over’’ (34). A singular focus on racism precludes an attention to ‘‘the appearance of sharp intraracial conflicts’’ and does not effectively address the ‘‘several new forms of determinism abroad’’ (38, 34). We still must be prepared ‘‘to give effective answers to the pathological problems represented by genomic racism, the glamour of sameness, and the eugenic projects currently nurtured by their confluence’’ (41). But the diffuse threats posed by invocations of racially essentialized identities (shimmering in ‘‘the glamour of sameness’’) as the basis for articulating ‘‘black political cultures’’ entails an analytical approach that countervails against positing racism as the singular focus of inquiry and critique.15 From Gilroy’s stance, to articulate a ‘‘postracial humanism’’ we must disable any form of racial vision and ensure that it can never again be reinvested with explanatory power. But what will take its place as a basis for talking about the dynamics of belonging and differentiation that profoundly shape social collectives today? Gilroy tries to make clear that it will not be ‘‘culture,’’ yet this concept infuses his efforts to articulate an alternative conceptual approach. Gilroy conveys many of the same reservations about culture articulated by the anthropologists listed above. Specifically, Gilroy cautions that ‘‘the culturalist approach still runs the risk of naturalizing and normalizing hatred and brutality by presenting them as inevitable consequences of illegitimate attempts to mix and amalgamate primordially incompatible groups’’ (27). In contrast, Gilroy expressly prefers the concept of diaspora as a means to ground a new form of attention to collective identities. ‘‘As an alternative to the metaphysics of ‘race,’ nation, and bounded culture coded into the body,’’ Gilroy finds that ‘‘diaspora is a concept that problematizes the cultural and historical mechanics of belonging’’ (123). Furthermore, ‘‘by focusing attention equally on the sameness within differentiation and the differentiation within sameness, diaspora disturbs the suggestion that political and cultural identity might be understood via the analogy of indistinguishable peas lodged in the protective pods of closed kinship and subspecies’’ (125). And yet, in a manner similar to Harrison’s prioritizing of racism as a central concern for social inquiry, when it comes to specifying what diaspora entails and how it works, vestiges of culture reemerge as a basis for the coherence of this new conceptual focus. When Gilroy delineates the elements and dimensions of diaspora, culture provides the basic conceptual background and terminology. In characterizing ‘‘the Atlantic diaspora and its successor-cultures,’’ Gilroy sequentially invokes ‘‘black cultural styles’’ and ‘‘postslave cultures’’ that have ‘‘supplied a platform for youth cultures, popular cultures, and styles of dissent far from their place of origin’’ (178). Gilroy explains how the ‘‘cultural expressions’’ of hip-hop and rap, along with other expressive forms of ‘‘black popular culture,’’ are marketed by the ‘‘cultural industries’’ to white consumers who ‘‘currently support this black culture’’ (181). Granted, in these uses of ‘‘culture’’ Gilroy remains critical of ‘‘absolutist definitions of culture’’ and the process of commodification that culture in turn supports. But his move away from race importantly hinges upon some notion of culture. We may be able to do away with race, but seemingly not with culture.

#### Whiteness cant be the root cause- history of other races justifying violence based on racialization

Spickard 2009 Paul Spickard, Graduated Harvard, Ph.D in History from UC Berkeley, professor of history at UC Santa Barbara, review of “Amalgamation Schemes: Antiblackness and the Critique of Multiracialism”, in American Studies, vol 5 num 1/2, MUSE

For Sexton (as for the Spencers and Gordon) race is about Blackness, in the United States and around the world. That is silly, for there are other racialized relationships. In the U.S., native peoples were racialized by European intruders in all the ways that Africans were, and more: they were nearly extinguished. To take just one example from many around the world, Han Chinese have racialized Tibetans historically in all the ways (including slavery) that Whites have racialized Blacks and Indians in the United States. So there is a problem with Sexton's concept of race as Blackness. There is also a problem with his insistence on monoraciality. For Sexton and the others, one cannot be mixed or multiple; one must choose ever and only to be Black. I don't have a problem with that as a political choice, but to insist that it is the only possibility flies in the face of a great deal of human experience, and it ignores the history of how modern racial ideas emerged. Sexton does point out, as do many writers, the flawed tendencies in multiracial advocacy mentioned in the second paragraph above. But he imputes them to the whole movement and to the subject of study, and that is not a fair assessment.

#### Don’t let them get away with playing the “all your evidence is a product of racism” card – you should hold their arguments to rigorous logical standards and not simply dismiss our evidence as ‘just another link’

John McWhorter (Senior Fellow at the Manhattan Institute, Associate Professor of Linguistics at UC Berkeley after teaching at Cornell University) 2000 “Losing the Race: Self-Sabotage in Black America” p. 54-5

As the spawn of Victimology, Separatism shares with its progenitor a tendency to be allowed to trump truth in cases that require choosing between them. In this vein, a considerable amount of black academic work downplays logical argument and factual evidence in the service of filling in an idealized vision of the black past and present, which is founded not upon intellectual curiosity but upon raising in-group self-esteem. Mother Egypt “Afrocentric History,” for example, is primarily founded upon a fragile assemblage of misreadings of classical texts to construct a scenario under which Ancient Egypt was a “black” civilization (was Anwar Sadat a “brother”?), raped by the Ancient Greeks, who therefore owed all notable in their culture to them. Professional classicists easily point out the errors in these claims, only to have their proponents dismiss them as “racists” for having even questioned them, neglecting in the process to provide actual answers. Indeed, to insist upon facts – or apparently, to master the complex classical languages in which the original documents were written – is “inauthentic.” The goal here is not to weigh evidence carefully in order to unearth the truth, but to construct interpretations of evidence that bolster a pre-conceived “truth,” like “creation scientists” whose objectivity is decisively crippled by a fundamental conviction that God must be the driver of the universe. Uninterested in any information inapplicable to the construction of the Afrocentric myth and closed to constructive engagement, these people may be many wonderful things, but one thing they are not is scholars. Yet they are respectfully addressed as “professor” by gullible students, and one eminent black undergraduate profiled in Ebony cited a volume of this kind of history as the most important book she had read that year. Ideally, an afrocentric academia is conceivable in which people simply apply the tools of the mainstream academia to illuminating black concerns. This is the vision most defenses of Afrocentric work are based on. However, in practice, the centrality of victimhood in the black cultural identity subverts this ideal. All too often, black scholarship is devoted not to general scholarly inquiry about black people, but a subset of this: Chronicling black victimhood past and present, and to remedy that victimhood, celebration and legitimization of black people past and present. Because black people are no more perfect than anyone else and life past and present is complex, this abridged conception of academic inquiry inherently conflicts with the commitment to mainstream academia to striving for assessment as unbiased as possible. In this conflict between victimology and truth, Victimology is naturally allowed the upper hand. The result is a sovereign entity where the outward forms of academia – articles, books, conferences, symposia – are harnessed to a local set of rules: a Separatist conception of academia. In “black” academia, as often as not, comment is preferred over question, folk wisdom is often allowed to trump rigorous argumentation, and sociopolitical intent is weighted more heavily than the empirical soundness of ones conclusions. There are certainly quite a few excellent black scholars, but overall, Separatist academic standards are pervasive enough to make black conferences quite often perceptibly less rigorous than mainstream ones. Many mainstream scholars would be, or have been, surprised at the sparseness of serious, constructive debate at may black conferences, unaware that because of the grips of victimology and separatism, this kind of debate would be superfluous to the proceedings, and even unwelcome. After four decades, many black academics have spent their entire careers in this alternate realm, and as such, have never been required to assess the full range of facts applying to a case, to construct rigorous arguments, or to address anything but the very politest and most superficial of criticism. Here is the beginnings of the notions at the center of “Afrocentric History” such as that Cleopatra was “black,” that Aristotle stole books from an Egyptian library that wasn’t even built until twenty-five years after he died, etc. Moderate black academics are more likely to say of the most egregious Afrocentric work that “more work needs to be done” than to actually pin it as nonsense, which makes complete sense when we realize that the fundamental commitment of much black academic work is not assessment of facts and testing of theories, but chronicling victimhood and reinforcing community self-esteem

#### Their cooption arguments are unsupported and nonfalsifiable – don’t buy their rhetorically powerful cards – force them to provide specific applications of their abstract evidence. Allowing them to get away with vague, jargon laden cards about race results in the same poor scholarship they criticize

John McWhorter (Senior Fellow at the Manhattan Institute, Associate Professor of Linguistics at UC Berkeley after teaching at Cornell University) 2000 “Losing the Race: Self-Sabotage in Black America” p. 55-8

This problem is by no means limited just to the collection of people committed to “afrocentric history”’ it is seldom far from the surface in any scholarly setting in the realm of “blackademia.” As a conference on black performance in 1999, a black scholar from England argued that whites’ tendency to adopt black American popular cultural forms is evidence not of an identification with black people, nor of a desire for cross-cultural harmony or understanding, but of a desire to eliminate the black presence via co-opting what makes them unique. Interesting idea, but hardly as obvious or incontrovertible as the operations of gravity. Does the white teen who like Snoop Doggy Dogg want to eliminate niggers, or does he simply like the beat and vibrate in tune with the antiestablishment attitude that has enthralled young Westerners since Goethe’s Young Werther? Did whites stir the blues and jazz into their marches and jigs to create rock music because they were racists, or because blues and jazz are among the most sublimely intoxicating aesthetic creations humanity has ever known Here in the Bay Area, I have noticed that white females of ages roughly ten to fourteen are fond of imitating black women’s “sassy” “uh-UHH!...” accompanied by the pushing forward of an admonishing second finger pointing upwards, and waved back and forth in opposition to corresponding “sassy swivel” neck movements (tough to describe on paper – thing of Aretha Franklin in The Blues Brothers). Perhaps I lack some exotic brand of insight, but I simply do not see sublimated hate in these girls – on the contrary, they are expressing a joyous admiration of black women’s trademark strength; it’s the melting pot in all of its glory. Similarly, among the white male high schoolers and undergraduates I see who perform hip-hop, imitating “ghetto” gestures and intonation as closely as they can, what I see is a sincere admiration of a massively compelling art form. A lot of these kids will even say “sometimes I wish I was black” – and I do not think that what they wish is that they could become black while real black people disappeared; what they wish – regardless of the fact that this would of course be more complicated than a fantasy dwells upon – is to join black people. Some might disagree with me, but just as many would not, and the point is that there are obviously issues to be discussed here. Yet the scholar at this conference simply put forth his declaration that this kind of imitation masks racist hatred without a shred of support. To be sure, his point was rendered especially seductive by the densely elegant jargon in which academics in the humanities are trained to couch their thoughts. Furthermore, this was all delivered in a gorgeous Oxonian accent which, in all of its calfskin suave, also betrayed that he is extremely unlikely to have experience nay of the particular slings and arrows of a black American inner-city, or even middle-class, life. In general, there was not a hint of anything but Sir Alec Guinness in his demeanor, and thus his statement cannot be informed by any personal discomfort with seeing “his” culture “co-opted.” Indeed, put aside his references to “mimesis” and “negation,” and all this guy was saying was “the only reason they imitate us is because they hate us.” Preface this statement with “Yo,” and its content remains exactly the same. Yet if “imitation is the sincerest form of flattery” has any value as a general aphorism, his was in essence an extremely underargued thesis. Mainstream conferences are devoted not to tossing out colorful accusations, but to sifting and evaluating the idea proposed by the participants. Yet despite this man’s having presented no evidence or argument whatsoever to support his claim, he was heartily applauded several times, and was one of the hits of the conference – he could barely get out of the auditorium for coffee, so besieged was he by people lauding him for telling it like it is. (No, I was not jealou – I was just attending the conference, not speaking at it!) Because this was a black conference, making an argument was less important than reaffirming common wisdom, and to hear common wisdome dressed up in arcane words and an Alistair Cooke accent is even better, in lending it the air of scholarly authority. The substance of scholarly authority, however, was a distinctly lesser concern. What was significant about this was that for anyone to ask this man to supply evidence for this point would have been as shockingly inappropriate as pullout a tuba and blowing on it. His point was simply assumed to be true, or at least, by the more exploratorily inclined, “a valid point of view.” But what this meant was that this was not a forum devoted to the presenting findings or evaluating conflicting interpretations of data or events – i.e., properly speaking it was not an academic exercise at all. It was a rally, designed to reinforced the emotionally based sentiments the audience and participants came in with. After all, even if the man was right, mainstream academia is not inclined to convene conferences with the purpose of proclaiming what is already known. Political science conferences do not feature various speakers presenting nimble variations upon the point that “war is bad”’ biologists do not convene to urgently remind one another that all forms of life are based on DNA. The Separatist current makes this kind of thing seem natural to conveners of many black conferences, out of a sense that actual academic debate is somehow “besides the point” for Africna Americans since our status as eternal victims make our regularly proclaiming this, as it would be for villagers in Chechnya, a more pressing concern. And make no mistake – the same priorities reign even without plumy accents and Judith Butler jargon. I once attended a conference where a black woman gave a paper taking issue with an article which, by her reading, denied that black female speech had any unique patterns. After criticizing the author, with the unspoken implication that this writer was one ore oppressor trying to deny black people their identity, the professor presented a few features of black female speech. In the question session afterwards, a white woman very politely pointed out that the author of the article in question was quite aware of the uniqueness and richness of black female speech, and that the professor’s interpretation was based on a misreading of the author’s phrasing. Ordinarily in academia, the presenter would defend herself by making specific reference to the article and its argumentation. Here, however, was a conflict between the tenets of mainstream academia and the very different ones in black academia. The professor’s sole answer was, “well, I read it as denying the uniqueness of black female speech, and that was my interpretation.” Period. It did not appear to even occur to her that an actual address of the issue might be germane. Unlike mainstream academics who come to a conference prepared to field criticism during question sessions, she considered herself to have done her job simply by presenting the list of black female speech traits – and at a black conference, she had. Indeed, her presentation was constructed not as a reasoned demonstration but as a backyard “calling-out” of the author in the name of injured pride. She opened by reading a passage form the author’s paper and then repeating it in a challenging intonation of mock disbelief, with friends in the audience assigned to shout back the phrase in the same tone of voice to evoke the black church’s call-and-response tradition; she then did this with two more phrases. This was cute, but couching an academic paper as a prelude to a ghetto catfight renders one’s presentation inherently immune to constructive discussion. To criticize it in any way, even politely, is to question not the lines of argument, but an expression of cultural identity – and thus the person themselves. Indeed, the professor’s set jaw at being questioned made it painfully clear that any further dwelling upon the point would be processed as a slight against her and her race, and the questioner has hip enough to intuit the conflict in traditions here and dutifully sit down.

#### Methodological criticisms of our evidence base on the institutionalized nature of race does not warrant simply ignoring it -

Martyn Hammersley (Prof. Education and Social Research @ Centre for Childhood, Development and Learning) 1993, British Journal of Sociology, “Research and 'anti-racism': the case of Peter Foster and his critics,” 44.3, 11-93, JSTOR]

Various sorts of criticism have been directed at the validity of Foster's work. Some is substantive in character, in other words it consists of a questioning of his claims on the basis of appeals to what is taken to be well-known from other sources. For example, critics sometimes rely on the findings of other research to throw doubt on the validity of Foster's conclusions. Thus, Connolly comments that the fact that Foster's findings challenge he growing" perceived wisdom" of a number of research and theoretical perspectives developed since the mid 1980s (. . .) raises numerous important issues concerning the study's political, ethical and theoretical orientation and, consequently, the research methods used.6 Accompanying these substantive criticisms, very often, are methodological criticisms: these question the inferences that Foster draws on the basis of his own or others' data. For instance, both Connolly and Gillborn and Drew challenge Foster's claim that there was little evidence of racism on the part of the teachers in the school he studied, on the grounds that he took insufficient account of black students' views.7 They argue that he explains away the unsolicited complaints of teacher racism voiced by three of the students he interviewed by treating these as products of a general anti-school attitude. The critics also argue that the fact that so few of the students reported the existence of teacher racism resulted from the influence on them of Foster's own status as a white middle class male whom they identified with the teachers. Another methodological criticism that has been made of Foster's study is that the school he investigated was atypical and therefore does not constitute a sound basis for generalisation to other schools.8 Interestingly, these methodological criticisms parallel in character, if not in force, those that Foster himself makes of other studies; indeed, of many of the studies on which his critics rely in their substantive criticisms. And he, and others, have responded to the attacks of the critics with further methodological arguments.9 What we have here, then, is a body of substantive and methodological arguments which are interpreted in conflicting ways by Foster and his critics. One response to this situation might be to call for further research designed to resolve the disagreement. I would not want to discourage this, but I doubt whether it would succeed. It seems to me that the roots of the disagreement lie more deeply than these substantive and methodological criticisms themselves. We get an inkling of this from the fact that Foster's critics sometimes combine such criticisms with what I will call meta-methodological arguments. These concerned effects in what they take to be the presuppositions n the basis of which Foster approached his own data and that of others. The clearest published example of such criticism is provided by Connolly. He argues that, as a result of his adoption of a Weberian orientation, Foster was unable to recognise the racism that was taking place 'under his nose' (p. 142) in the school he studied. Connolly sees Foster's work in terms of a deterministic model of research in which the findings are constrained by his starting assumptions, in such a way as to rule out the detection of many forms of racism. Gillborn and Drew hint at the same point, criticizing Foster's definition of racism as too narrow. l l In part, what seems to be implied in these arguments is that the evidence which Foster offers in his study, and his questioning of the findings of other studies, must be rejected because they are incompatible with the widely accepted theory that racism is institutionalized in British society, that it is part of the fundamental structure of that society on this basis his critics argue that while discrimination may not seem to be occurring in some particular setting, once we view this setting in the context of British (or English) society as a whole it will be seen to form part of a larger pattern of racism. So, here Foster's claims are being questioned on the grounds of his presumed commitment to an inadequate methodological framework, one which gives a misleading priority of micro-empirical evidence at the expense of macro-theoretical perspective. This can be summarised as the charged that Foster's work is empiricist1.2 And, of course this argument connects with much discussion of the methodology of qualitative research today, in which the empiricism of quantitative research, and of some qualitative work, is challenged on the basis of alternative epistemological ssumptions.l3 What is being rejected here can be more usefully (because more specifically) referred to as a foundationalist epistemology. This is the notion that research conclusions are founded, in some rigorously determinate fashion, on a body of evidence whose own validity is beyond question (for example, because it consists of reports of intersubjectively observable behaviour). Thus, Troyna criticizes Foster for 'methodological purism', which he interprets as requiring evidence that rules out all possible alternative interpretations.l4 Foundationalism has, of course, been subjected to very damaging criticism in philosophy, as well as in the social sciences, over the past 30 or 40 years, and I think it is clear that it is not defensible. There is no single, agreed alternative to foundationalism, but we can identify three radical alternatives that have become increasingly influential in social research in recent years; and whose influence is detectable in the writings of some of Foster's critics. These alternatives are: relativism, standpoint theory, and instrumentalism. These are not always clearly distinguished, and they are sometimes used in combination. However, I will try to show that none of them is very satisfactory. Applying relativism to the case under discussion, it would be argued that the validity of Foster's appeal to the canons of good research is relative to a particular methodological framework, namely positivism or post-positivism and that other frameworks would produce different conclusions. We may, for instance, decide to treat the claims of some black pupils that they and others have been subjected to racist treatment by teachers as necessarily true in their own terms, as reflecting their experience and the framework of assumptions that constitute it, that framework being incommensurable with the one adopted by Foster. Something like this may underlie Connolly's question: 'how can Foster as a White middle class male construct his own definition of racism to then use to judge the accuracy of Black working class students definitions?"5If treated as valid, this argument has the effect of apparently undercutting Foster's empirical research in the sense that it need no longer be treated by others as representing reality. Yet, at the same time, from this point of view Foster's arguments remain valid in their own terms; in fact, they remain as valid as those of his critics. This seems to lead to a sort of stalemate. And, of course, there is the problem that relativism is self-undermining: if it is true, then in its own terms it can only be true relative to a relativist framework; so that from other points of view it remains false.'6 As a non-relativist, this leaves Foster free to claim quite legitimately( even from the point of view of relativism) that his views represent reality, whereas a relativist critic could not make the same claim for her or his views but must treat them simply as representing a particular framework of beliefs to which he or she happens to be committed. The second view I want to consider is sometimes associated with versions of the first, but must be kept separate because it involves a quite distinctive and incompatible element. I will refer to this as standpoint theory. Here people's experience and knowledge is treated as valid or invalid by dint of their membership in some social category.'7 Here again Foster's arguments may be dismissed because they reflect his background and experience as a white, middle class, male teacher. However, this time the implication is that reality is obscured from those with this background because of the effects of ideology. By contrast, it is suggested, the oppressed (black, female and/or working class people) have privileged insight into the nature of society. This argument produces a victory for one side, not the stalemate that seems to result from relativism; the validity of Foster's views can therefore be dismissed. But in other respects this position is no more satisfactory than relativism. We must ask on what grounds we can decide that one group has superior insight into reality. This cannot be simply because they declare that they have this insight; otherwise everyone could make the same claim with the same legitimacy (we would be back to relativism). This means that some other form of ultimate justification is involved, but what could this be? In the Marxist version of this argument the working class (or, in practice, the Communist Party) are the group with privileged insight into the nature of social reality, but it is Marx and Marxist theorists who confer this privilege on them by means of a dubious philosophy of history.l8 Something similar occurs in the case of feminist standpoint theory, where the feminist theorist ascribes privileged insight to women, or to feminists engaged in the struggle for women’s emancipation. l9 However, while we must recognise that people in different social locations may have divergent perspectives, giving them distinctive insights, it is not clear why we should believe the implausible claim that some people have privileged access to knowledge while others are blinded by ideology.20

#### Our evidence should be preferred over their propaganda tactics – you should not ignore or reject our evidence because it doesn’t directly address institutionalized racism

Martyn Hammersley (Prof. Education and Social Research @ Centre for Childhood, Development and Learning) 1993, British Journal of Sociology, “Research and 'anti-racism': the case of Peter Foster and his critics,” 44.3, 11-93, JSTOR]

This is not to say that practitioners, such as 'anti-racist' educators, should simply ignore the findings of research. The point is rather that they should judge those findings in relation to their own practical knowledge and according to what is required to pursue their work well. On this basis it might be quite reasonable for 'anti-racists to continue with their campaign against racism among teachers despite the doubts that Foster has raised; though they would be foolish to completely ignore those doubts. All this said, the criticisms of Foster's work do not seem to derive primarily from such practical judgments about his findings. Many of them seem more motivated by a concern with its possible propaganda consequences: not only can Foster's work not be used to support the 'anti-racist' campaign against teacher racism, it could be used by the other side. Indeed, it seems to be suspected by some of the critics that Foster is working for the opposition. The key question, for some at least, is 'whose side are we on?'.44 I do not doubt that propaganda considerations are necessary ones for practitioners engaged in political activity to take into account. While in an ideal world, perhaps, disputes would be resolved on the basis of discussion in pursuit of the truth, it is clear I think that the world we live in is very far from that ideal. However, great danger arises if propaganda concerns come to outweigh other practical concerns. In these circumstances, practical activity is likely to fail because erroneous assumptions accumulate; and its failure may do widespread damage. It would be a mistake, then, it seems to me, for 'anti-racists to dismiss Foster's work. To the extent that it throws doubt on the accuracy of some of the assumptions on which they operate, they ought to consider its validity seriously and not simply ignore, reject or even try to suppress it.45I t may point to a necessary reconstruction of 'anti-racism' This might be required if it were true that racism on the part of British teachers was not widespread or that it did not play a significant role in the generation of 'racial' inequality. Accepting this would not involve a denial that there may be features of the British education system and society that generate the under achievement of black pupils. Indeed, Foster himself suggests one mechanism for this: the allocation of black pupils to schools that are less effective educationally.46Of course, there still remains the question of what level or sort of evidence should persuade 'anti-racists' that Foster is right. I do not want to speculate about this here, merely to point out that there should be some level of confirming evidence at which 'anti-racists' would accept this argument. And even if Foster does not provide that level of evidence, his work could be accepted by them as making a potential contribution to increasing the effectiveness of their activities.47I n my view these considerations should outweigh any negative propaganda effects that Foster's work is likely to have. After all, racists have seldom found it difficult to invent arguments and evidence to support their position, and have generally shown scant regard for the difference between such inventions and more soundly based scientific conclusions. I want to conclude by going even further than this and suggesting that 'anti-racists' are unwise to reject the conventional model of research in favour of an activist conception. One reason for this is that the propaganda capacity of research is to a large extent parasitic upon the conventional model. Once research becomes seen as geared to the pursuit of particular political goals, with research results being selected, even in part, according to their suitability for propaganda purposes, its propaganda value is gone.

#### The argument that their claims are constructed to protect normative legal that are false – this is a non-falsifiable conspiracy – their paranoid mode of though makes effective politics impossible.

Daniel Farber (PhD University of Michigan) and Suzanna Sherry (JD Constitutional Law Vanderbilt University). Beyond All Reason: A radical Assault on Truth in American Law. 1997. P. 166-7.

Radical multiculturalists tend to take a similar posture with respect to outsiders. Either the criticism is another effort by members of the dominant group to maintain their status and power, or it is pandering by members of the oppressed group to the power structure. Even outsiders who purport to be sympathetic to the radical multiculturalists position may be viewed with suspicion – they may be co-opting the radical potential of the movement. Indeed, once you take the position that truth and merit are masks for the exercise of power, there really isn’t any way to consider an argument expect as an attempted exercise of power. So the natural response is not to ask whether the argument is valid, but instead to look for the right tactical response to the hostile move. In addition, it becomes almost impossible to conceive of friendly criticism; to admit that the critic is honestly motivated by a concern about the truth of your own position would be to concede that “truth” is something other than a mask for power. If truth and merit do not exist, concerns about the truth or merit of work by multiculturalists can only be yet another power play. Moreover, as we have already discussed, radical multiculturalists like paranoids, can explain away any seemingly adverse evidence, because they know in advance that it cannot be valid. The paranoid knows that there is a conspiracy against him, and if there is evidence to the contrary, that only proves the power and deviousness of the conspiracy. Similarly, the radical multiculturalists can always deconstruct any apparently contrary evidence. The research agenda, after all, is not to test whether society is irredeemably racist and sexist but to uncover precisely how society is shaped by racism and sexism. Counter-evidence only increases the challenge. The paranoid mode of thought is a threat to efforts at dialogue between radical multiculturalists and others. Combined with the self-sealing nature of social constructionism and its reliance on stockries of oppression, it makes genuine intellectual engagement with outsiders difficult. Nevertheless, as we discuss in our “Conclusion,” prospects are not utterly hopeless. Something constructive may yet emerge from the clash between the radical multiculturalists and the mainstream.

#### We are rational human subjects - Knowledge is objective – we can use our understanding of our shared reality to make decisions – MAKE THEM PROVE WE ARE WRONG.

Daniel Farber (PhD University of Michigan) and Suzanna Sherry (JD Constitutional Law Vanderbilt University). Beyond All Reason: A radical Assault on Truth in American Law. 1997. P. 27

At least since the Enlightenment, knowledge has been thought of as universally accessible and objective. Something counts as knowledge of because of its pedigree but because of its content. That the Pope or the president or the New York Times says it does not insulate it from challenge. Moreover, you and I can know the same thing. We can convey that knowledge to others, and we can be persuaded through reason to reassess what we know. Some things even count as -common knowledge." Objectivity is a tricky concept. (Ask any philosopher.) In using the term objective knowledge, we have in mind something more modest :han eternal, unchanging truth, or what philosophers sometimes call the God's-eye view of the universe. Knowledge as understood at any riven time is not necessarily the same as ultimate truth. We someimes think we "know" things that seem well-established but turn out not to be true, as when everyone knew that the sun revolved around the earth, or that chocolate caused hyperactivity in children. These things have since been disproved, and we now have knowledge of—or at least a very well-justified belief in—their converses. Knowledge is nevertheless objective in the sense that it reflects something bevond fiat or a parochial viewpoint. We would, for instance, tend to discount an unsupported statement by the chocolate industry denying any relationship between chocolate and hyperactivity. This is because we generally believe that there are independent standards for evaluating claims to knowledge and for mounting challenges to established knowledge. Moreover, these standards are crucial to our common vision of knowledge as both objective and subject to change. What keeps knowledge from being stagnant is its universal vulnerability to challenge. Objectivity is the aspiration to eliminate beliefs based on bias, personal idiosyncracy, fiat, or careless investigation.

### Greatest Hits Vol. 1

#### Human life is inherently valuable

Penner 2005 Melinda Penner (Director of Operations – STR, Stand To Reason) 2005 “End of Life Ethics: A Primer”, Stand to Reason, http://www.str.org/site/News2?page=NewsArticle&id=5223

Intrinsic value is very different. Things with intrinsic value are valued for their own sake. They don’t have to achieve any other goal to be valuable. They are goods in themselves. Beauty, pleasure, and virtue are likely examples. Family and friendship are examples. Something that’s intrinsically valuable might also be instrumentally valuable, but even if it loses its instrumental value, its intrinsic value remains. Intrinsic value is what people mean when they use the phrase "the sanctity of life." Now when someone argues that someone doesn’t have "quality of life" they are arguing that life is only valuable as long as it obtains something else with quality, and when it can’t accomplish this, it’s not worth anything anymore. It's only instrumentally valuable. The problem with this view is that it is entirely subjective and changeable with regards to what might give value to life. Value becomes a completely personal matter, and, as we all know, our personal interests change over time. There is no grounding for objective human value and human rights if it’s not intrinsic value. Our legal system is built on the notion that humans have intrinsic value. The Declaration of Independence: "We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that each person is endowed by his Creator with certain unalienable rights...." If human beings only have instrumental value, then slavery can be justified because there is nothing objectively valuable that requires our respect. There is nothing other than intrinsic value that can ground the unalienable equal rights we recognize because there is nothing about all human beings that is universal and equal. Intrinsic human value is what binds our social contract of rights. So if human life is intrinsically valuable, then it remains valuable even when our capacities are limited. Human life is valuable even with tremendous limitations. Human life remains valuable because its value is not derived from being able to talk, or walk, or feed yourself, or even reason at a certain level. Human beings don’t have value only in virtue of states of being (e.g., happiness) they can experience. The "quality of life" view is a poison pill because once we swallow it, we’re led down a logical slippery slope. The exact same principle can be used to take the life of human beings in all kinds of limited conditions because I wouldn't want to live that way. Would you want to live the life of a baby with Down’s Syndrome? No? Then kill her. Would you want to live the life of an infant with cerebral palsy? No? Then kill him. Would you want to live the life of a baby born with a cleft lip? No? Then kill her. (In fact, they did.) Once we accept this principle, it justifies killing every infant born with a condition that we deem a life we don’t want to live. There’s no reason not to kill every handicapped person who can’t speak for himself — because I wouldn’t want to live that way. This, in fact, is what has happened in Holland with the Groningen Protocol. Dutch doctors euthanize severely ill newborns and their society has accepted it.

#### No root cause of war – decades of research votes aff

Cashman 2000 Greg Cashman (Professor of Political Science at Salisbury State University) 2000 “What Causes war?: An introduction to theories of international conflict” pg. 9

Two warnings need to be issued at this point. First, while we have been using a single variable explanation of war merely for the sake of simplicity, multivariate explanations of war are likely to be much more powerful. Since social and political behaviors are extremely complex, they are almost never explainable through a single factor. Decades of research have led most analysts to reject monocausal explanations of war. For instance, international relations theorist J. David Singer suggests that we ought to move away from the concept of “causality” since it has become associated with the search for a single cause of war; we should instead redirect our activities toward discovering “explanations”—a term that implies multiple causes of war, but also a certain element of randomness or chance in their occurrence.

#### Util good- Calculation is good and doesn’t devalue life

Revesz 2008 Richard L. Revesz (Dean and Lawrence King Professor of Law at New York University School of Law, JD Yale Law School) and Michael A Livermore. (JD NYU School of Law, Executive Director of the Institute for Policy Integrity, and Managing director of the NYU Law Review). Retaking Rationality How Cots-Benefit Analysis Can Better protect the Environment and Our Health. 2008. P. 1-4.

Governmental decisions are also fundamentally different from personal decisions in that they often affect people in the aggregate. In our individual lives, we come into contact with at least some of the consequences of our decisions. If we fail to consult a map, we pay the price: losing valuable time driving around in circles and listening to the complaints of our passengers. We are constantly confronted with the consequences of the choices that we have made. Not so for governments, however, which exercise authority by making decisions at a distance. Perhaps one of the most challenging aspects of governmental decisions is that they require a special kind of compassion—one that can seem, at first glance, cold and calculating, the antithesis of empathy. The aggregate and complex nature of governmental decisions does not address people as human beings, with concerns and interests, families and emotional relationships, secrets and sorrows. Rather, people are numbers stacked in a column or points on a graph, described not through their individual stories of triumph and despair, but by equations, functions, and dose-response curves. The language of governmental decisionmaking can seem to—and to a certain extent does—ignore what makes individuals unique and morally important. But, although the language of bureaucratic decisionmaking can be dehumanizing, it is also a prerequisite for the kind of compassion that is needed in contemporary society. Elaine Scarry has developed a comparison between individual compassion and statistical compassion.' Individual compassion is familiar—when we see a person suffering, or hear the story of some terrible tragedy, we are moved to take action. Statistical compassion seems foreign—we hear only a string of numbers but must comprehend "the concrete realities embedded there."' Individual compassion derives from our social nature, and may be hardwired directly into the human brain.' Statistical compassion calls on us to use our higher reasoning power to extend our natural compassion to the task of solving more abstract—but no less real—problems. Because compassion is not just about making us feel better—which we could do as easily by forgetting about a problem as by addressing it—we have a responsibility to make the best decisions that we can. This book argues that cost-benefit analysis, properly conducted, can improve environmental and public health policy. Cost-benefit analysis—the translation of human lives and acres of forest into the language of dollars and cents—can seem harsh and impersonal. But such an approach is also necessary to improve the quality of decisions that regulators make. Saving the most lives, and best protecting the quality of our environment and our health—in short, exercising our compassion most effectively—requires us to step back and use our best analytic tools. Sometimes, in order to save a life, we need to treat a person like a number. This is the challenge of statistical compassion. This book is about making good decisions. It focuses on the area of environmental, health and safety regulation. These regulations have been the source of numerous and hard-fought controversies over the past several decades, particularly at the federal level. Reaching the right decisions in the areas of environmental protection, increasing safety, and improving public health is clearly of high importance. Although it is admirable (and fashionable) for people to buy green or avoid products made in sweatshops, efforts taken at the individual level are not enough to address the pressing problems we face—there is a vital role for government in tackling these issues, and sound collective decisions concerning regulation are needed. There is a temptation to rely on gut-level decisionmaking in order to avoid economic analysis, which, to many, is a foreign language on top of seeming cold and unsympathetic. For government to make good decisions, however, it cannot abandon reasoned analysis. Because of the complex nature of governmental decisions, we have no choice but to deploy complex analytic tools in order to make the best choices possible. Failing to use these tools, which amounts to abandoning our duties to one another, is not a legitimate response. Rather, we must exercise statistical compassion by recognizing what numbers of lives saved represent: living and breathing human beings, unique, with rich inner lives and an interlocking web of emotional relationships. The acres of a forest can be tallied up in a chart, but that should not blind us to the beauty of a single stand of trees. We need to use complex tools to make good decisions while simultaneously remembering that we are not engaging in abstract exercises, but that we are having real effects on people and the environment. In our personal lives, it would be unwise not to shop around for the best price when making a major purchase, or to fail to think through our options when making a major life decision. It is equally foolish for government to fail to fully examine alternative policies when making regulatory decisions with life-or-death consequences. This reality has been recognized by four successive presidential administrations. Since 1981, the cost-benefit analysis of major regulations has been required by presidential order. Over the past twenty-five years, however, environmental and other progressive groups have declined to participate in the key governmental proceedings concerning the cost-benefit analysis of federal regulations, instead preferring to criticize the technique from the outside. The resulting asymmetry in political participation has had profound negative consequences, both for the state of federal regulation and for the technique of cost-benefit analysis itself. Ironically, this state of affairs has left progressives open to the charge of rejecting reason, when in fact strong environmental and public health pro-grams are often justified by cost-benefit analysis. It is time for progressive groups, as well as ordinary citizens, to retake the high ground by embracing and reforming cost-benefit analysis. The difference between being unthinking—failing to use the best tools to analyze policy—and unfeeling—making decisions without compassion—is unimportant: Both lead to bad policy. Calamities can result from the failure to use either emotion or reason. Our emotions provide us with the grounding for our principles, our innate interconnectedness, and our sense of obligation to others. We use our powers of reason to build on that emotional foundation, and act effectively to bring about a better world.

#### Democratic checks prevent their impact from escalating

O’Kane 1997 (“Modernity, the Holocaust, and politics”, Economy and Society, February, ebsco)

Chosen policies cannot be relegated to the position of immediate condition (Nazis in power) in the explanation of the Holocaust. Modern bureaucracy is not ‘intrinsically capable of genocidal action’ (Bauman 1989: 106). Centralized state coercion has no natural move to terror. In the explanation of modern genocides it is chosen policies which play the greatest part, whether in effecting bureaucratic secrecy, organizing forced labour, implementing a system of terror, harnessing science and technology or introducing extermination policies, as means and as ends. As Nazi Germany and Stalin’s USSR have shown, furthermore, those chosen policies of genocidal government turned away from and not towards modernity. The choosing of policies, however, is not independent of circumstances. An analysis of the history of each case plays an important part in explaining where and how genocidal governments come to power and analysis of political institutions and structures also helps towards an understanding of the factors which act as obstacles to modern genocide. But it is not just political factors which stand in the way of another Holocaust in modern society. Modern societies have not only pluralist democratic political systems but also economic pluralism where workers are free to change jobs and bargain wages and where independent firms, each with their own independent bureaucracies, exist in competition with state-controlled enterprises. In modern societies this economic pluralism both promotes and is served by the open scientific method. By ignoring competition and the capacity for people to move between organizations whether economic, political, scientific or social, Bauman overlooks crucial but also very ‘ordinary and common’ attributes of truly modern societies. It is these very ordinary and common attributes of modernity which stand in the way of modern genocides.

## 2NC

#### Existence is a prerequisite to ontological questioning

Wapner 2003 Paul Wapner (associate professor and director of the Global Environmental Policy Program at American University) Winter 2003 “Leftist criticism of” http://www.dissentmagazine.org/article/?article=539

THE THIRD response to eco-criticism would require critics to acknowledge the ways in which they themselves silence nature and then to respect the sheer otherness of the nonhuman world. Postmodernism prides itself on criticizing the urge toward mastery that characterizes modernity. But isn't mastery exactly what postmodernism is exerting as it captures the nonhuman world within its own conceptual domain? Doesn't postmodern cultural criticism deepen the modernist urge toward mastery by eliminating the ontological weight of the nonhuman world? What else could it mean to assert that there is no such thing as nature? I have already suggested the postmodernist response: yes, recognizing the social construction of "nature" does deny the self-expression of the nonhuman world, but how would we know what such self-expression means? Indeed, nature doesn't speak; rather, some person always speaks on nature's behalf, and whatever that person says is, as we all know, a social construction. All attempts to listen to nature are social constructions-except one. Even the most radical postmodernist must acknowledge the distinction between physical existence and non-existence. As I have said, postmodernists accept that there is a physical substratum to the phenomenal world even if they argue about the different meanings we ascribe to it. This acknowledgment of physical existence is crucial. We can't ascribe meaning to that which doesn't appear. What doesn't exist can manifest no character. Put differently, yes, the postmodernist should rightly worry about interpreting nature's expressions. And all of us should be wary of those who claim to speak on nature's behalf (including environmentalists who do that). But we need not doubt the simple idea that a prerequisite of expression is existence. This in turn suggests that preserving the nonhuman world-in all its diverse embodiments-must be seen by eco-critics as a fundamental good. Eco-critics must be supporters, in some fashion, of environmental preservation.

#### Method is the foremost political question- whoever has the best explanation for exploitation should win because they are the ones with the most effective strategy for engagement

Tumino ‘1

[Stephen, Prof English at Pitt, ““What is Orthodox Marxism and Why it Matters Now More than Ever”, Red Critique, p. online]

Any effective political theory will have to do at least two things: it will have to offer an integrated understanding of social practices and, based on such an interrelated knowledge, offer a guideline for praxis. My main argument here is that among all contesting social theories now, only Orthodox Marxism has been able to produce an integrated knowledge of the existing social totality and provide lines of praxis that will lead to building a society free from necessity. But first I must clarify what I mean by Orthodox Marxism. Like all other modes and forms of political theory, the very theoretical identity of Orthodox Marxism is itself contested—not just from non-and anti-Marxists who question the very "real" (by which they mean the "practical" as under free-market criteria) existence of any kind of Marxism now but, perhaps more tellingly, from within the Marxist tradition itself. I will, therefore, first say what I regard to be the distinguishing marks of Orthodox Marxism and then outline a short polemical map of contestation over Orthodox Marxism within the Marxist theories now. I will end by arguing for its effectivity in bringing about a new society based not on human rights but on freedom from necessity. I will argue that to know contemporary society—and to be able to act on such knowledge—one has to first of all know what makes the existing social totality. I will argue that the dominant social totality is based on inequality—not just inequality of power but inequality of economic access (which then determines access to health care, education, housing, diet, transportation, . . . ). This systematic inequality cannot be explained by gender, race, sexuality, disability, ethnicity, or nationality. These are all secondary contradictions and are all determined by the fundamental contradiction of capitalism which is inscribed in the relation of capital and labor. All modes of Marxism now explain social inequalities primarily on the basis of these secondary contradictions and in doing so—and this is my main argument—legitimate capitalism. Why? Because such arguments authorize capitalism without gender, race, discrimination and thus accept economic inequality as an integral part of human societies. They accept a sunny capitalism—a capitalism beyond capitalism. Such a society, based on cultural equality but economic inequality, has always been the not-so-hidden agenda of the bourgeois left—whether it has been called "new left," "postmarxism," or "radical democracy." This is, by the way, the main reason for its popularity in the culture industry—from the academy (Jameson, Harvey, Haraway, Butler,. . . ) to daily politics (Michael Harrington, Ralph Nader, Jesse Jackson,. . . ) to. . . . For all, capitalism is here to stay and the best that can be done is to make its cruelties more tolerable, more humane. This humanization (not eradication) of capitalism is the sole goal of ALL contemporary lefts (marxism, feminism, anti-racism, queeries, . . . ). Such an understanding of social inequality is based on the fundamental understanding that the source of wealth is human knowledge and not human labor. That is, wealth is produced by the human mind and is thus free from the actual objective conditions that shape the historical relations of labor and capital. Only Orthodox Marxism recognizes the historicity of labor and its primacy as the source of all human wealth. In this paper I argue that any emancipatory theory has to be founded on recognition of the priority of Marx's labor theory of value and not repeat the technological determinism of corporate theory ("knowledge work") that masquerades as social theory.

#### Geneaologies are anti-sciences – counter to Marxism - establishes our link argument

Kellner, 2006 http://pages.gseis.ucla.edu/faculty/kellner/essays/postmoderntheorych2.pdf

In order to theorize the birth of modern disciplinary and normalizing practices, genealogy¶ politicizes all facets of culture and everyday life. Following Nietzsche’s genealogies of¶ morality, asceticism, justice, and punishment, Foucault tries to write the histories of¶ unknown, forgotten, excluded, and marginal discourses. He sees the discourses of madness,¶ medicine, punishment and sexuality to have independent histories and institutional bases,¶ irreducible to macrophenomena such as the modern state and economy. Hence, against ‘the¶ tyranny of globalizing discourses’ (Foucault 1980a: p. 83), he calls for ‘an insurrection of¶ subjugated knowledges’ (1980a: p. 81), of those ‘disqualified’ discourses that positivistic¶ science and Marxism delegitimate because they are deemed marginal and/or non-formalizable.¶ Genealogies are therefore ‘anti-sciences’, not because they seek to ‘vindicate a lyrical right to ignorance or non-knowledge’ and attack the concepts and methods of science per se, but¶ rather because they contest ‘the [coercive] effects of the centralizing powers which are linked¶ to the institution and functioning of an organized scientific discourse’ (1980a: p. 84).

#### The aff is akin to market socialism- it ensures that capitalism is continued with a nicer face

Ebert and Zavarzadeh in 2008(Teresa L., English, State University of New York, Albany, Mas’ud, prolific writer and expert on class ideology, “Class in Culture”, p. 36-38)

**The** cultural **activism of capital against labor**, however, **was not limited to conservative thinkers. It also** energetically **recruited Left intellectuals and "socialists of the** heart." The defense of free enterprise from the Left has always been of great cultural value to capitalism. **When Left intellectuals defend the market directly-in the guise, for example, of "market socialism"** *(Market Socialism: The Debate among Socialists,* ed. Oilman; *Why Market Socialism? Voices from Dissent,* ed. Roosevelt and Belkin)--**or denounce the enemies of capital as totalitarian, as violators of human rights, and for repressing the play of cultural meanings and thus singularity and heterogeneity** (e.g., Sidney **Hook**, Emesto **Laclau**, Jean-Francois **Lyotard**, Jacques **Derrida**), **their discourses seem more authoritative and sound more credible coming from the supposed critics of capital than do the discourses of conservative authors.** To put it precisely: **the Left has been valuable to capitalism because it has played a double role in legitimating capitalism. It has criticized capitalism as a culture, but has normalized it as an economic system** (e.g., Deleuze and Guat-tari, *Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia;* Duncombe, ed., *Cultural Resistance Reader;* Kraus and Lotringer, eds., *Hatred of Capitalism).* **It** has **complained about capitalism's** so-called corporate **culture**, **but** has **normalized it as a system of wage-labor that** is **grounded on exchange-relations and produces the corporate culture**. **The normalization of capitalism by the Left takes many forms**, **but** all **involve the justification of exploitation, which the Left represents as redemptive. They are** all **versions**-with various degrees of conceptual complexity- -**of** Nicholas D. **Kristof's argument in** his "In **Praise of the Maligned Sweatshop**." **He writes that** the sweatshops in Africa set up by capitalists of the North are in fact "opportunities" and advises that "**anyone who cares about** fighting **poverty should campaign in favor of sweatshops**." His argument is summed up by two sentences printed in boldface and foregrounded in his essay: **"What's worse than being exploited? Not being exploited**" *(The New York Times,* 6 June 2006, A-21). **What** has **made this** double **role** of postwar Left writers **so effective for capitalism is the way their** innovative **writing**, unorthodox **uses of language, and** captivating **arguments have generated** intellectual **excitement**. Jean-Paul **Sartre**, Theodor **Adorno,** Jean-Francais **Lyotard**, Jacques **Derrida**, Judith **Butler**, Jean **Baudrillard**, Jacques **Lacan**, Michel **Foucault**, Gilles **Deleuze**, Giorgio **Agamben**, Slavoj **Zizek**, **and** Stuart **Hall**, to name the most familiar authors, **have each used** quite **different**, **but** still **intellectually intriguing idioms**, **to de-historicize capitalism**. In highly subtle and nuanced arguments, **they have translated capitalism's Authoritarian economic practices**-which quietly force workers to concede to the exploitation of their labor-**into cultural values of free choice and self-sovereignty** (at the same time that they question traditional subjectivity). **Their most effective contributions to capitalism and its economic institutions have been to represent capitalism as a discursive system of meanings and** thus **divert attention away from its economic violence to its semantic transgressions-its homogenizing of meanings** in, for example, popular culture **or its erasure of difference** in cultural lifestyles. **They** have **criticized capitalism**, in other words, **for its** cultural **destruction of human imagination, but** at the same time, they **have condoned its logic of exploitation by dismantling** almost all **the conceptual apparatuses and analytics that offer a materialist understanding of capitalism as an economic system**. More specifically, **they have discredited any efforts to place class at the center of understanding and to grasp the extent and violence of labor practices**. They have done so, in the name of the "new" and with an ecstatic joy bordering on religious zeal (Ronell, *The Telephone Book;* Strangelove, *The Empire of Mind: Digital Piracy and the Anti-Capitalist Movement;* Gibson-Graham, *A Postcapitatist Politics).* **Left thinkers,** for example**, have argued that "new" changes in capitalism**-**the shift**, they claim, **from production to consumption**-**have triggered "a revolution in human thought around the idea of 'culture" which**, under new conditions, **has** itself **become material, "primary and constitutive"** (Hall, "The Centrality of Culture" 220, 215), **and is no** longer secondary and **dependent on** such outside **matters as relations of production**. Consequently, Hall and **others have argued that the analytics of base/superstructure has become irrelevant to sociocultural interpretations because the "new" conditions have rendered such concepts as objectivity, cause and effect, and materialism questionable.** "**The** old **distinction**" **between "**economic **'base' and** the ideological **'superstructure**" therefore **can no longer be sustained because the new culture is** what Fredric Jameson calls **"mediatic**" *(Postmodernism* 68). According to Hall, "media both form a critical part of the material infrastructure ... and are the principal means by which ideas and images are circulated" (Hall 209) . . . The logic of Hall's argument is obtained by treating the "material" as materialist. Media, however, are "material" only in a very trivial sense, they have a body of matter, and are a material vehicle (as a "medium"), but **media are not "materialist**" because, as we argue in our theory of materialism below, **they do not produce "value" and are not "productive." They distribute values produced at the point of production**. The un-said of Hall's claim is that **production and consumption/distribution are no longer distinguishable and more significantly, labor has itself become immaterial-**which is now a popular tenet in the cultural turn (Hardt and Negri, *Multitude).* But, even Paul Thompson, who is not without sympathy for the tum to culture, argues that **"labour is never immaterial. It is not the content of labour but its commodity form that gives 'weight' to an object or idea in a market economy,"** and, he adds, **While it is true that production has been deterritorialised** to an extent, **network firms are not a replacement for the assembly line and do not substitute horizontal for vertical forms of coordination**. Network firms are a type of extended hierarchy, based, as Harrison observes, on concentration without centralisation: 'production may be decentralised, while power finance, distribution, and control remain concentrated among the big firms' *(Lean and Mean: The Changing Landscape of Corporate Power in the Age of Flexibility,* 1994: 20). **Internal networks do not exist independently of these relations of production.** and forms of cooperation, such as teams, are set in motion and monitored by management rather than spontaneously formed. ("Foundation and Empire: A Critique of Hardt and Negri" 84) **Relations of production have shaped and will continue to shape the cultural superstructure. Changes in its phenomenology-**the textures of everyday lifestyles, whether one listens to music in a concert hall, on the radio, or through an iPod-**should not lead to postmodern** Quixotic **fantasies about the autonomy of culture from its material base** [Ebert, *Cultural Critique (with an attitude)].* As Marx writes, the Middle Ages could not live on Catholicism, nor could the ancient world on politics. On the contrary, **it is the manner in which they gained their livelihood which explains why in one case politics, in the other case Catholicism, played the chief part** .... And then **there is** Don **Quixote who long ago paid the penalty for wrongly imagining that knight errantry was compatible with all economic forms of society**. (Marx, *Capital* l, 176).

#### Their balfour evidence attempts to make capitalism more equal- it cannot make up for the production of labor that exists outside of prison labor

Ebert and Zavarzadeh in 2008(Teresa L., English, State University of New York, Albany, Mas’ud, prolific writer and expert on class ideology, “Class in Culture”, p. 27-29)

On the theoretical level, **the attacks on labor focused on the material logic**: the question that Sumner H. Slichter had raised, namely that the U.S. was "shifting from a capitalistic community to a laboristic one-that is to a community in which employees rather than businessmen are the strongest single influence." **This second** cultural **front developed new arguments for the legitimacy, permanence, and transhistorical moral and social authority of capitalism as an economic regime** that was seen as the condition of possibility for human freedom. This is what, for example, F. A. Hayek's writings did. Not only did they provide the grounds for a Neoliberal economics that marginalized Keynesianism, but they also offered an ethics and a philosophy for capitalism (The Fatal Conceit: The Errors of Socialism). In a subsequent move, **post-theory** ("post" as in postcolonialism, postrnarxism, poststructuralism, etc.) **translated Neoliberal economies into a new philosophy of representation that made discourse the primary ground of social reality**. Discourse was not simply a "text" in its narrow sense but the ensemble of the phenomena in and through which social production of meaning takes place, an ensemble that constitutes a society as such. **The discursive is** not. therefore, **being conceived** as a level nor even as a dimension of the social, but rather **as being co-extensive with the social**.. .. There is nothing specifically social which is constituted outside the discursive, it is clear that the non-discursive is not opposed to the discursive as if it were a matter of "'1'0 separate levels. History and society are an infinite text. (Laclau, "Populist Rupture and Discourse" 87) **Class in post-theory was turned into a trope whose meanings are wayward and indeterminate**-**a metaphor for a particular language game** (Jenks, Culture 4). **This move has de-materialized class by hollowing out its economic content and turning its materialism into "a materiality without materialism and even perhaps without matter**" (Derrida, "Typewriter Ribbon" 281). **This** de-materializing **has taken place through a network of "post**" interpretive **strategies: Such as "destruction**" (Heidegger, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology 22- 23); **"deconstruction"** (Derrida, "Letter to a Japanese Friend"); **"schizoanalysis"** (Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia 273-382); **"reparative reading"** (Sedgwick, Touching Feeling 123-151), **"cultural logic"** (Jameson, Postmodernism or, the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism); **"performativity"** (Butler, Gender Trouble); **"immaterial labor"** (Hardt and Negri, MultItude), **and "whatever** (qualunque)" (Agamben, The Coming Community). **The goal of both the populist and** the **theoretical campaigns against the labor movement**-which capital often referred to as "socialistic schemes" (Fones- Wolf 52}---**has been the blurring of class lines by depicting class antagonisms as cultural differences,** and to persuade people that, as Wallace F. Bennett, chairman of the National Association of Manufacturers put it, **"We are all capitalists"** (quoted in Fones-Wolf 70-73). In other words, **as far as capitalism is concerned, there are no class differences in the U.S. and what makes people different are their values, lifestyles, and preferences. We call this obscuring of class relations by cultural values and the play of language the "cultural turn."** The term "cultural turn" is often used to designate a 'particular movement in social and cultural inquiries that acquires analytical authority in the 1970s and is exemplified by such books as Hayden White's Metahistory and Clifford Geertz's The Interpretation of Cultures , both of which were published in 1973. White describes history writing as a poetic act and approaches it as essentially a linguistic (tropological) practice (Metahistory ix). **The view of history and social practices as poiesis**-which is most powerfully articulated in Heidegger's writings and is re-written in various idioms by diverse authors from Cleanth Brooks through Jacques Derrida to Giorgio Agamben-**constitutes the interpretive logic of the cultural turn**. Geertz's argument that culture is a semiotic practice, an ensemble of texts (Interpretation of Cultures 3- 30), canonizes the idea of culture as writing in the analytical imaginary. **The cultural tum is associated by some critics with the social movements of the 1960s and 1970s,** whose cultural activism they assume energized rebellion against "scientific" social and cultural inquiries and ushered in the cultural tum with its linguistic reading of culture and emphasis on the subjective (Bonnell and Hunt, ed., Beyond the Cultural Turn 1-32). **Other critics have also related the cultural tum to the radical activism of the post-1968 era and to postmodemism as well as to a tendency among radical intellectuals,** as Larry Ray and Andrew Sayer put it, **to approach language no longer as reflecting "material being" but to read it** (in Heidegger's words) **as the "house of being"** (Culture and Economy after the Cultural Turn I). **These and** similar **explanations of the cultural tum are insightful in their own terms**. However, **"their own terms" are not only historically narrow but are conceived within the very terms that they seem to critique: they are, in other words, accounts of the cultural tum from within the cultural tum**. As a result, **in spite of their professed interest in material analysis, their interpretations, like the writings of the cultural tum, remain culturalist. They** too **analyze culture in cultural terms**-that is, **immanently**. **Culture cannot be grasped in its own terms because its own terms are always the terms of ideology. Therefore to understand culture, one needs to look "outside**."

### A2: Ignores Identity

#### Only the alternative’s focus on the primacy class can solve – it is the key revolutionary agent – also answers their erases identity arguments.

Meyerson 2k

Gregory Meyerson, teaches critical theory, American and African American literature, as well as composition at North Carolina A & T University and co-editor of the Marxist online journal, Cultural Logic, and has published numerous essays on Marxism, critical race theory, post-structuralism and American literature. “Rethinking Black Marxism: Reflections on Cedric Robinson and Others”. Cultural Logic, Volume 3, Number 2, Spring, 2000. http://clogic.eserver.org/3-1&2/meyerson.html

3. The "relative autonomy" of "race" has been enabled by a reduction and distortion of class analysis. The essence of the reduction and distortion involves equating class analysis with some version of economic determinism. The key move in the critique of economic determinist Marxism depends upon the view that the economic is the base, the cultural/political/ideological the superstructure. It is then relatively easy to show that the (presumably non-political) economic base does not cause the political/cultural/ideological superstructure, that the latter is/are not epiphenomenal but relatively autonomous or autonomous causal categories in their own right--though such causal pluralism often results in the deconstruction of the category of cause. It might be said, at least with regard to the "class struggle in theory," that most critics of Marxism zero in on the perceived conceptual inadequacies of base and superstructure. So I'd like to state my position on this at some length before turning to Robinson. 4. Marxism properly interpreted emphasizes the primacy of class in a number of senses. One, of course, is the primacy of the working class as a revolutionary agent--a primacy which does not, as often thought, render women and people of color "secondary." Such an equation of white male and working class, as well as a corresponding division between a "white" male working class identity and all the others, whose identity is thereby viewed as either primarily one of gender and race or hybrid, is a view this essay contests all along the way. The primacy of class means that building a multiracial, multi-gendered international working-class organization or organizations should be the goal of any revolutionary movement: the primacy of class puts the fight against racism and sexism at the center. The intelligibility of this position is rooted in the explanatory primacy of class analysis for understanding the structural determinants of race, gender and class oppression. Oppression is multiple and intersecting but its causes are not. 5. As I will show, the incorrect understanding of the primacy of class does carry with it for critics of historical materialism both the devaluation of "race" and "gender" as explanatory categories and their devaluation as real people, women and people of color. So when the charge is made against Marxism that it makes race and gender secondary, there is always the sense that race and gender are being treated at once as analytical categories and citizens--with the implication that Marxism in theory is the corollary of a deprivation of rights in practice. On this view, race, gender, class are co-primary, interacting, intersecting and, to reiterate the confusion I see between the triad as analytical category and person, in dialogue. 6. In my view, and this is surely controversial, but it also puts Marxism on its strongest footing, the primacy of class means not only that class is the primary determinant of oppression and exploitation but the only structural determinant. "Race" and gender (this essay focuses on racism but has implications for gender) are not structural determinants. There is racist and sexist ideology. And there is a racial and gendered division of labor, whose severity and function vary depending on where one works in the capitalist global economy. Both ideology and the division of labor are understood here to be functional for class rule--facilitating profit making and social control. Class rule is itself a form of class struggle. This latter point is crucial. Class rule is never automatic or easy, and there is constant resistance, both to class rule itself and its symptoms. This essay thus strongly rejects that part of the Althusserian thesis on social reproduction that explains class rule as a function of interpellation.3 7. So class does not mean the economic in contradistinction to the political or the material in contradistinction to the mental. And class struggle should itself not be seen as a reflex of the primacy of the productive forces over the social relations of production--in this scenario, the working class is not really struggling to emancipate itself but to emancipate "the productive forces." Such a view also legitimates nationalism as a stepping stone to internationalism--insofar as nationalism (through, say, import-substitution) helps develop capitalism enough so that it becomes ripe for the next stage. Finally, class does not mean "objective," defined in turn as "impersonal forces." All agents must face the constraints of a given mode of production--capitalists must obey capital's laws of motion. They must be motivated to maximize profit in order to survive, though the strongest profit making motives in the world cannot prevent the destruction of capital, which is a property of the system. In this sense, the mode of production is objective, not reducible to the wills of individual agents. But processes of class rule always involve subjects (embodied to be sure) who do make choices about how to rule and how to resist.

### 2NC Alt Solves

#### Alternative visions serve as analytic tools—asking different questions expose the role of exploitation in the material system of power.

Noumoff, prof @ McGill University, 1

(Sam, “Globalization and Marginalization,” Labour, Capital, and Society, Vol. 34, Issue 1, p51-91)

¶ **Exploitation is an inevitable consequence of unequal power. The challenge is to systematically reduce it as¶ the prerequisite to systemic transformation**. **The central strategic question is how to combine the struggle for¶ authentic national independence with the struggle for workers' rights**. Clearly, the sheet is not blank, but¶ neither is it replete with predetermined answers. **The major lesson is to face the objective situation with¶ principle and integrity. This requires a comprehensive analytic discourse which compares the reality on the¶ ground with an alternative vision of society**. In other words, a **strategic reassessment of objective reality, and¶ a creative exploration of elastic responses which test its limits.**

#### Capitalism crushes identities by repurposing them for modes of exploitation

Rowland Keshena, 2008 <http://radicalprofeminist.blogspot.com/2008/12/marxism-vs-indigenism-anti-critique-of.html> Marxism vs. Indigenism: An Anti-Critique of Ward Churchill

¶ The primary concept behind Marx's theory of historical materialism is that all of history is based on, and driven by, material realities rather than mysterious forces. Another way of putting this is that it is not so much the ideas we have that determine our existence as much as it is the factors of our material existence that determine our ideas. This does not mean that ideas have absolutely no effect on the course of history, rather just that they only have effect when put into material action.¶ ¶ The Marxist model of historical materialism looks for the various causes of developments and changes in human societies in the way in which humans collectively make the means to live, thus giving an emphasis, through economic analysis, to everything that co-exists with the economic base of society. But what is meant by economics in this context? We often hear the term “mode of production” get thrown around alot, e.g., capitalism is a mode of production. If we break down, humans need to eat, drink, sleep, etc and in order to do these things they have to produce things, in one fashion or another, and the “mode” is how the production is organized and carried out. Like all other factors, this organization to is intrinsically social and its impact and been seen and felt on all other aspects of society, including: culture, politics, the state, and law. To put it simply, our social relations of production play a major role in how our social relations are organized in general.¶ ¶ However, any given mode of production that a society utilizes does not appear out of thin air and and neither do things like culture and ideas. The fact is that these develop together, and develop because of the course of human actions and interactions. However, importantly, the behaviours and courses of action taken by people are determined by the possibilities, limits, and imperatives of historical conditions.

## 1NR

#### Incentives must induce behaviors

Russel Thomas, 2007 [Principal at Meritology, a consultancy that models business value and risk forinformation technology, Incentive-based Cyber Trust – A Call to Action,http://meritology.com/resources/Incentive based%20Cyber%20Trust%20Initiative%20v3.5.pdf] (ADI)

“Incentive” – Our definition differs somewhat from the usual economic definition: “In economics, an incentive is any factor (financial or non-financial) that provides a motive for a particular course of action, or counts as a reason for preferring one choice to the alternatives. Since human beings are purposeful creatures, the study of incentive structures is central to the study of all economic activity (both in terms of individual decision-making and in terms of co-operation and competition within a larger institutional structure).” [13] Generally, the incentives we consider are tied to desired outcomes, so that they are a form of gain sharing or shared equity. For purposes of this paper and the proposed Initiative, “incentive ” is further qualified to include only positive incentives such as remunerative, moral, and personal incentives. We exclude negative or coercive incentives from this definition because we want to draw on and stimulate “market forces”, broadly defined. Market systems normally motivate agents through positive incentives. In contrast, coercive incentives (penalties, etc. for failures to act) are usually administered through non-market processes such as legal , regulatory, or authority institutions .

#### Of/for energy production is an adjective phrase

**Megginson, 2007** (David Megginson, University of Ottawa, Department of English, “The Function Of Phrases” writingcentre.uottawa.ca/hypergrammar/phrfunc.html)

An adjective phrase is any phrase which modifies a noun or pronoun. You often construct adjective phrases using participles or prepositions together with their objects: I was driven mad by the sound of my neighbour's constant piano practising. In this sentence, the prepositional phrase "of my neighbour's constant piano practising" acts as an adjective modifying the noun "sound."

#### Energy production means conversion into heat, light, or electricity- Not coal extraction

Division of Conservation of Solar Application, Pacific Northwest Laboratory, 1980 “An Analysis of Federal Incentives used to Stimulate Energy Production”

<http://www.scribd.com/doc/67538352/Federal-Incentives-for-Energy-Production-1980> p42

Discussing governmental actions In a field that lacks consistent Policy is difficult, since boundaries defining energy actions are unclear. All governmental actions probably have at least some indirect relevance to energy. If a consistent Policy did exist, the discussion could focus on those actions that were part of the planned and consistent program. For this analysis, however, boundaries must be somewhat arbitrarily defined. First, this discussion will include only those actions taken by the Federal Government; relevant actions of state and local governments are not considered. Second, the discussion covers only those Federal Government actions in which major causes included an attempt to Influence energy or major effects included some Influence on energy. Within those limits, the discussion considers actions related to both production and consumption, although production receives the most emphasis. It also includes actions relating to both increases and decreases In energy consumption or production. Energy production Is defined as the transformation of natural resources into commonly used forms of energy such as heat, light, and electricity. By this definition, the shining of the sun or the running of a river are not examples of energy production, but the installation of solar panels or the construction of a hydroelectric dam are. Energy consumption is defined as the use of one of these common, "manufactured" forms of energy. Under this definition sunbathing is not energy consumption, but heating water by means of a solar panel is. In both definitions, the crucial ingredient is the application of technology and resources to change a natural resource into a useful energy form.

#### C. Studies prove—depth is better than breadth.

**Arrington 09** (Rebecca, UVA Today, “Study Finds That Students Benefit From Depth, Rather Than Breadth, in High School Science Courses” March 4)

A recent study reports that high school students who study fewer science topics, but study them in greater depth, have an advantage in college science classes over their peers who study more topics and spend less time on each. Robert Tai, associate professor at the University of Virginia's Curry School of Education, worked with Marc S. Schwartz of the University of Texas at Arlington and Philip M. Sadler and Gerhard Sonnert of the Harvard-Smithsonian Center for Astrophysics to conduct the study and produce the report. "Depth Versus Breadth: How Content Coverage in High School Courses Relates to Later Success in College Science Coursework" relates the amount of content covered on a particular topic in high school classes with students' performance in college-level science classes. The study will appear in the July 2009 print edition of Science Education and is currently available as an online pre-print from the journal. "As a former high school teacher, I always worried about whether it was better to teach less in greater depth or more with no real depth. This study offers evidence that teaching fewer topics in greater depth is a better way to prepare students for success in college science," Tai said. "These results are based on the performance of thousands of college science students from across the United States." The 8,310 students in the study were enrolled in introductory biology, chemistry or physics in randomly selected four-year colleges and universities. Those who spent one month or more studying one major topic in-depth in high school earned higher grades in college science than their peers who studied more topics in the same period of time. The study revealed that students in courses that focused on mastering a particular topic were impacted twice as much as those in courses that touched on every major topic.

# Rd3 Neg v Kansas CG

### OFF

#### Purchase Agreements are not financial incentives

Czinkota 2009 **-** Associate Professor at the McDonough School of Business at Georgetown University (Michael, Fundamentals of International Business, p. 69)

Financial incentives offer special funding for the investor by providing, for example, land or buildings, loans, and loan guarantees. Non financial incentives include guaranteed government purchases, special protection from competition through tariffs, import quotas, and local content requirements, and investments in infrastructure facilities.

The advantage to our interp is limits- there are almost infinite incentives- only by limiting to financial incentives can the neg have any hope of keeping up with the number of mechanisms- procurement is uniquely bad because it does not require commercialization- key to energy DA’s which are fundamental to the topic- also key to energy market DA’s like electricity prices

#### Alternative financing only explodes limits further

Leos 2007 [Leonard Leos ¶ Paul Rouleau ¶ Mark Wadsworth ¶ June 2007 Naval Post Graduate School MBA PROFESSIONAL REPORT ¶ “Budget Scoring of Alternative Financing¶ Methods for Defense Requirements” http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA473232]

Alternative financing consists of almost any financing option or combination of ¶ options that can be used in lieu of conventional full-funding. The private sector has ¶ metrics such as profit or stock price that help motivate corporate executives in their ¶ selection of the most beneficial financing method for their company. Without these ¶ incentives, the federal budget process remains a delicate balance between agency needs ¶ and Congressional control of the purse. Current scoring guidelines are designed to ¶ provide the decision-makers in Congress with the most informative representation of ¶ current and future government obligations. The legislation also has the effect of biasing ¶ full-funding versus other forms of financing. Yet, in certain situations, the needs and ¶ resources of the government can be combined with the capabilities of the private sector to ¶ form a partnership that is beneficial to both parties. Public-private Partnerships represent ¶ the most practical financing method available that harnesses these capabilities and ¶ addresses the needs of the DoD.

### 1NC

#### The United States Federal Government should establish a coordinating body within the Tennessee Valley Authority to develop a competitive, performance-based procurement standard for Tennessee Valley Authority. TVA energy acquisition should meet the following requirements:

* meets requirements of existing US-Russian nuclear cooperation agreements
* enables reprocessing

#### The TVA should create a reverse auction for contracts with energy project developers to supply the technology that meets these requirements at lowest cost. Contracts should be awarded through a series of six monthly auctions, with contracts awarded to companies that meet these performance requirements at the lowest cost, and demonstrate decreasing costs and continued performance over multiple auction rounds.

#### Solves the aff without picking winners—competition over a portfolio of tech substantially reduces energy cost

**Wood, 12** – Gratten Institute Program Director (Australia) (Tony, “Building the bridge: A practical plan for a low-cost, low-emissions energy future” <http://grattan.edu.au/static/files/assets/a8778779/Building_the_bridge_report.pdf>

Governments must address these market failures, beyond putting a price on carbon. They must provide the credible financial return and predictable policy settings that companies need to make substantial, risky investments. But how can they support new technologies without `picking winners’ or, conversely, gambling that the market alone will do the job? This report sets out an innovative proposal to build a bridge between the current market and the market for low-emissions technologies Australia needs.¶ Here is how it would work: Government enters into long-term contracts with project developers to buy electricity at a price that makes low-emission projects viable. It awards contracts through a series of six-monthly auctions, held over 10 years. Competition to win contracts delivers the lowest price for low-emission power. Developers can invest knowing the contracts will be honoured irrespective of government policy on the carbon price. A 10-year timeframe and clear rules provide companies with a predictable investment environment, and multiple opportunities to invest. The scheme may produce about 5 per cent of Australia’s power. ¶ The auctions will award power contracts in specific technology categories. Over multiple rounds, technologies must deliver both low costs and show that their costs are falling. Those that do will gain more opportunities to build projects; those that do not will have opportunities withdrawn. The outcomes clarify the current uncertainty about which technologies will best meet Australia’s long-term needs. It is too soon to punt on just one or two horses. Instead, government should pay to develop a portfolio of options from which a proven set of technologies can emerge. ¶ Government should still fund technology R&D. But learning what works on the ground is the only way to identify the best mix for reliable, low-cost, low-emissions energy supply. The auction process gives companies the chance to gain practical deployment experience, and thereby to cross the bridge to commercial viability. Once technologies are viable, government should withdraw support, beyond a well-managed carbon price.

#### Early lifecycle competition is key to innovation – plan is procurement disaster and causes lock-in

**Hansen, 3** – LTC, US Army (Richard, “COMPETITION: A MEANS TO TRANSFORM THE DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL BASE,” USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT,

http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA415099&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf)

Increased industrial competition can be beneficial throughout the defense acquisition lifecycle, provided the benefits outweigh the costs. There may be times when the savings generated are less than the costs of a second competitor, for example, a second competing production line. However, leveraging competitive market forces early in the R&D process has proven very beneficial. Furthermore, this **competition** early in the lifecycle may be imperative given the growing enthusiasm for evolutionary acquisition and a procurement trend that suggests more frequent but smaller production lots and less total production quantity. Early competition stimulates efforts to mature technology and solve system integration challenges. The lack of this technological maturity has certainly been a factor that has contributed to our dissatisfaction with the defense acquisition system. Consider multiple studies from the Government Accounting Office:¶ · DOD Faces Challenges in Implementing Best Practices, 2002.¶ · Better Matching of Needs and Resources Will Lead to Better Weapon Systems Outcomes, 2001.¶ · Employing Best Practices Can Shape Better Weapon System Decisions, 2000.¶ · Better Management of Technology Development Can Improve Weapon Systems Outcomes, 1999.¶ · Best Commercial Practices Can Improve Program Outcomes, 1999.¶ · Improved Program Outcomes Are Possible, 1998.¶ A consistent theme in these studies indicates DoD’s inclination to commit to a formal program start too early.15 Those unsuccessful program initiations were characterized by a lack of systems engineering and resulting immature technology. **That** lack of upfront systems engineering **coupled with a lack of competition can** lead to disaster.

#### Innovation key to solve great power war

Baru 9 - Visiting Professor at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy in Singapore (Sanjaya, “Year of the power shift?,”

http://www.india-seminar.com/2009/593/593\_sanjaya\_baru.htm

In the modern era, the idea that strong economic performance is the foundation of power was argued most persuasively by historian Paul Kennedy. ‘Victory (in war),’ Kennedy claimed, ‘has repeatedly gone to the side with more flourishing productive base.’6 Drawing attention to the interrelationships between economic wealth, technological innovation, and the ability of states to efficiently mobilize economic and technological resources for power projection and national defence, Kennedy argued that nations that were able to better combine military and economic strength scored over others.¶ ‘The fact remains,’ Kennedy argued, ‘that all of the major shifts in the world’s *military-power* balance have followed alterations in the *productive* balances; and further, that the rising and falling of the various empires and states in the international system has been confirmed by the outcomes of the major Great Power wars, where victory has always gone to the side with the greatest material resources.’7¶ **I**n Kennedy’s view the geopolitical consequences of an economic crisis or even decline would be transmitted through a nation’s inability to find adequate financial resources to simultaneously sustain economic growth and military power – the classic ‘guns vs butter’ dilemma.

### K

#### The history of nuclear power is one rooted in exceptionalism- the distinction between peaceful nuclear development and proliferation risks is often only founded on where the tech was created

Hecht 2010 [Gabrielle is associate professor of history at the University of Michigan, January Technology and Culture¶ Volume 51, Number 1, Project Muse]

The salience of "uranium from Africa"—both in the lead-up to the war and in subsequent opposition to it—traded on three sets of fears and assumptions widespread in the American public sphere:¶ • the fear of nuclear weapons, and the assumption that acquiring "uranium" is tantamount to building an atomic bomb;¶ • the fear of "Africa" as a dark, corrupt continent, and the assumption that actions there are ultimately unknowable or incomprehensible;¶ • the fear of any nuclear materials not within direct Western control, and the assumption that the difference between licit and illicit nuclear trade is clear-cut.¶ Commentators on the Iraq war spilled a lot of ink on the first of these, very little on the second, and only a bit more on the third. But they largely missed the complex technological and political threads that bind these three outlooks together.¶ In this essay I attempt to break these restraints by offering three genealogies for "uranium from Africa." First, I consider the problem of when uranium counts as a "nuclear" thing, when it doesn't, and what Africa has to do with it. Before "uranium" becomes weapons-usable, it must be mined as ore, processed into yellowcake, converted into uranium hexafluoride, enriched, and pressed into bomb fuel. At what stage in this process does it come to count as a "nuclear material"? The answer, I argue, has depended on time, place, purpose, and markets. Second, I excavate the phrase's more specific rendition, displaying fragments of a history of "yellowcake from Niger." Places matter. Niger is not merely an avatar for global threats, but a nation with its own politics, priorities, and conflicts, all of which have significant [End Page 2] bearing on the production and distribution of its uranium. Third, I examine another moment when African provenance of uranium was geopolitically contested: the flow of Namibian uranium to the U.S., Japan, and Europe during the height of international sanctions against apartheid. In this instance, licit trade and black markets were materially entwined in ways that made African things invisible.¶ Understanding the transnational networks that shape the power of technology in the contemporary world is a complex and difficult proposition. Only a bird's-eye view can reveal the patterns, flows, and imbalances that map the distribution of technologies and the powers they serve or exert. Yet the view from above is always partial; it runs the risk of deceiving us into thinking that some places don't matter enough to deserve our attention. This is a dangerous illusion. We must land in unfamiliar places and study them on their own terms.¶ The result is necessarily a fractured history. The fault lines between these multiple narratives gape because transnational history is not smooth and seamless, but uneven and disjointed. As shifting signifiers, nuclearity and markets run through these histories; their meanings are shaped by place, but not always in the same way. The notion of technopolitics helps to highlight such shifts and indeterminacies. Elsewhere, I have used the term in discussions of politically strategic technological design.5 Here I use it more expansively, seeking to highlight the distribution of power in material things and symbolic circulations. These hybrid forms of power, I argue, make some things nuclear, some things commodities, some things African, and some things all three.¶ Is Uranium a Nuclear Thing?¶ Nuclear exceptionalism has been a recurring theme in political discourse since the U.S. dropped an atomic bomb on Hiroshima in 1945. American and European cold warriors and their activist opponents portrayed atomic weapons as fundamentally different from any other human creation. "The bomb" appeared as the ultimate trump card: first for the superpowers, then for waning colonial powers, then for other nations. Geopolitical status seemed directly proportional to the number of nukes a nation possessed. Such nuclear exceptionalism went well beyond discourse; indeed, its technopolitical qualities made it particularly robust. "Nuclear" scientists and engineers gained prestige, power, and funding far beyond their colleagues in "conventional" research. Fission meant splitting atoms, and the resulting rupture in nature's very building blocks propelled claims to a corresponding rupture in historical space and time. [End Page 3]¶ Nuclear exceptionalism could be made, unmade, and remade. In the early decades of civilian nuclear power, exceptionalist claims came primarily from experts and atomic energy institutions. As anti-nuclear groups gained prominence, however, they articulated their own exceptionalist claims by highlighting the unprecedented qualitative and quantitative dangers posed by exposure to radioactive substances. In response, the industry sought to make itself mundane: radioactivity was part of nature, nuclear power merely a form of energy among others. When reactor accidents at Three Mile Island (1979) and Chernobyl (1986) challenged the banality of nuclear things, experts re-branded exceptionalism: the industry, they argued, spent more money preventing deaths from occupational exposure than any other industry. Whatever the political leaning, the stakes of exceptionalism were amplified by morality-talk: nuclear things were either sacred or profane. Whatever the political leaning, too, exceptionalist claims carried the sense that an immutable ontology distinguished the nuclear from the non-nuclear, that the difference was ultimately a clear-cut matter of fission and radioactivity.6¶ Historically, however, the degree to which—and purpose for which—a nation, a program, a technology, or a material counted as "nuclear" hasn't always been a matter of consensus. Consider: Yellowcake from Niger made Iraq nuclear enough to justify war in 2003. But in 1995, yellowcake didn't suffice to make Niger itself nuclear. According to an Office of Technology Assessment report that year, neither Niger, nor Gabon, nor Namibia had any "nuclear activities." Yet together, these three nations accounted for about a quarter of the world's uranium production that year.7¶ So when does uranium count as a nuclear thing? When does it lose its nuclearity? And what does Africa have to do with it?¶ These questions were present from the beginning of attempts to define, regulate, and market a global nuclear order, via the creation of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The agency's 1956 statute allocated five permanent seats on its Board of Governors to states globally deemed the "most advanced in the technology of atomic energy including the production of source materials," and another five according to geographic region.8 Uranium "producers" in Eastern and Western bloc nations would rotate through another two seats; "suppliers of technical assistance" would rotate through one. Remaining board members would be elected by delegates from all IAEA member states. [End Page 4]¶ In those initial negotiations, the South African delegate had pushed hard to include "source materials" as an indicator of "advancement" in the IAEA statute.9 Contracts with the U.S. and Britain had already made uranium vital to the apartheid economy and turned South Africa into one of the world's largest producers.10 Pressures for decolonization of the African continent were mounting; the South African delegate suspected that apartheid policies would make it impossible to obtain an elected seat. As it was, India had tried to relegate South Africa to one of the rotating seats for "producers." Indeed, in 1956, South African "nuclear" activities consisted only of uranium ore production, underwritten by a very small research program; in terms of technological "advancement," this was equivalent to Portugal, Australia, and others who qualified for "producer" seats. Worse, it seemed that South Africa's competitors for the Africa/Middle East regional seat—Israel and Egypt—had more developed research programs. The Suez Crisis heightened the political risks (for the U.S. and the UK) of granting either of those countries the right to represent the whole region. But the region's choice of representative had to be technologically justified too. If "source materials" could count, then South Africa would easily qualify as the region's "most advanced [nation] in the technology of atomic energy"—not the least because the other African producers were not (yet) nations. This argument carried the day; South Africa won its seat.¶ So in 1956 "source materials" included uranium ore, which in turn seemed nuclear enough to trump the increasingly vocal opposition of postcolonial nations to the apartheid state. But this didn't compel the nuclearity of uranium ore to remain stable for all time.¶ Let's not forget why South Africans craved a board seat: they wanted to influence the formation of a uranium market. Today's media cover the IAEA primarily as the UN's "nuclear watchdog," conducting inspections to certify that civilian installations haven't been diverted to military ends. But this function of the IAEA emerged historically; it was not built into the institution from the beginning. Crucially, the IAEA emerged—partly in response to the "Atoms for Peace" initiative—in order to facilitate the circulation of nuclear things.11 The South Africans certainly lost no time exploring [End Page 5] commercial possibilities. When he wasn't occupied with agency politics, their delegate used the personal contacts he'd made at the IAEA to deepen relationships with potential uranium customers. In 1959, for example, he escorted two representatives of the South African Atomic Energy Board (AEB) all over Western Europe. This "sales survey team" sought to forecast supply and demand for the upcoming decade, guess at the probable price structure of commercial contracts, and assess how safeguards might constrain the sale of uranium.12 The tour proved so fruitful that the AEB's sales committee repeated it regularly, building on their IAEA delegate's expanding network of contacts.13¶ South Africans were by no means alone in using the agency in this way. From its inception, the IAEA served as a forum for its members. They learned about competing technologies and materials. They made commercial contacts. They offered or applied for technical assistance—and when such exchanges materialized, they inevitably involved buying and selling. And yes, as part of all this, they discussed international rules for regulating the flow of atomic knowledge and things.¶ The problem with the trade in nuclear things was the exceptionalism of things nuclear. How to buy and sell technologies that carried such heavy moral baggage and destructive potential? "Safeguards" sounded like an attractive answer. But what exactly would they entail? The U.S. promoted a pledge system: purchasers should agree not to use nuclear technologies and materials toward military ends and accept international inspections verifying compliance. Most other nations selling nuclear systems paid lip service, at least, to such a scheme. Buyers, however, rejected the prospect of controls. India, in particular, argued that regulating access would perpetuate colonial inequalities and undermine national sovereignty.¶ Arguments on both ends obscured more mundane political and commercial issues. South Africa, for example, wanted to avoid mandatory controls on uranium end-use which might commercially disadvantage its product. It had concrete reasons for such fears: South Africans suspected that Israel had "broke[n] off negotiations for supplies of Rand concentrates" [End Page 6] in 1962 because it had "instead obtained the supplies [it] required from France, without [the] safeguard inspection requirements"14 that South Africans had initially agreed to in order to placate the U.S. and the UK. Within India, experts disagreed over whether to build an atomic bomb, but at the IAEA they wanted to keep their options open by minimizing international controls. The U.S., the UK, and the Soviet Union, meanwhile, refused to accept inspections on their soil. Western European designers of nuclear systems feared that inspections would open the door to commercial spying, accusing the U.S. and the UK of seeking competitive advantage. Western Europe should also receive inspection exemption and remain subject only to Euratom safeguards. "Third world" nations deemed such proposals straightforward moves by the North to dominate the global South.15¶ The 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) expressed (but did not resolve) all of these tensions. Under the NPT, "nuclear weapons states" pledged not to transfer atomic weapons or explosive devices to "non-nuclear weapons states" and to make "good faith" efforts to reduce their atomic arsenals. Other signatories renounced atomic weapons and agreed to accept IAEA compliance measures. The treaty thus tried to permanently fix which states had nuclear weapons and which didn't. It also sought to establish the relationship between these by invoking another ontology of global order, that of human rights and "development." The NPT referred to "the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to . . . nuclear energy for peaceful purposes," which in turn would be facilitated by international cooperation that would proceed "with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world."16¶ The NPT codified global nuclearity but left the IAEA to implement its vision. The agency launched a major "technical assistance" program aimed at developing nations. It also tried to design a safeguards system. This was difficult, and the agency's solution to the problem of which things were nuclear enough to require safeguards kept changing. Secure in its position on the board, South Africa pushed to exclude mines and ore-processing plants from official definitions so as to minimize external oversight of its [End Page 7] industry. The IAEA's 1968 safeguards document defined a "principal nuclear facility" as "a reactor, a plant for processing nuclear material, irradiated in a reactor, a plant for separating the isotopes of a nuclear material, a plant for processing or fabricating nuclear material (excepting a mine or ore-processing plant)."17 Uranium mines and mills were thus specifically excluded from the category of "principal nuclear facilities." The 1972 safeguards document further excluded uranium ore from the category of "source material," thereby exempting its production from the ritual of inspections.18¶ By offering mechanisms to balance the spread and containment of nuclear things, inspections (and safeguards) themselves served to define nuclearity. For the NPT had never been specific on this point. How would exporters know what they could sell? In 1971, a committee formed to draft a list of things nuclear enough to trigger safeguards.19 Published in 1974, the first trigger list included reactors, fuel fabrication and reprocessing plants, and isotope separation plant equipment. Still, not all "nuclear exporters" agreed with its specifications. Competing lists developed.20 They grew longer and more detailed.21 Much remained unresolved or under-specified. Did uranium ore count as "source material" or not? It depended on the IAEA document. Did yellowcake count as "natural uranium" for export purposes? Also unclear. In any case, safeguards on uranium sales, when they existed, consisted merely of lines in a contract, paper promises that the buyer wouldn't use the ore for military ends. In and of themselves, uranium ore and yellowcake did not trigger inspections.22¶ The safeguards/inspections regime didn't simply aim to preserve the global nuclear weapons order. The regime's fine-grained distinctions about nuclearity also served as a technopolitical frame for global trade. At the most basic level, it did this by ontologically separating things which could safely be bought and sold from things which could not. Limiting safeguards on uranium sales to lines in a contract represented an accommodation between the exceptionalism of nuclearity and the banality of commerce. This [End Page 8] accommodation, in turn, laid down the technopolitical conditions in which "the uranium market" could exist as both concept and object. In the 1940s and 1950s, the U.S. and the UK had strongly resisted the notion of a "market value" for uranium.23 Invoking the specter of Soviet supremacy (and knowing full well that they were the only large-scale buyers at that stage), they'd strong-armed suppliers into cost-plus pricing arrangements and kept contract terms secret. Cold war ideology had thus placed uranium beyond "the market."24 Only after safeguards on uranium ore became defined as end-use pledges written into sales contracts did the "uranium market" emerge as an object and practice of political economy. A critical component of this process, freedom from direct inspections meant that the production of commercial-grade yellowcake could proceed under the mundane conditions that obtained for any other commodity. Producers paid penalties if the chemical and metallurgical content of their yellowcake didn't meet the specs laid down by conversion plants, but no one followed the ore from its site of production to its final destination.¶ These accommodations held sway until the mid-1990s. Until then, inspections consisted of verifying declarations states made concerning their own "nuclear material and activities." Revelations that inspections had missed secret Iraqi and North Korean weapons programs, however, pushed the IAEA to expand its purview. The resulting "Additional Protocol" (1997) specified a set of technopolitical practices intended to increase the agency's ability to detect undeclared nuclear activities. For the first time, uranium mines and mills would be included in inspection rituals.25 Adoption of the "Additional Protocol" remained voluntary. If a state signed on, however, the resulting inspections promised a definitive verdict on weapons programs. States would subject themselves to more intrusive inspections precisely to achieve this apparent finality. Each inspection that exonerated a nation of evil intentions would contribute to global security—and market stability.26

#### Exceptionalism leads to extinction- produces a denial of death that demands constant causalities

Peterson ‘7 (Christopher, Lecturer @ University of Western Sidney, Kindred Specters: Death, Mourning, and American Affinity, pgs. 3-8)

While this study accords with the claim that American culture disavows mortality, 1 do not argue for any simple reversal of this interdiction with an aim toward affirming finitude per se. If death is beyond our experience (as Heidegger among others has observed), if I am ultimately absent from "my" own death, then strictly speaking there is nothing for me to recognize or avow. Yet dying is something that I do every day. Indeed, it might be more accurate to say that American culture disavows dying, understood as a process that extends from our birth to our biological demise." Even with such an amended formulation, however, it is not entirely clear whether dying can ever be fully affirmed or avowed. That "we live as if we were not going to die," as Zygmunt Bauman observes, "is a remarkable achievement," especially given the ease with which we disavow dying on a daily basis." Some degree of disavowal would seem both unavoidable and necessary for our survival. Any effort to prolong one's life, from simply eating well and exercising to taking medications to prevent or treat illness, evidences this disavowal. For Bauman, however, the disavowal of dying often has violent political and social consequences. Noting the wartime imperative "to limit our casualties" for instance, Bauman remarks that "the price of that limiting is multiplying the dead on the other side of the battleline" (34). Drawing from Freud's claim that, "at bottom no one believes in his own death," Bauman argues that death is "socially managed" by securing the "immortality" of the few through the mortalization of others (35, his emphasis).8 The belief in my self-presence, which is also always a belief in my immortality, is thus dialectically conditioned by the nonpresence of others. Scholars in race and sexuality studies have done much to bring our attention to the ways in which American culture represents racial and sexual minorities as dead - both figuratively and literally. Indeed, this gesture both accompanies and reinforces the larger cultural dissimulation of mortality by making racial and sexual others stand in for the death that haunts every life. The history of American slavery tells a familiar story of how American consciousness disavows and projects mortality onto its "others." Orlando Patterson has described the institution of slavery in terms of a process of kinship delegitimation that constructs slaves as "socially dead."? For Patterson, slavery - across its various historical forms - emerges as a substitute for death a forced bargain by which the slave retains his/her life only to enter into the liminal existence of the socially dead. As a substitution for death slavery does not "absolve or erase the prospect of death," for the specter of material death looms over the slave's existence as an irreducible remainder (5). This primary stage in the construction of the socially dead person is followed by what Patterson refers to as the slave's "natal alienation," his/her alienation from all rights or claims of birth: in short, a severing of all genealogical ties and claims both to the slave's living blood relatives, and to his/her remote ancestors and future descendants. Although Patterson does not approach the problem of social death through a psychoanalytic vocabulary of disavowal and projection, one might say that the presumptive ontology of slave-owning, legally recognized kinship, was dependent on a deontologization of slave kinship that worked to deny the death that each life bears within itself. Building on Patterson's argument, Toni Morrison observes in Playing in the Dark that, "for a people who made much of their 'newness' - their potential, freedom, and innocence - it is striking how dour, how troubled, how frightened and haunted our early and founding literature truly is." For Morrison, African-American slaves came to shoulder the burden of the darkness (both moral and racial) against which America defined itself. The shadow of a racialized blackness did not so much threaten the ostensible "newness" of American life as it conditioned the latter's appearance as new and free. Hence "freedom," she writes, "has no meaning ... without the specter of enslavement" (56). Echoing Morrison, Russ Castronovo asserts in Necro Citizenship that nineteenth-century American politics constructed the citizen in relation to a morbid fascination with ghosts, seances, spirit rappings, and mesmerism. Taking his point of departure from Patrick Henry's in-famous assertion, "give me liberty or give me death," Castronovo explores how admission into the domain of citizenship required a certain depoliticization and pacification of the subject: "The afterlife emancipates souls from passionate debates, everyday engagements, and earthly affairs that animate the political field."!' From Lincoln's rumored dabbling in spiritualism, to attempts by mediums to contact the departed souls of famous Americans, to a senator's introduction of a petition in 1854 asking Congress to investigate communications with the "other side" so numerous are Castronovo's examples of what he calls" spectral politics" that we would have a difficult time contesting his diagnosis that nineteenth-century American political discourse worked to produce politically and historically dead citizens. That these citizens were constructed in tandem with the production of large slave populations- noncitizens who were urged by slavery proponents and abolitionists alike to believe that emancipation existed in a promised afterlife - would lend still more credence to the argument that nineteenth-century America propagated a dematerialized politics. One wonders, however, how Castronovo's argument sits in relation to Aries's contention that American life tends toward an interdiction of death, and if Castronovo's rejection of necropolitics, moreover, is not finally symptomatic of this very disavowal. Castronovo maintains that, "for cultures that fear death ... necrophilia promotes fascination with and helps tame an unknowable terror:' (5). American necrophilia, according to Castronovo, responds to an overwhelming fear and denial of death. Castronovo thus aims 'to turn us away from such preoccupation with ghosts, spirits, and the afterlife toward "specific forms of corporeality," such as the laboring body, the slave body, and the mesmerized body, in order to avoid "reinscrib[ing] patterns of abstraction" (17). Yet, this move away from general to specific forms of embodiment still retains the notion of "the body," and therefore of a self-contained, sell-present entity. If nineteenth-century politics required that the citizen be disembodied and dematerialized, it does not follow that a move toward embodiment remedies such a spiritualized politics. Although Castronovo cautions that recourse to the body" does not automatically guarantee resistance," the overall tenor of his project pathologizes the spectral (18). Indeed, one has the sense that Castronovo would like to untether politics from death altogether - as if political life is not always haunted by finitude. Reversing the terms of political necrophilia, he offers something like a political necrophobia that sees every intrusion of the spectral as synonymous with depoliticization. If nineteenth-century spiritualism infused American political life with a familiar set of distinctions between spirit/matter, soul/body, that says nothing about how these binaries might be displaced rather than merely reversed. A binaristic approach to the subject of mortality is also legible in Sharon Holland's Raising the Dead, which asserts that "bringing back the dead (or saving the living from the shadow of death) is the ultimate queer act."11Drawing from the activist slogan "silence = death" from the early years of the AIDS epidemic, and extending this activist imperative to address the social death of sexual and racial minorities more generally, Holland observes that the deaths of queer and racial subjects serve "to ward off a nation's collective dread of the inevitable" (38). Yet, as in Castronovo's critique of necropolitics, this imperative to "raise the dead" reverses rather than displaces the logic through which dominant, white, heterosexual culture disavows and projects mortality onto racial and sexual minorities. While we must address the particular effects that social death has on racial and sexual minorities, this social reality must also be thought in relation to a more generalizable principle of mourning. For the "shadow of death" haunts all lives, not just queer ones. The "ultimate queer act," pace Holland, would be to deconstruct rather than reinscribe the binary between life and death, to resist the racist and heterosexist disavowal of finitude. That Americanist literary criticism on the subject of mortality remains implicated in the larger cultural disavowal of dying suggests that we ought to reassess our critical energies, particularly as these powers are enlisted to address how American political ideology produces the "death" of racial and sexual others. Indeed, I would argue that such criticism remains invested - despite all claims to the contrary - in an American exceptionalist project. American exceptionalism names, in part, a fetishization of novelty and futurity that initially defined America against an ostensibly decaying and moribund Europe. As David Noble has argued, the doctrine of exceptionalism excluded America from "the human experience of birth, death, and rebirth" by figuring Europe in terms of time and America in terms of timeless space." If, as George Berkeley put it, America is "time's noblest offspring," history gives birth to its final progeny in order that the latter might escape time altogether. America thus becomes eternally present while "Europe breeds in her decay." If the "new world" qua new must deny mortality, then reanimating the excluded from within the terms of a dialectical reversal renews rather than dismantles the American exceptionalist project. Challenging the ideology of American exceptionalism is particularly crucial for a post-9/11 politics that aims to resist the transformation of American exposure to injury and death into a newly reconsolidated sense of innocence and immortality. As Donald Pease has argued, 9/11 transformed "virgin land" into "ground zero," effecting an ideological shift from a "secured innocent nation to a wounded, insecure emergency state."16 Drawing from the work of Giorgio Agamben. Pease describes the emergency state as a nation that - by exempting itself from its own democratic rules of free speech, due process, and above all, the rules of war - marks a division between those whom the state protects from injury and those whom the state is free to injure and kill with impunity (13). The reduction of the Arab other to that which cannot be killed because it is already dead works to cover over the wound that ground zero opens up under the surface of virgin land. The emergency state (or what Agamben calls the "state of exception") thus also names a nation that attempts to except itself from the universal condition of mortality. As Bauman notes, "if mortality and transience are the norm among humans, durability may be attained only as an exception" (67, his emphasis).

#### The alternative is to reject the Affirmative-Questioning American exceptionalism is key to understanding our place in the world- rejection is key to more productive politics

Walt 2011[Stephen M. Walt, an FP contributing editor, is Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international affairs at Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government NOVEMBER 2011, Foreign Policy, “The Myth of American Exceptionalism” http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/10/11/the\_myth\_of\_american\_exceptionalism]

Most statements of "American exceptionalism" presume that America's values, political system, and history are unique and worthy of universal admiration. They also imply that the United States is both destined and entitled to play a distinct and positive role on the world stage.¶ The only thing wrong with this self-congratulatory portrait of America's global role is that it is mostly a myth. Although the United States possesses certain unique qualities -- from high levels of religiosity to a political culture that privileges individual freedom -- the conduct of U.S. foreign policy has been determined primarily by its relative power and by the inherently competitive nature of international politics. By focusing on their supposedly exceptional qualities, Americans blind themselves to the ways that they are a lot like everyone else.¶ This unchallenged faith in American exceptionalism makes it harder for Americans to understand why others are less enthusiastic about U.S. dominance, often alarmed by U.S. policies, and frequently irritated by what they see as U.S. hypocrisy, whether the subject is possession of nuclear weapons, conformity with international law, or America's tendency to condemn the conduct of others while ignoring its own failings. Ironically, U.S. foreign policy would probably be more effective if Americans were less convinced of their own unique virtues and less eager to proclaim them.¶ What we need, in short, is a more realistic and critical assessment of America's true character and contributions. In that spirit, I offer here the Top 5 Myths about American Exceptionalism.

### Politics

#### Obama PC will get immigration to pass- it will be close though- still things to be negotiated

Weissenstein 2-23 [Michael Weissenstein 2-23-2013 ABC News “McCain, Obama to Meet on Immigration Tuesday” http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/mccain-guardedly-optimistic-immigration-reform-18570284]

U.S. Sen. John McCain said Friday that he and other lawmakers working on an immigration overhaul will meet with President Barack Obama on Tuesday to discuss the effort to revamp the system.¶ McCain, a member of a bipartisan group of eight senators working on a bill, said there is still significant disagreement with the president, but he is optimistic about producing legislation that includes a path to legalization for illegal immigrants.¶ The White House could not immediately confirm the Tuesday meeting.¶ "The president of the United States has supported our efforts. In fact we will be meeting with the president on Tuesday," McCain said during a visit to Mexico.¶ He did not say how many senators would attend the meeting.¶ McCain told reporters after meeting with Mexican President Enrique Pena Nieto that many details must be worked out between Obama and senators trying to produce legislation.¶ Asked about the prospects for reaching a deal, he said: "I am guardedly optimistic that we could by the end of the next month. There's still a number of agreements that need to be made before I can assure you that we will have a resolution."¶ While they differ on some key details, both Obama and the Senate are contemplating legislation that would provide a pathway to citizenship for most of the 11 million illegal immigrants already in the U.S., tighten border security, crack down on businesses that employ illegal workers and strengthen the legal immigration system.¶ McCain ticked off those aspects and added that he also envisions the legislation including a process for foreign agricultural and low-skilled laborers to work in the United States, a provision for highly educated workers to remain in the U.S., better identification cards for migrants and a special path for migrants brought to the U.S. as children.¶ "On some of those we have specific agreement, in other areas we agree in principle, but we have not resolved the details," he said. "We are making progress, but we are still not at a point where we can say we will succeed."

#### MOX use is controversial in Congress – current conflicts about cost and legitimacy

Rob Pavey, 2011 http://chronicle.augusta.com/news/metro/2011-09-12/mox-report-congress-six-months-overdue

The mixed oxide, or MOX plant, is designed to dispose of 34 metric tons of plutonium by blending the material with uranium to make commercial reactor fuel. Efforts to find utilities willing to use the fuel have progressed slowly.¶ In June, the House Appropriations Committee expressed new concerns about the project’s escalating costs and the quest to find clients for the fuel.¶ “The costs of this program continue to escalate, with current estimates of as much as $9.7 billion, just to construct the needed facilities,” committee members wrote in the fiscal 2012 Energy and Water Development Appropriations Bill.¶ Although the Tennessee Valley Authority is exploring its use in as many as five of its reactors, the recent crisis with Japan’s nuclear program will make such an alliance less likely, and much more difficult, the committee wrote.¶ Josh McConaha, a spokesman for the National Nuclear Security Administration, said officials are diligently working on the report. “The MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility report is currently in progress and will be submitted to Congress as soon as it is completed,” he said.

#### Solves US-India relations

**LA Times**, 11/9/**20**12 (Other countries eagerly await U.S. immigration reform, p. http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/world\_now/2012/11/us-immigration-reform-eagerly-awaited-by-source-countries.html)

"Comprehensive immigration reform will see expansion of skilled labor visas," predicted B. Lindsay Lowell, director of policy studies for the Institute for the Study of International Migration at Georgetown University. A former research chief for the congressionally appointed Commission on Immigration Reform, Lowell said he expects to see at least a fivefold increase in the number of highly skilled labor visas that would provide "a significant shot in the arm for India and China." There is widespread consensus among economists and academics that skilled migration fosters new trade and business relationships between countries and enhances links to the global economy, Lowell said. "Countries like India and China weigh the opportunities of business abroad from their expats with the possibility of brain drain, and I think they still see the immigration opportunity as a bigger plus than not," he said.

#### US/India relations averts South Asian nuclear war

Schaffer, Spring **200**2 (Teresita – Director of the South Asia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Security, Washington Quarterly, p. Lexis)

Washington's increased interest in India since the late 1990s reflects India's economic expansion and position as Asia's newest rising power. New Delhi, for its part, is adjusting to the end of the Cold War. As a result, both giant democracies see that they can benefit by closer cooperation. For Washington, the advantages include a wider network of friends in Asia at a time when the region is changing rapidly, as well as a stronger position from which to help calm possible future nuclear tensions in the region. Enhanced trade and investment benefit both countries and are a prerequisite for improved U.S. relations with India. For India, the country's ambition to assume a stronger leadership role in the world and to maintain an economy that lifts its people out of poverty depends critically on good relations with the United States.

#### Extinction

Starr ’11 (Consequences of a Single Failure of Nuclear Deterrence by Steven Starr February 07, 2011, Associate member of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation \* Senior Scientist for PSR

Only a single failure of nuclear deterrence is required to start a nuclear war, and the consequences of such a failure would be profound. Peer-reviewed studies predict that less than 1% of the nuclear weapons now deployed in the arsenals of the Nuclear Weapon States, if detonated in urban areas, would immediately kill tens of millions of people, and cause long-term, catastrophic disruptions of the global climate and massive destruction of Earth’s protective ozone layer. The result would be a global nuclear famine that could kill up to one billion people. A full-scale war, fought with the strategic nuclear arsenals of the United States and Russia, would so utterly devastate Earth’s environment that most humans and other complex forms of life would not survive. Yet no Nuclear Weapon State has ever evaluated the environmental, ecological or agricultural consequences of the detonation of its nuclear arsenals in conflict. Military and political leaders in these nations thus remain dangerously unaware of the existential danger which their weapons present to the entire human race. Consequently, nuclear weapons remain as the cornerstone of the military arsenals in the Nuclear Weapon States, where nuclear deterrence guides political and military strategy. Those who actively support nuclear deterrence are trained to believe that deterrence cannot fail, so long as their doctrines are observed, and their weapons systems are maintained and continuously modernized. They insist that their nuclear forces will remain forever under their complete control, immune from cyberwarfare, sabotage, terrorism, human or technical error. They deny that the short 12-to-30 minute flight times of nuclear missiles would not leave a President enough time to make rational decisions following a tactical, electronic warning of nuclear attack. The U.S. and Russia continue to keep a total of 2000 strategic nuclear weapons at launch-ready status – ready to launch with only a few minutes warning. Yet both nations are remarkably unable to acknowledge that this high-alert status in any way increases the probability that these weapons will someday be used in conflict. How can strategic nuclear arsenals truly be “safe” from accidental or unauthorized use, when they can be launched literally at a moment’s notice? A cocked and loaded weapon is infinitely easier to fire than one which is unloaded and stored in a locked safe. The mere existence of immense nuclear arsenals, in whatever status they are maintained, makes possible their eventual use in a nuclear war. Our best scientists now tell us that such a war would mean the end of human history. We need to ask our leaders: Exactly what political or national goals could possibly justify risking a nuclear war that would likely cause the extinction of the human race? However, in order to pose this question, we must first make the fact known that existing nuclear arsenals – through their capacity to utterly devastate the Earth’s environment and ecosystems – threaten continued human existence. Otherwise, military and political leaders will continue to cling to their nuclear arsenals and will remain both unwilling and unable to discuss the real consequences of failure of deterrence. We can and must end the silence, and awaken the peoples of all nations to the realization that “nuclear war” means “global nuclear suicide”. A Single Failure of Nuclear Deterrence could lead to: \* A nuclear war between India and Pakistan; \* 50 Hiroshima-size (15 kiloton) weapons detonated in the mega-cities of both India and Pakistan (there are now 130-190 operational nuclear weapons which exist in the combined arsenals of these nations); \* The deaths of 20 to 50 million people as a result of the prompt effects of these nuclear detonations (blast, fire and radioactive fallout); \* Massive firestorms covering many hundreds of square miles/kilometers (created by nuclear detonations that produce temperatures hotter than those believed to exist at the center of the sun), that would engulf these cities and produce 6 to 7 million tons of thick, black smoke; \* About 5 million tons of smoke that would quickly rise above cloud level into the stratosphere, where strong winds would carry it around the Earth in 10 days; \* A stratospheric smoke layer surrounding the Earth, which would remain in place for 10 years; \* The dense smoke would heat the upper atmosphere, destroy Earth’s protective ozone layer, and block 7-10% of warming sunlight from reaching Earth’s surface; \* 25% to 40% of the protective ozone layer would be destroyed at the mid-latitudes, and 50-70% would be destroyed at northern and southern high latitudes; \* Ozone destruction would cause the average UV Index to increase to 16-22 in the U.S, Europe, Eurasia and China, with even higher readings towards the poles (readings of 11 or higher are classified as “extreme” by the U.S. EPA). It would take 7-8 minutes for a fair skinned person to receive a painful sunburn at mid-day; \* Loss of warming sunlight would quickly produce average surface temperatures in the Northern Hemisphere colder than any experienced in the last 1000 years; \* Hemispheric drops in temperature would be about twice as large and last ten times longer then those which followed the largest volcanic eruption in the last 500 years, Mt. Tambora in 1816. The following year, 1817, was called “The Year Without Summer”, which saw famine in Europe from massive crop failures; \* Growing seasons in the Northern Hemisphere would be significantly shortened. It would be too cold to grow wheat in most of Canada for at least several years; \* World grain stocks, which already are at historically low levels, would be completely depleted; grain exporting nations would likely cease exports in order to meet their own food needs; \* The one billion already hungry people, who currently depend upon grain imports, would likely starve to death in the years following this nuclear war; \* The total explosive power in these 100 Hiroshima-size weapons is less than 1% of the total explosive power contained in the currently operational and deployed U.S. and Russian nuclear forces.

### Adv 1

#### Fukishima crushed what little hope there was for a nuclear rensaissance

Cooper 2011 (NUCLEAR SAFETY AND NUCLEAR ECONOMICS: HISTORICALLY, ACCIDENTS DIM THE PROSPECTS FOR NUCLEAR REACTOR CONSTRUCTION; FUKUSHIMA WILL HAVE A MAJOR IMPACT MARK COOPER, PHD Senior Fellow for Economic Analysis Institute for Energy and the Environment, Vermont Law School December 2011, http://www.nirs.org/neconomics/Nuclear-Safety-and-Nuclear-Economics-Post-Fukushima.pdf)

The increase in risk associated with the post-accident reviews and the history of cost escalation, before and after accidents will make investors and governments look less favorably on nuclear power. This inclination is compounded by the fact that the cost of new nuclear reactors was highly uncertain before Fukushima (as shown in Exhibit 5). Since the first estimates were put forward by nuclear "Enthusiasts" in an effort to create the impression of a “nuclear renaissance,” cost estimates have increased dramatically and the numbers that were originally hyped to kick off the “renaissance” proved to be far too low. Although the Enthusiasts have since raised their cost projections somewhat, Wall Street analysts still use construction cost projections that are at least 50 percent higher Fukushima will magnify the economic problems that the “nuclear renaissance” faced, which are the very problems that that have plagued nuclear power throughout its history. Nuclear power has always suffered from high cost and continuous cost escalation, high risk and uncertainty. With long lead-times and large sunk costs, nuclear is a very risky investment in an environment filled with ambiguities and competitive alternatives. Thus, new reactors are the antithesis of prudent investment. That is the reason that the “nuclear renaissance” never materialized. Hype and speculation of dozens of projects quickly gave way to a handful that became increasingly dependent on massive public subsidies to move forward. Before Fukushima, the Energy Information Administration, which had been one of the early Enthusiasts, had already conceded that only four reactors would be built over the next two decades. After Fukushima, even that number is in doubt.

#### Russia won’t break relations with the US

Eugene B. Rumer, senior fellow at the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University, and Celeste A. Wallander, director of the Russia and Eurasia Program and the Trustee Fellow at CSIS, Winter 2003, The Washington Quarterly

Given Russia's geopolitical predicament, it is difficult to imagine how a rational, even selfish, assessment of Russian interests would lead Russia to conclude that it would be best served by undermining the United States. The fallout from a weaker and diminished U.S. role in global security affairs would carry with it a number of serious challenges to Russian security interests, ranging from a strong Russian stake in partnership with the United States on geopolitically balancing China to the immediate threat to Russian security in the event of U.S. abandonment of its security assistance to Central Asia to the prospect of Iran armed with nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles with Moscow well within range. Thus, although Russia apparently has a strong interest in making clear to the United States that it is not to be taken for granted and that its interests and sensitivities are not to be brushed aside, Russia has no compelling rational interest in undermining or geopolitically balancing the United States' international position.

#### No cascade of proliferation – its all alarmist rhetoric

Muthia Alagappa, pub. date: 2008, Distinguished Senior Fellow, East-West Center, “The Long Shadow: Nuclear Weapons and Security in 21st Century Asia,” accesed: 1-6-09, p. 521-2, Google Books

It will be useful at this juncture to address more directly the set of instability arguments advanced by certain policy makers and scholars: the domino effect of new nuclear weapon states, the probability of preventative action against new nuclear weapon states, and the compulsion of these states to use their small arsenals early for fear of losing them in a preventive or preemptive strike by a stronger nuclear adversary. On the domino effect, India’s and Pakistan’s nuclear weapon programs have not fueled new programs in South Asia or beyond. Iran’s quest for nuclear weapons is not a reaction to the Indian or Pakistani programs. It is grounded in that country’s security concerns about the U ntiedStates and Tehran’s regional aspirations. The North Korean test has evoked mixed reactions in Northeast Asia. Tokyo is certainly concerned; its reaction, though, has not been to initiate its own nuclear weapon program but to reaffirm and strengthen the American extended deterrence commitment to Japan. Even if the U.S.-Japan security treaty were to weaken, it is not certain that Japan would embark on a nuclear weapon program. Likewise, South Korea has sought reaffirmation of the American extended deterrence commitment, but has firmly held to its nonnuclear posture. Without dramatic change in it’s political, economic, and security circumstances, South Korea is highly unlikely to embark on a covert (or overt) nuclear weapon program as it did in the 1970s. South Korea could still become a nuclear weapon state by inheriting the nuclear weapons of North Korea should the Kim Jong Il regime collapse. Whether it retains or gives up that capability will hinge on the security circumstances of a unified Korea. The North Korean nuclear test has not spurred Taiwan or Mongolia to develop nuclear weapon capability. The point is that each country’s decision to embark on and sustain nuclear weapon programs is contingent on its particular security and other circumstances. Through appealing, the domino theory is not predictive; often it is employed to justify policy on the basis of alarmist predictions. The loss of South Vietnam, for example, did not lead to the predicted domino effect in Southeast Asia and brought about a fundamental transformation in that sub region (Lord 1993, 1996). In the nuclear arena, the nuclear programs of China, India, and Pakistan were part of a security chain reaction, not mechanically falling dominos. However, as observed earlier the Indian, Pakistani, and North Korean nuclear tests have thus far not had the domino effect predicted by alarmist analysts and policy makers. Great caution should be exercised in accepting at face value the sensational predictions of individuals who have a vested interest in accentuating the dangers of nuclear proliferation. Such analysts are now focused on the dangers of a nuclear Iran. A nuclear Iran may or may not have destabilizing effects. Such claims must be assessed on the basis of an objective reading of the drivers of national and regional security in Iran and the Middle East.

#### Robust statistical studies prove prolif decreases war and escalation

Victor Asal and Kyle Beardsley, pub. date: 2007, Assistant Prof. Pol. Sci. – SUNY Albany, and Kyle Beardsley, Asst. Prof. Pol. Sci. – Emory Univ., Journal of Peace Research, “Proliferation and International Crisis Behavior,” accessed: 12-18-09, http://jpr.sagepub.com/cgi/reprint/44/2/139

The literature on international conflict is divided on the impact of nuclear proliferation on state conflict. The optimists’ argument contends that nuclear weapons raise the stakes so high that states are unlikely to go to war when nuclear weapons enter the equation. The pessimists rebut this argument, contending that new proliferators are not necessarily rational and that having nuclear weapons does not discourage war but rather makes war more dangerous. Focusing on one observable implication from this debate, this article examines the relationship between the severity of violence in crises and the number of involved states with nuclear weapons. The study contends that actors will show more restraint in crises involving more participants with nuclear weapons. Using data from the International Crisis Behavior (ICB) project, the results demonstrate that crises involving nuclear actors are more likely to end without violence and, as the number of nuclear actors involved increases, the likelihood of war continues to fall. The results are robust even when controlling for a number of factors including non-nuclear capability. In confirming that nuclear weapons tend to increase restraint in crises, the effect of nuclear weapons on strategic behavior is clarified. But the findings do not suggest that increasing the number of nuclear actors in a crisis can prevent war, and they cannot speak to other proliferation risks

#### Russian weapons are secure- they have impassable security features and are easily recovered.

Mueller 2008 (John Mueller, pub. date: 1-1-08, Dept. of Political Science Ohio State Univ., “THE ATOMIC TERRORIST: ASSESSING THE LIKELIHOOD,” http://polisci.osu.edu/faculty/jmueller/APSACHGO.PDF)

It might be added that Russia has an intense interest in controlling any weapons on its territory since it is likely to be a prime target of any illicit use by terrorist groups, particularly, of course, Chechen ones with whom it has been waging an vicious on-and-off war for over a decade (Cameron 2004, 84). Officials there insist that all weapons have either been destroyed or are secured, and the experts polled by Linzer (2004) point out that "it would be very difficult for terrorists to figure out on their own how to work a Russian or Pakistan bomb" even if they did obtain one because even the simplest of these "has some security features that would have to be defeated before it could be used" (see also Kamp 1996, 34; Wirz and Egger 2005, 502; Langewiesche 2007, 19). One of the experts, Charles Ferguson, stresses You’d have to run it through a specific sequence of events, including changes in temperature, pressure and environmental conditions before the weapon would allow itself to be armed, for the fuses to fall into place and then for it to allow itself to be fired. You don't get off the shelf, enter a code and have it go off. Moreover, continues Linzer, most bombs that could conceivably be stolen use plutonium which emits a great deal of radiation that could relatively easily be detected by passive sensors at ports and other points of transmission.

#### No nuclear terrorism –statistically insignificant cumulative probability

John Mueller (Woody Hayes Chair of National Security Studies, Mershon Center, and is professor of Political Science, at Ohio State University) 2010 “Atomic Obsession: Nuclear Alarmism from Hiroshima to Al Qaeda” p, 187-190

Assigning a probability that terrorists will be able to overcome each barrier is, of course, a tricky business, and any such exercise should be regarded as rather tentative and exploratory, or perhaps simply as illustrative-though it is done all the time in cost-benefit analysis. One might begin a quantitative approach by adopting probability estimates that purposely, and heavily, bias the case in the terrorists' favor. In my view, this would take place if it is assumed that the terrorists have a fighting chance of 50 percent of overcoming each of the 20 obstacles displayed in Table 13-1, though for many barriers, probably almost all, the odds against them are surely much worse than that. Even with that generous bias, the chances that a concerted effort would be successful comes out to be less than one in a million, specifically 1,048,576. Indeed, the odds of surmounting even seven of the 20 hurdles at that unrealistically, even absurdly, high presumptive success rate is considerably less than one in a hundred. If one assumes, somewhat more realistically, that their chances at each barrier are one in three, the cumulative odds they will be able to pull off the deed drop to one in well over three billion specifically 3.486,784,401. What they would be at the (still entirely realistic) level of one in ten boggles the mind. One could also make specific estimates for each of the hurdles, but the cumulative probability statistics are likely to come out pretty much the same-or even smaller. There may be a few barriers, such as numbers 13 or absolute loyalty trump the one oftechnical competence. This would increase the chances that the bomb-making enterprise would go undetected, while at the same time decreasing the likelihood that it would be successful. However, given the monumentality of the odds confronting the would-be atomic terrorist, adjustments for such issues are scarcely likely to alter the basic conclusion. That is, if one drastically slashed the one in 3.5 billion estimate a thousandfold, the odds of success would still be one in 3.5 million. Moreover, all this focuses on the effort to deliver a single bomb. If the requirement were to deliver several, the odds become, of course, even more prohibitive. Getting away from astronomical numbers for a minute, Levi points out that even if there are only ten barriers and even if there were a wildly favorable 80 percent chance of overcoming each hurdle, the chance of final success, following the approach used here, would only be 10 percent. Faced even with such highly favorable odds at each step, notes Levi, the wouldbe atomic terrorist might well decide "that a nuclear plot is too much of a stretch to seriously try." Similarly, Jenkins calculates that even if there are only three barriers and each carried a 50/50 chance of success, the likelihood of accomplishing the full mission would only be 12.5 percent.14 Odds like that are not necessarily prohibitive, of course, but they are likely to be mind-arrestingly small if one is betting just about everything on a successful outcome. Multiple Attempts The odds considered so far are for a single attempt by a single group, and there could be multiple attempts by multiple groups, of course. Although Allison considers al-Qaeda to be "the most probable perpetrator" on the nuclear front, he is also concerned about the potential atomic exploits of other organizations such as Indonesia's Jemaah Islamiyah, Chechen gangsters, Lebanon's Hezbollah, and various doomsday cults. IS However, few, if any, groups appear to have any interest whatever in striking the United States except for al-Qaeda, an issue to be discussed more fully in the next chapter. But even setting that consideration aside, the odds would remain long even with multiple concerted attempts.16 If there were a hundred such efforts over a period of time, the chance at least one of these would be successful comes in at less than one in over 10,000 at the one chance in two level. At the far more realistic level of one chance in three, it would be about one in nearly 35 million. If there were 1,000 dedicated attempts, presumably over several decades, the chance of success would be worse than one in a thousand at the SO/50 level and one in nearly 3.5 million at the one in three level.I7 Of course, attempts in the hundreds are scarcely realistic, though one might be able to envision a dozen or so. Additionally, if there were a large number of concerted efforts, policing and protecting would presumably become easier because the aspirants would be exposing themselves repeatedly and would likely be stepping all over each other in their quest to access the right stuff. Furthermore, each foiled attempt would likely expose flaws in the defense system, holes the ...,. defenders would then plug, making subsequent efforts that much more dif• ficult. For example, when the would-be peddler of a tiny amount of pur loined highly enriched uranium was apprehended in 2006, efforts were made to trace its place of origin using nuclear forensics. IS ." Also, the difficulties for the atomic terrorists are likely to increase over time because of much enhanced protective and policing efforts by ... self-interested governments. Already, for example, by all accounts Russian nuclear materials are much more adequately secured than they were 10 or ~, .-s 15 years ago.19

#### No retaliation

Michael Crowley (Senior Editor the New Republic) January 2010 “Obama and Nuclear Deterrence”, http://www.tnr.com/node/72263

The Los Angeles Times ran an important story yesterday about the Obama administration's Nuclear Posture Review, which evaluates U.S. policy towards the use of nuclear weapons. Apparently there's a debate inside the administration--one that is splitting the civilians from the generals--not just about the size of our nuclear stockpile but also how we conceive of possible first-strike and retaliatory policies. A core issue under debate, officials said, is whether the United States should shed its long-standing ambiguity about whether it would use nuclear weapons in certain circumstances, in hopes that greater specificity would give foreign governments more confidence to make their own decisions on nuclear arms. Some in the U.S. argue that the administration should assure foreign governments that it won't use nuclear weapons in reaction to a biological, chemical or conventional attack, but only in a nuclear exchange. Others argue that the United States should promise that it would never use nuclear weapons first, but only in response to a nuclear attack. As the story notes, some experts don't place much weight on how our publicly-stated doctrine emerges because they don't expect foreign nations to take it literally. And the reality is that any decisions about using nukes will certainly be case-by-case. But I'd still like to see some wider discussion of the underlying questions, which are among the most consequential that policymakers can consider. The questions are particularly vexing when it comes to terrorist groups and rogue states. Would we, for instance, actually nuke Pyongyang if it sold a weapon to terrorists who used it in America? That implied threat seems to exist, but I actually doubt that a President Obama--or any president, for that matter--would go through with it.

#### No dead hand

Nikolai **Sokov**, pub. date: October **1997**, works @ the Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute, CSIS, “Could Norway Trigger a Nuclear War? Notes on the Russian Command and Control System,” accessed: 10-2-09, <http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/pm_0024.pdf>

The recently leaked information suggests that the reason for the "mistaken identity" of the Norwegian rocket was technical. The Norwegian rocket used the first stage of an old American tactical missile "Honest John." Consequently, the boost phase speed was higher than usual for previous research launches. The rocket was also unusually large, consisting of three stages and measuring 18.4 meters long and 6 tons. Apparently, it was mistaken for an American Trident IISLBM (its length is 13.4 meters without the front section). The trajectory (to the north from Russia) was also considered "legitimate," since conceivably, a real attack could be preceded by launching a missile to the north of Russia and detonating a device with an extra powerful electromagnetic impulse to knock out communications systems. The computer systems classified it as a combat missile and flashed a warning. The system was automatically activated up to the top, including Yeltsin's "nuclear briefcase." Then, in a matter of minutes, the situation was assessed and the alert status decreased back to normal. Reportedly, the alert did not even reach launch teams at missile bases. Lessons The incident tells much about the Russian command and control system:1. The "mistaken identity" resulted not from an error but from proper functioning. Evidently, the computers are programmed to alert personnel to certain types of missiles and speed is one of the criteria, as is probably size as well. Thus, a rocket that does not have the characteristics of a combat missile is unlikely to provoke an alert.2. Yeltsin's nuclear briefcase probably works only in passive mode, i.e. the whole system has to be put on alert before he issues the command to launch. This is consistent with other publicly available sources, which claim that the participation of the General Staff and/or the SRF is imperative. The military and designers have always been proud of the built-in checks: they view them as a precaution against reckless politicians. An interesting consequence is that the system might be able to function even in the event that the top leadership (the President) is incapacitated. This provides added reliability and removes the rationale for a "dead-hand" system.3. There is not a "dead-hand" system, otherwise a "response" would have followed based on perceived attack. In other words, the case of the Norwegian rocket demonstrated that detection and putting the system on a higher alert status are automated, but command to launch is made by humans. Apparently, there is at least one gap in the chain of automatic response, and the gap is at the crucial link: the decision to launch.4. The incident indirectly demonstrated that the personnel at the missile launchers are "out of the loop:" the information about the suspected attack did not reach them. This means that it is unlikely that they are able to launch weapons independently. Otherwise, they would have received information of an attack, which is vital.

#### No arctic war- No opportunity and coop solves – prefer experts

Young, Professor – Institutional and International Governance, Environmental Institutions @ UCSB, Arctic expert, PhD – Yale, 2011

(Oran R, “The future of the Arctic: cauldron of conflict or zone of peace?” *International Affairs* 87:1, p. 185-193)

Popular accounts of the Arctic’s jurisdictional issues are regularly couched in terms of provocative phrases like the afore-mentioned ‘who owns the Arctic’ or ‘use it or lose it’. **But these** phrases **turn out to be highly misleading** in this context. **There are virtually no disputes in the Arctic regarding sovereignty** over northern lands; no one has expressed a desire to redraw the map of the Arctic with regard to the terrestrial boundaries of the Arctic states. Most of the disagreements are to do with jurisdiction over marine areas where the idea of ownership in the ordinary sense is irrelevant. While some of these disagreements are of long standing and feature relatively entrenched positions, they are not about establishing ownership, and they do not indicate that some level of ‘use’ is required to avoid the erosion of sovereignty. **There is little prospect that these disputes will spawn armed clashes.** As both Michael Byers and Shelagh Grant make clear in their excellent analyses of Arctic sovereignty, recent efforts to address matters involving sovereignty in the Arctic are marked by a spirit of rule-based problem-solving, rather than an escalating spiral of politically charged claims and counterclaims. The process of delineating jurisdictional boundaries regarding the seabed beyond the limits of Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) is taking place in conformity with the rules and procedures set forth in Article 76 of UNCLOS. Norway and Russia have signed an international treaty resolving their differences regarding jurisdictional boundaries in the Barents Sea. There are signs that Canada and the United States are interested in a similar approach with regard to the Beaufort Sea. The Russians, whose much ballyhooed 2007 initiative to plant the Russian flag on the seabed at the North Pole is widely discussed in the books under review, have acted in conformity with the relevant rules of international law in addressing jurisdictional matters and repeatedly expressed their readiness to move forward in a cooperative manner in this realm. There are, of course, significant sensitivities regarding the legal status of the Northern Sea Route and especially the Northwest Passage. But given that commercial traffic on these routes is likely to be limited during the near future, and that the use of these routes will require the active cooperation of the coastal states, regardless of their formal legal status, **opportunities arise for** devising **pragmatic arrangements** governing the use of these waterways. The progress now being made regarding the development of a mandatory Polar Code covering Arctic shipping is good news. The fact that ‘hot spots’ in the search for oil and gas in the Arctic are located, for the most part, in areas that are not subject to jurisdictional disputes is also helpful. Overall, it seems fair to conclude that the **Arctic states are living** up to their promises to deal **with jurisdictional issues in** the region in **a peaceful manner.**

### Adv 2

#### No impact to cesium release

Kaiser 2011 (Tiffany Kaiser, August 2, 2011, “NRC: Far Fewer People Would Die in a U.S. Nuclear Meltdown Than Previously Thought,” Daily Tech, http://www.dailytech.com/NRC+Far+Fewer+People+Would+Die+in+a+US+Nuclear+Meltdown+Than+Previously+Thought/article22330.htm)

The NRC is adjusting previous projections of how much and how quickly cesium 137 would escape in the case of a total blackout¶ The nuclear crisis at Fukushima Daiichi in Japan has caused a nuclear frenzy where leaders around the world are questioning the safety of their plants. For instance, French President Nicolas Sarkozy called for global nuclear review after visiting Japan, and U.S. senators demanded that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) repeat an expensive inspection of the country's nuclear power.¶ But now, the NRC is close to completing a large nuclear study that may ease a few worried minds.¶ The NRC has been working with Sandia National Laboratories (a Department of Energy lab) on a study that revises previous projections of how quickly and how much cesium 137, which is a radioactive material made when uranium is split, could release from a plant after a nuclear core meltdown. The NRC has been working on the study for six years, and it will not be completely finished until next spring. But the nuclear watchdog group, Union of Concerned Scientists, has obtained an early copy of the report through a Freedom of Information Act request.¶ The new study is based on how much and how quickly cesium 137 could escape an American nuclear plant if a total blackout were to occur. A total blackout means complete loss of power from the grid, and backup diesel generators and batteries have failed as well. This leads to a nuclear meltdown. NRC scientists said that a total blackout would be rare at an American plant, but it is better to be safe than sorry. In addition, the NRC wanted to update previous projections related to cesium 137.¶ The NRC focused on two different types of reactors in the U.S.: the Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station in Pennsylvania, which has boiling-water reactors like Fukushima Daiichi, and the Surry Power Station in Virginia, which has pressurized-water reactors. Over 100 different plants were studied. Through computer models and engineering analyses, the NRC has concluded that the meltdown of a typical American reactor would lead to "far fewer deaths" than previously thought.¶ According to the new study, only 1 to 2 percent of a reactor core's cesium 137 could escape during a total blackout. Previous NRC estimates concluded that 60 percent of the cesium inventory could escape.¶ In addition, the new study found that one person in every 4,348 within a 10-mile radius of a nuclear meltdown would develop a "latent cancer" from radiation exposure. In previous estimates, it was one person in every 167.¶ The NRC said that large releases of radioactive material would not be "immediate," meaning that people within a 10-mile radius would have plenty of time to evacuate the premises. It concluded that the chance of death from acute radiation exposure within a 10-mile radius would be near zero, but some would be exposed to high enough doses to experience fatal cancers decades later.

#### Death toll would be “a fraction of a person”- their ev overestimates radioactive releases and speed of accidents

Kaiser 2011 (Tiffany Kaiser, August 2, 2011, “NRC: Far Fewer People Would Die in a U.S. Nuclear Meltdown Than Previously Thought,” Daily Tech, http://www.dailytech.com/NRC+Far+Fewer+People+Would+Die+in+a+US+Nuclear+Meltdown+Than+Previously+Thought/article22330.htm)

"Accidents progress more slowly, in some cases much more slowly, than previously assumed," said Charles G. Tinkler, a senior adviser for research on severe accidents and an author of the study. "Releases are smaller, and in some cases much smaller, of certain key radioactive materials." The NRC's revised projections report tells what temperatures, flows of water and steam pressures would occur in a nuclear meltdown, as well as when leaks would begin after the meltdown. The NRC concluded that Peach Bottom would not release enough radioactive material to cause fatal harm to any human immediately, but could increase the chances of fatal cancer later on. As far as Surry goes, the number of people living within a 10-mile radius was so small that the death toll would be a fraction of a person.

## 2NC

# Topicality

#### Contextual definitions bad – intent to define outweighs

Eric Kupferbreg (University of Kentucky, Senior Assistant Dean, Academic & Faculty Affairs at Northeastern University, College of Professional Studies Associate Director, Trust Initiative at Harvard School of Public Health) 1987 “Limits - The Essence of Topicality” http://groups.wfu.edu/debate/MiscSites/DRGArticles/Kupferberg1987LatAmer.htm

Often, field contextual definitions are too broad or too narrow for debate purposes. Definitions derived from the agricultural sector necessarily incorporated financial and bureaucratic factors which are less relevant in considering a 'should' proposition. Often subject experts' definitions reflected administrative or political motives to expand or limit the relevant jurisdiction of certain actors. Moreover, field context is an insufficient criteria for choosing between competing definitions. A particularly broad field might have several subsets that invite restrictive and even exclusive definitions. (e.g., What is considered 'long-term' for the swine farmer might be significantly different than for the grain farmer.) Why would debaters accept definitions that are inappropriate for debate? If we admit that debate is a unique context, then additional considerations enter into our definitional analysis.

### 2NC Limits Overview

#### They expand limits to any rule that also requires spending by the government

**Schoofs ‘4** (Sam Schoofs, Calvin College, 2004, Washington Internships for Students of Engineering Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers, 6 August 2004 “A federal Renewable Portfolio Standard: Policy Analysis and Proposal”)

D. Renewable Energy Policy Overview There are two main categories of renewable energy policies. The first category gives some financial incentives to encourage renewable energy that includes tax incentives, grants, loans, rebates, and production incentives [13]. Tax incentives cover personal, sales, property, and corporate taxes and they help to reduce the investment costs and to reward investors for their support of renewable energy sources [12], [13]. As an example, 24 states currently have some form of grant program in place that ranges from as small as $500 up to $1,000,000 [13]. The second category of renewable energy policies is called rules and regulations, which mandate a certain action from an obligated entity. Included within this category are renewable portfolio standards, equipment certification, solar/wind access laws, **and green power purchasing**/aggregation polices [13]. As an example, equipment certification allows the states to regulate the performance criteria that equipment is required to meet in order to be eligible for financial incentives [12]. Seven states currently have equipment certification programs in place

#### Literally doubles the educational benefit

**Arrington 2009** (Rebecca, UVA Today, “Study Finds That Students Benefit From Depth, Rather Than Breadth, in High School Science Courses” March 4)

A recent study reports that high school students who study fewer science topics, but study them in greater depth, have an advantage in college science classes over their peers who study more topics and spend less time on each. Robert Tai, associate professor at the University of Virginia's Curry School of Education, worked with Marc S. Schwartz of the University of Texas at Arlington and Philip M. Sadler and Gerhard Sonnert of the Harvard-Smithsonian Center for Astrophysics to conduct the study and produce the report. "Depth Versus Breadth: How Content Coverage in High School Courses Relates to Later Success in College Science Coursework" relates the amount of content covered on a particular topic in high school classes with students' performance in college-level science classes. The study will appear in the July 2009 print edition of Science Education and is currently available as an online pre-print from the journal. "As a former high school teacher, I always worried about whether it was better to teach less in greater depth or more with no real depth. This study offers evidence that teaching fewer topics in greater depth is a better way to prepare students for success in college science," Tai said. "These results are based on the performance of thousands of college science students from across the United States." The 8,310 students in the study were enrolled in introductory biology, chemistry or physics in randomly selected four-year colleges and universities. Those who spent one month or more studying one major topic in-depth in high school earned higher grades in college science than their peers who studied more topics in the same period of time. The study revealed that students in courses that focused on mastering a particular topic were impacted twice as much as those in courses that touched on every major topic

#### Turns their offense—limits are vital to creativity and innovation

David Intrator (President of The Creative Organization) October 21, 2010 “Thinking Inside the Box,” http://www.trainingmag.com/article/thinking-inside-box

One of the most pernicious myths about creativity, one that seriously inhibits creative thinking and innovation, is the belief that one needs to “think outside the box.” As someone who has worked for decades as a professional creative, nothing could be further from the truth. This a is view shared by the vast majority of creatives, expressed famously by the modernist designer Charles Eames when he wrote, “Design depends largely upon constraints.” The myth of thinking outside the box stems from a fundamental misconception of what creativity is, and what it’s not. In the popular imagination, creativity is something weird and wacky. The creative process is magical, or divinely inspired. But, in fact, creativity is not about divine inspiration or magic. It’s about problem-solving, and by definition a problem is a constraint, a limit, a box. One of the best illustrations of this is the work of photographers. They create by excluding the great mass what’s before them, choosing a small frame in which to work. Within that tiny frame, literally a box, they uncover relationships and establish priorities. What makes creative problem-solving uniquely challenging is that you, as the creator, are the one defining the problem. You’re the one choosing the frame. And you alone determine what’s an effective solution. This can be quite demanding, both intellectually and emotionally. Intellectually, you are required to establish limits, set priorities, and cull patterns and relationships from a great deal of material, much of it fragmentary. More often than not, this is the material you generated during brainstorming sessions. At the end of these sessions, you’re usually left with a big mess of ideas, half-ideas, vague notions, and the like. Now, chances are you’ve had a great time making your mess. You might have gone off-site, enjoyed a “brainstorming camp,” played a number of warm-up games. You feel artistic and empowered. But to be truly creative, you have to clean up your mess, organizing those fragments into something real, something useful, something that actually works. That’s the hard part. It takes a lot of energy, time, and willpower to make sense of the mess you’ve just generated. It also can be emotionally difficult. You’ll need to throw out many ideas you originally thought were great, ideas you’ve become attached to, because they simply don’t fit into the rules you’re creating as you build your box.

### 2NC Reasonability

#### Reasonability is impossible – it’s arbitrary and undermines research and preparation

Resnick, assistant professor of political science – Yeshiva University, ‘1

(Evan, “Defining Engagement,” Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 54, Iss. 2)

In matters of national security, establishing a clear definition of terms is a precondition for effective policymaking. Decisionmakers who invoke critical terms in an erratic, ad hoc fashion risk alienating their constituencies. They also risk exacerbating misperceptions and hostility among those the policies target. Scholars who commit the same error undercut their ability to conduct valuable empirical research. Hence, if scholars and policymakers fail rigorously to define "engagement," they undermine the ability to build an effective foreign policy.

# CP

### 2NC Perm Do Both

#### Perm produces massive cost overruns- tanks solvency

Cantarelli, 11 (11/28, Chantal, Delft University of Technology, “Cost Overruns in Large-Scale Transport Infrastructure Projects,” Dutch Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment)

Moreover, cost overruns are considered problematic for the following four reasons (Flyvbjerg et al., 2007, p.6). First of all, “they lead to a Pareto-inefficient allocation of resources, i.e., waste”. Cost forecasts are often inaccurate but the large standard deviations show that the margin by which costs are “wrong” differs across projects. As a consequence, the ranking of projects is affected and “decision makers are likely to implement inferior projects”. Additional budget is required as projects become more expensive than was initially estimated. The budget for other projects can therefore be affected, particularly as the total budget for infrastructure investments is often fixed in a given period. Cost overruns thus result in both financial wastage but also in fewer infrastructure projects being realised than planned. Secondly, cost overruns can “lead to delays and further cost overruns”. When confronted with cost overruns, attempts must be made to secure additional funding and projects must often be renegotiated or reapproved. This inevitably takes time and cost overruns increase with each additional year before implementation (Flyvbjerg et al., 2004). Thirdly, cost overruns “destabilize policy, planning, implementation, and operations of projects”. Cost overruns can lead to continuous reapproval and unrest in the project organisation and parliament. Fourthly, “the problem is getting bigger because projects get bigger”. When projects become more and more expensive and still involve cost overruns, the financial consequences can become so large that it even may destabilise the finances of a whole country or region.

### 2NC Perm Do the CP

#### A wide array of possible technology exists – the CP induces competition between all of them, and reduces overall costs – even if the plan is eventually adopted – it’s adopted with greater overall innovation

**Jenkins et al, 11** – Director of Energy and Climate Policy at the Breakthrough Institute (Jesse, “A NATIONAL CLEAN ENERGY TESTBEDS PROGRAM” November, <http://thebreakthrough.org/blog/Testbeds.pdf>)

N-CET’s first step would be an assessment of the status of advanced energy technologies and a determination as to which broad technology categories would benefit from centralized demonstration sites. DOE staff would lead this process, with input from DOD on technical assessment and military energy technology needs, based on DOD experience with energy technology development, procurement, and use. The assessment process should consider the following criteria in selection of eligible technology categories:¶ 1. Eligible technologies should generally not be considered commercially ready as a result of high perceived technology risk or similar factors;¶ 2. Eligible technologies will require large-scale demonstration before proceeding to commercialization;¶ 3. Accelerating permitting and siting and establishing key infrastructure (e.g., transmission connection) would accelerate demonstration and assessment of technology risks, reduce technology uncertainty, and hasten commercialization for eligible technologies; and¶ 4. Eligible technologies will have the long-term potential to:¶ A. Contribute to the diversification of sources of United States energy supply and reduce the nation’s reliance on fossil energy sources, with a favorable balance of environmental effects if the entire technology system is considered; or¶ B. Help strengthen and enhance US military capabilities and reduce the military’s operational reliance on fossil energy sources; or¶ C. Contribute to reducing, avoiding, or sequestering energy-related greenhouse gas emissions.¶ Under such criteria, technologies that might be suitable for selection include CSP, wave power, floating¶ deep-water wind turbine designs, enhanced/engineered geothermal energy production methods, modular¶ nuclear reactor designs, carbon capture and storage technologies for fossil fuel and biomass-fired power¶ plants, and grid-connected energy storage technologies, among others. The decision of the technology¶ assessment panel would direct N-CET as to what kinds of demonstration sites would be necessary.¶ After an initial period of time (e.g., several years), N-CET would re-asses technology needs and consider¶ new demonstration zones and/or alterations or closures for existing N-CET zones.¶ Demonstration Site Selection and Preparation¶ Based on the results of the technology assessment and selection, N-CET would identify potential demonstration sites on federal lands and waters. This task would fall to DOI and DOD, as the primary stewards of suitable public lands and waters, although DOE-managed sites throughout the country would also be considered. The process would ensure that the best possible sites are identified for each technology type, while minimizing costs to the government.¶ Of the possible sites, DOE and DOD would select the sites best suited to be a “demonstration zone” for each technology category. Some necessary qualities—size, geology, and weather, for example— would vary by technology type, but all sites would require electricity grid interconnection or suitable indigenous, on-site demand (e.g., from military or industrial facilities or other large-scale energy consumers). Therefore, sites with advantageous existing infrastructure, such as electricity substations, large on-site energy demand, and/or proximity to long-distance transmission lines would be favored.¶ Each demonstration zone would ideally house a number of individual “testbeds”—ready-to-use sites suitable for large-scale demonstration of a given technology design—in order for multiple designs to undergo demonstration simultaneously. If an appropriate number of testbeds cannot be accommodated in a single demonstration zone, multiple demonstration zone locations may be selected for a given technology category.¶ In addition to identifying suitable sites, N-CET would facilitate demonstration by pre-permitting testbeds and conducting programmatic environmental impact statement (EIS) assessments for demonstration zones. DOI would head this effort with support from DOE. 25 Similar actions are already underway on public lands. For example, as part its efforts to comply with the Energy Policy Act of 2005, which calls for greater use of public lands for energy production, BLM has completed programmatic environmental impact statements for commercial, utility-scale wind and geothermal plant siting on BLM-managed lands and is currently conducting a programmatic EIS for solar energy plants. 26¶ N-CET would further lower the barriers to demonstration by supplying the appropriate basic infrastructure for the demonstration zones, according to technology type. This would include access roads or port facilities, water supply as needed for plant cooling, and basic testbed site preparation to prepare for construction activities.¶ In order to provide true performance evaluations, all N-CET demonstration zones would be grid-connected or serve suitable indigenous, on-site energy load centers. As needed, N-CET would build or upgrade substations and transmission grid interconnection infrastructure. N-CET would also prenegotiate interconnection and transmission capacity allocation agreements with transmission line owners, to be finalized after specific technology designs have been selected.¶ By establishing plug and play testbeds at N-CET demonstration zones, the program will greatly reduce the demonstration hurdles faced by new and innovative clean energy technologies. By reducing the cost, time, and permitting burdens associated with finding and preparing sites for demonstration, N-CET will allow more designs to reach demonstration and accelerate the commercialization of promising clean energy technologies.¶ Competitive Application Process¶ After establishing an operational demonstration zone, N-CET would oversee a competitive application process to select the designs that would be granted use of the testbeds. Applicants could be any private firms, public-private partnerships, or consortia whose technology fits the qualities outlined above for technology assessment. The design must have long-term potential to reach a market-competitive price and/or should meet military procurement requirements. Applicant designs must be sufficiently advanced to conduct a grid-connected, large-scale pilot or full-scale demonstration. Applicants must also prove their ability to meet their share of the project-specific financing, discussed further below.¶ Financing¶ N-CET could be housed within DOE, but with a separate congressional authorization and high level of autonomy so that it can most freely function as a productive collaboration between DOE, DOD, and DOI. N-CET’s budget would provide funding for technology assessment, site selection, pre-permitting, programmatic EISs, construction of basic common infrastructure, applicant selection, and program administration.¶ Securing project-specific financing to cover the cost of demonstration project construction and installation, operation, testing, validation, and monitoring would be the responsibility of the project applicant. While applicants may draw on existing federal programs designed to finance or reduce risk for innovative energy technology demonstrations, at least 35 percent of project financing costs should be provided by private sector participants in the project. 27 This cost share requirement will ensure private sector involvement, a necessary step to reduce technology risk and spur commercialization.¶ While N-CET is a novel concept that will reduce key barriers to financing the demonstration and commercialization of nascent clean energy technologies, it remains one piece of the larger puzzle of securing financing for these early-stage energy technologies. This proposal will need to be considered along with other financing mechanisms to address the wide range of financing challenges that face innovative clean energy companies along the entire technology innovation lifecycle. 28¶ Department of Defense Participation¶ As the nation’s single largest energy consumer, the DOD has strong motivation to optimize its energy use. As discussed earlier, the military has an acute need for non-fossil fuel alternatives and to enhance the resiliency of electricity grids at military facilities at home and abroad. As a result, DOD is motivated to explore new options and is already accelerating the demonstration of biofuels for Air Force aircraft and Navy vessels and opening military lands for clean energy generation. 29¶ N-CET will provide DOD further opportunities to engage in dual-use energy technology demonstrations to meet civilian and military energy needs. As part of the N-CET technology assessment and selection process, DOD will be able to highlight and recommend technologies it deems necessary and beneficial. DOD may also opt to make its own lands available for demonstration zones. In addition, the military is likely to be a willing and effective partner in clean energy innovation efforts.¶ The CNA Military Advisory Board finds that “in the course of addressing its most serious energy challenges, the Department of Defense can contribute to national solutions as a technological innovator, early adopter, and testbed.” 30 Because of its unique structure, leadership culture, and experience with technology innovation, DOD “can be a powerful catalyst of energy innovation,” especially when collaborating with other agencies. 31 N-CET will provide an invaluable opportunity for DOD to act on these advantages in collaboration with DOE, serving as a guide and testbed in the country’s search for effective advanced energy technologies.

#### Process over product – this counterplan encourages the development of better researched and planned policies and is vital to being a competent advocate for energy policy – the alternative is policy failure

**Nolon 11** – Associate Professor of Law and Dispute Resolution Program Director, Vermont Law School

(Sean, “NEGOTIATING THE WIND: A FRAMEWORK TO ENGAGE CITIZENS IN SITING WIND TURBINES”, <http://cojcr.org/vol12no2/327-372.pdf>, dml)

Despite demonstrated need and available technology, the promise of wind energy has yet to live up to its potential. As a society, we see the benefits of renewable sources of energy but struggle to implement our vision through siting of new facilities. In some instances, this gap results from opposition caused by applicants’ and regulators’ emphasis (read: overemphasis) on the substance rather than the process of decision-making. Applicants often enter an approval process expecting that doling out concessions will adequately address citizen opposition. The resulting opposition is often as much a product of what was proposed as how it was proposed. 210 Attending to procedural needs as well as substantive needs can offer some solace to weary and suspicious citizens and provide the substrate on which a satisfactory solution can be reached.

#### resolved --- it means permanence and certainty

Google Dictionary, 12-

[“Define Resolved” <https://www.google.com/search?q=define+resolved&ie=utf-8&oe=utf-8&aq=t&rls=org.mozilla:en-US:official&client=firefox-a>]

Firmly determined to do something.

#### It must be definite

**Dictionary.com** ([www.dictionary.com/browsed/resolved](http://www.dictionary.com/browsed/resolved)

Resolve:

to come to a definite or earnest decision about; determine (to do something): I have resolved that I shall live to the full.

#### should requires immediate legal effect

Summers, 94-

 [Justice – Oklahoma Supreme Court, “Kelsey v. Dollarsaver Food Warehouse of Durant”, 1994 OK 123, 11-8, <http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287#marker3fn13>]

¶4 The legal question to be resolved by the court is whether the word "should"[13](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287#marker3fn13) in the May 18 order connotes futurity or may be deemed a ruling in praesenti.[14](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287#marker3fn14) The answer to this query is not to be divined from rules of grammar;[15](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287#marker3fn15) it must be governed by the age-old practice culture of legal professionals and its immemorial language usage. To determine if the omission (from the critical May 18 entry) of the turgid phrase, "and the same hereby is", (1) makes it an in futuro ruling - i.e., an expression of what the judge will or would do at a later stage - or (2) constitutes an in in praesenti resolution of a disputed law issue, the trial judge's intent must be garnered from the four corners of the entire record.[16](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287#marker3fn16)  [CONTINUES – TO FOOTNOTE] [13](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287#marker2fn13) "Should" not only is used as a "present indicative" synonymous with ought but also is the past tense of "shall" with various shades of meaning not always easy to analyze. See 57 C.J. Shall § 9, Judgments § 121 (1932). O. JESPERSEN, GROWTH AND STRUCTURE OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1984); St. Louis & S.F.R. Co. v. Brown, 45 Okl. 143, 144 P. 1075, 1080-81 (1914). For a more detailed explanation, see the Partridge quotation infra note 15. Certain contexts mandate a construction of the term "should" as more than merely indicating preference or desirability. Brown, supra at 1080-81 (jury instructions stating that jurors "should" reduce the amount of damages in proportion to the amount of contributory negligence of the plaintiff was held to imply an obligation and to be more than advisory); Carrigan v. California Horse Racing Board, 60 Wash. App. 79, [802 P.2d 813](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/deliverdocument.asp?box1=802&box2=P.2D&box3=813) (1990) (one of the Rules of Appellate Procedure requiring that a party "should devote a section of the brief to the request for the fee or expenses" was interpreted to mean that a party is under an obligation to include the requested segment); State v. Rack, 318 S.W.2d 211, 215 (Mo. 1958) ("should" would mean the same as "shall" or "must" when used in an instruction to the jury which tells the triers they "should disregard false testimony"). [14](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287#marker2fn14) In praesenti means literally "at the present time." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 792 (6th Ed. 1990). In legal parlance the phrase denotes that which in law is presently or immediately effective, as opposed to something that will or would become effective in the future [in futurol]. See Van Wyck v. Knevals, [106 U.S. 360](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/deliverdocument.asp?box1=106&box2=U.S.&box3=360), 365, 1 S.Ct. 336, 337, 27 L.Ed. 201 (1882).

### 2NC Solvency

#### The performance standard maximizes ability to meet energy needs

**Crowley et al, 7 –** chair of study done by LMI Government Consulting for the DOD (Thomas, TRANSFORMING THE WAY DOD LOOKS AT ENERGY: AN APPROACH TO ESTABLISHING AN ENERGY STRATEGY

<http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA467003&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf>)

To coordinate the efforts of DoD components, provide strategic direction, focus research and development efforts, and monitor compliance with energy-efficiency guidelines, DoD needs an effective energy governance structure. We recommend that DoD establish a coordinating body with policy and resource oversight authority. Considering the need for collaboration among the services and DoD, we believe an empowered committee would be more effective that a single leader.

From our survey of emerging energy technologies, the department has a wide range of options for addressing energy efficiency and alternate sources of energy. Under the guidance of the coordinating body, DoD can begin a structured analysis of how to apply organizational, process, and technology changes to execute a strategy to reduce energy dependence. Although assessing the strategic, operational, fiscal, and environmental impacts of a change provides a mechanism to value potential choices, these impacts may not provide sufficient insight to be determinative. To promote the changes that will have the greatest utility in addressing the disconnects, we recommend that the department begin by focusing on three areas:

􀂡 Greatest fuel use (aviation forces)

􀂡 Greatest logistic difficulty (forward land forces and mobile electric power)

􀂡 Greatest warrior impact (individual warfighter burden).

DoD energy transformation must begin in the near term, addressing current practices and legacy forces, while investing for long-term changes that may radically alter future consumption patterns. We recommend a time-phased approach to reduce our reliance on fossil and carbon-based fuels. This approach includes the following:

􀂡 Organizational and process changes that can be implemented immediately

􀂡 Engineered solutions, to improve the efficiency of current forces and those nearing acquisition

􀂡 Invention of new capabilities, employed in new operational concepts, for those forces yet to be developed.

Applying this approach to the three focus areas will give DoD an opportunity to develop portfolios of solutions that can reduce energy use and dependence**. The** coordinating **body can evaluate these portfolios** to **against** the energy disconnects to identify optimal solutions across the services, broader department objectives, and U.S. government strategic objectives and energy efforts. The coordinating body can then focus technology development as required to achieve the desired solutions.

For the energy transformation to be successful, DoD’s senior leaders must articulate a clear vision for the change and must ensure—through their sustained commitment and active participation—that it becomes engrained in the organization’s

ethos. We propose the following vision:

DoD will be the nation’s leader in the effective use of energy, significantly reducing DoD’s dependence on traditional fuels and enhancing operational primacy through reduced logistics support requirements.

Establishing a goal for mobility energy efficiency will provide near-term objectives in support of the vision, enhance operational effectiveness by reducing logistics support requirements, and free resources for recapitalization of the force. Our estimates show that implementing a 3 percent reduction per year until 2015 could result in savings of $43 billion by 2030 based on Energy Information Agency reference case price projections, without including any multiplier effects.

### 2NC Certainty Solvency Deficit

#### Reverse auctions provide political certainty to drive widespread commercial investment

**ACORE, 12** – American Council on Renewable Energy “Reverse Auctions for Renewable Energy Smart Policy in Everyone’s Best Interest” 5/29, <http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&ved=0CDcQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.acore.org%2Fwp-content%2Fuploads%2F2012%2F06%2FReverse-Auctions-for-Renewable-Energy-5.29.12.docx&ei=Hf-LUMjuELTI0AHDiIHQCQ&usg=AFQjCNG4jwxCIPdfUR8s7ctf4QNhSb5mJw>

The renewables sector should look beyond its support of tax-based support policy mechanisms to more market driven support policies, such as reverse auctions, that work in the best interest of all stakeholders by driving volume and installations and further reducing costs to the consumer. The policy proposal to create a Reverse Auction Authority that has the power to distribute support monies from an “American Energy Trust Fund”, for example, would provide the political certainty that the renewables sector needs and further assist renewable energy technologies along their respective cost curves towards grid parity, enabling sustainable long-term growth of this industry in the U.S.

# Case

### Enviro D

#### Environmental collapse wont cause extinction

Gregg Easterbrook (a senior fellow at The New Republic) July 2003 “We're All Gonna Die!” http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/11.07/doomsday.html?pg=1&topic=&topic\_set=

If we're talking about doomsday - the end of human civilization - many scenarios simply don't measure up. A single nuclear bomb ignited by terrorists, for example, would be awful beyond words, but life would go on. People and machines might converge in ways that you and I would find ghastly, but from the standpoint of the future, they would probably represent an adaptation. Environmental collapse might make parts of the globe unpleasant, but considering that the biosphere has survived ice ages, it wouldn't be the final curtain. Depression, which has become 10 times more prevalent in Western nations in the postwar era, might grow so widespread that vast numbers of people would refuse to get out of bed, a possibility that Petranek suggested in a doomsday talk at the Technology Entertainment Design conference in 2002. But Marcel Proust, as miserable as he was, wrote Remembrance of Things Past while lying in bed.

## Russia

### Russia Relations

#### Civilian nuclear coop now

World Nuclear News 2011 [World Nuclear News 21 September 2011 “USA and Russia commit to expand nuclear power” http://www.world-nuclear-news.org/NP\_USA\_and\_Russia\_commit\_to\_expand\_nuclear\_power\_2109111.html]

Energy leaders from Russia and America have made a "commitment to supporting the safe and secure expansion of civil nuclear energy" on the sidelines of the International Atomic Energy Agency's General Conference.¶ ¶ Officials from the US Department of Energy and Russia's Rosatom signed what the US side called a "joint statement on strategic direction of US-Russia nuclear cooperation." US energy secretary Stephen Chu said it was a milestone for the two nuclear energy pioneers. They were long separated by their opposition during the Cold War, but now share a leading role in nuclear security and disarmament.

### Prolif

#### Nuclear proliferation induces caution to otherwise violent regimes

Jonathan **Tepperman** Newsweek Aug 29, **2009** “Why Obama Should Learn to Love the Bomb” http://www.newsweek.com/id/214248/page/1

The argument that nuclear weapons can be agents of peace as well as destruction rests on two deceptively simple observations. First, nuclear weapons have not been used since 1945. Second, there's never been a nuclear, or even a nonnuclear, war between two states that possess them. Just stop for a second and think about that: it's hard to overstate how remarkable it is, especially given the singular viciousness of the 20th century. As Kenneth Waltz, the leading "nuclear optimist" and a professor emeritus of political science at UC Berkeley puts it, "We now have 64 years of experience since Hiroshima. It's striking and against all historical precedent that for that substantial period, there has not been any war among nuclear states." To understand why—and why the next 64 years are likely to play out the same way—you need to start by recognizing that all states are rational on some basic level. Their leaders may be stupid, petty, venal, even evil, but they tend to do things only when they're pretty sure they can get away with them. Take war: a country will start a fight only when it's almost certain it can get what it wants at an acceptable price. Not even Hitler or Saddam waged wars they didn't think they could win. The problem historically has been that leaders often make the wrong gamble and underestimate the other side—and millions of innocents pay the price. Nuclear weapons change all that by making the costs of war obvious, inevitable, and unacceptable. Suddenly, when both sides have the ability to turn the other to ashes with the push of a button—and everybody knows it—the basic math shifts. Even the craziest tin-pot dictator is forced to accept that war with a nuclear state is unwinnable and thus not worth the effort. As Waltz puts it, "Why fight if you can't win and might lose everything?"

#### Russian weapons are secure- they have impassable security features and are easily recovered.

Mueller 2008 (John Mueller, pub. date: 1-1-08, Dept. of Political Science Ohio State Univ., “THE ATOMIC TERRORIST: ASSESSING THE LIKELIHOOD,” http://polisci.osu.edu/faculty/jmueller/APSACHGO.PDF)

It might be added that Russia has an intense interest in controlling any weapons on its territory since it is likely to be a prime target of any illicit use by terrorist groups, particularly, of course, Chechen ones with whom it has been waging an vicious on-and-off war for over a decade (Cameron 2004, 84). Officials there insist that all weapons have either been destroyed or are secured, and the experts polled by Linzer (2004) point out that "it would be very difficult

for terrorists to figure out on their own how to work a Russian or Pakistan bomb" even if they did obtain one because even the simplest of these "has some security features that would have to be defeated before it could be used" (see also Kamp 1996, 34; Wirz and Egger 2005, 502; Langewiesche 2007, 19). One of the experts, Charles Ferguson, stresses You’d have to run it through a specific sequence of events, including changes in temperature, pressure and environmental conditions before the weapon would allow itself to be armed, for the fuses to fall into place and then for it to allow itself to be fired. You don't get off the shelf, enter a code and have it go off. Moreover, continues Linzer, most bombs that could conceivably be stolen use plutonium which emits a great deal of radiation that could relatively easily be detected by passive sensors at ports and other points of transmission.

### 2NC Russian Loose Nukes

#### No loose nukes—Russia takes steps to ensure none are vulnerable to theft—Even if terrorists got them they wouldn’t be able to use them—Several layers of security—Prefer Mueller, he’s a professor of political science

#### No loose nukes

RIA. "Nuclear Terrorism "Impossible In Russia" - Army Expert." 29 Sep. 2001. http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/5467.html

\*\*\*Cites member of the Coordinating Council of the Russian Armed Forces\*\*\*

Vladimir Bentsianov, member of the coordinating council of the Russian armed forces and chairman of the Russian committee of veterans of the special risk unit, is convinced that nuclear terrorism in Russia is impossible. RIA-Novosti says he expressed this view today at a news conference entitled "Is nuclear terrorism possible in Russia? – 50 years of war without nuclear weapons being used". He said that "there can be no nuclear terrorism in Russia".Sergey Alekseyenko, who took part in the testing of nuclear weapons in Semipalatinsk, noted that from 1955 to 1975 such robust special depots, shelters and fortifications were created on the territory of the USSR that it is simply impossible to somehow steal an atomic bomb or nuclear weapon part. Also, Alekseyenko stressed, the depots were designed in such a way that they could withstand an impact of 40 kilotonnes, and were built to last for 500 years. He also believes that special emphasis has to be placed on guarding atomic power stations. He stressed that physicists and nuclear specialists have to look at the real problems of reprocessing nuclear waste, the storage of which he believes is a very expensive business. Science must therefore make every effort now to make a thorough study of the atom, he noted.

### Russia War

#### Russia is not aggressive- looking for cooperation

Itar-Tass 2012 [Itar-Tass 28/02/2012 “Experts see no aggressiveness in Putin’s foreign policy article” http://www.itar-tass.com/en/c39/354109.pdf]

Outright criticism of the United States and NATO in the international scene has prompted some analysts to speculate that¶ with Putin’s return to the Kremlin Russia’s foreign policy will get tougher. However, the key idea of most commentaries is¶ this: the national leader defends Russia’s interests in the world arena, and the article is not aggressive, it merely expresses¶ the expectation Russia will be respected. In his article titled Russia and the Changing World Putin says the country will not¶ be isolating itself and wishes to stay open and cooperate with al l other countries in various fields , including the¶ strengthening of universal security, but at the same time it believes it will be impermissible for individual countries and¶ blocks to encroach on state sovereignty.¶ Putin unequivocally accused the United States and NATO of “undermining confidence” and pointed out that “some aspects¶ of their behavior do not fit in with the logic of modern development and rely on the stereotypes of bloc mentality.” Russia, as¶ follows from the article, is most resentful over NATO’s expansion and plans for building a missile defense system in Europe.¶ The United States and NATO, Putin believes, on the pretext of human rights protection has abused the sovereignty of other¶ states in a series of armed conflicts. Moreover, it was protecting human rights “selectively,” while violating the right of¶ masses of other people to life. The events of the ”Arab spring,” and the outcome of the operation in Iraq have brought about¶ a situation where religious extremism is on the rise in the countries involved, and the situation is getting even worse than it¶ had been before external intervention, he said.¶ In his analysis of the West’s participation in the events of the “Arab spring” and its actions in the Middle East in general Putin¶ calls in question whether the aims of the United States and NATO are really ‘noble’. He speculates that the real aims are not¶ the establishment of democracy or the protection of human rights, but “interest in the re-division of markets.” Such foreign¶ interference, whatever noble goals may be used as a cover-up, is confined to actual support for one of the parties to a¶ conflict and to ousting the latter’s rival with the net effect “domination of one force is replaced by a still more aggressive¶ domination of the other,” Putin said.¶ Alongside his critical description of the United States’ foreign policy Putin believes that “in periods of international¶ turbulence close and trusting cooperation by Moscow and Washington is particularly in great demand.” In relations with the¶ United States Russia is prepared for a qualitative breakthrough on the condition “the Americans will be guided in reality by¶ the principles of equitable partnership and mutual respect.”¶ “Putin is contesting the Russian presidency and for that reason he was obliged to formulate Russia’s attitude to a number of¶ fundamental issues very harshly. This article was written not only for the people of Russia. With it the prime minster sends a¶ message to our neighbors, partners and competitors. If the article were written for the sole purpose of maneuvering, it would¶ remain unnoticed, the deputy chairman of the State Duma’s international affairs committee, is quoted by Life News as¶ saying.¶ At the same time Putin not only identified the problems of international community, but proposed ways of handling them,¶ the legislator said. For instance, he not only mentioned our differences over the missile defense issue, but also called for¶ enhancing cooperation, thereby easing the risk of a major international conflict.¶ “This article is a demand for respecting Russia,” the weekly Argumenty I Fakty quotes the general director of the Center forPolitical Information, Alexei Mukhin, as saying. “Putin has not proposed some new foreign policy strategy, he merely stated¶ that at a certain point Russia selected the correct path to follow, and if it continues along it, it will achieve respect. The most¶ important thing is the prime minister declared he is a serious person and does not change his views under the influence of¶ time-serving political considerations.”¶ “There are some nuances, but in general the point of view is clear and stable,” political scientist Fyodor Lukyanov said on¶ the Russian News Service radio station. “I believe that in this article there is nothing offensive or aggressive. It is rather¶ defensive. It describes the world in which Russia will have to exist during his hypothetical presidency as a very dangerous¶ place.”¶ “It is very important the article declares that despite the existing controversies and problems Russia sees the United States¶ as a partner,” the RBC Daily quotes political scientist Alexei Zudin as saying. “Certainly there will be attempts to interpret¶ the foreign policy approaches, declared in that article, as aggressive. I believe that this does not agree with the reality.

#### No aggressive Russia- personnel constraints

Stratfor 2012 [Stratfor August 31, 2012 “The Future of Russia's Military: Part 5” http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/future-russias-military-part-5]

One challenge facing the Kremlin is recruitment. Several factors, including negative demographic trends, have undermined the military's ability to recruit and retain a sufficient number of quality personnel.¶ According to official numbers from the Russian armed forces, the military can currently build an estimated maximum force of 800,000 personnel -- a smaller figure than the 1 million personnel target usually given. In April 2012, the military comprised 160,100 officers, 189,700 contract soldiers and 317,200 conscripts. Taking retention rates and general attrition levels into account, the Russian military needs to conscript around 300,000 people during each of its drafts to maintain target troop levels of 1 million.¶ However, the military has reportedly fallen short of its conscription goals in recent years, with 280,000 Russians inducted in the fall 2010 draft, 218,720 in spring 2011, 135,850 in fall 2011 and 132,000 in spring 2012. An increasing number of violations associated with the draft is thus unsurprising. During the fall 2011 draft, officials who were under pressure to meet even the lowered targets committed some 6,000 violations in the conscription of Russians considered unfit to serve.¶ The conscription problems have forced the military to attempt to recruit higher numbers of contract soldiers by raising salaries and improving living conditions. These efforts require considerable funding, but they will be central to the modernization of the Russian military moving forward.

## 1NR

### Exceptionalism Bad

#### Exceptional logic collapses heg- causes overstretch

Edwards 2012 [Jason A. is Assistant Professor of Communication Studies at Bridgewater State University in Massachusetts.¶ Rhetoric & Public Affairs¶ Volume 15, Number 2, Summer 2012 “An Exceptional Debate:¶ The Championing of and Challenge to American Exceptionalism” Project Muse]

Andrew Bacevich’s The Limits of Power, like Hodgson’s work, challenges [End Page 358] America’s exceptionalist ethos. A primary difference between the two books is that Bacevich does not deny that the United States is exceptional; rather, he maintains that exceptionalism as it is currently construed has been one of the leading culprits in America’s current crisis. Since the beginning of the War on Terror, Bacevich has advocated, in two previous books, that the United States needs to revise its foreign policy, and he has argued that the United States has begun a slow march to empire.9 Those two books laid the groundwork for many of the ideas presented in The Limits of Power. However, this book is his manifesto.¶ Over an introduction, three chapters, and a conclusion, Bacevich argues that the malevolent actions of Saddam Hussein and Osama Bin Laden cannot explain why the United States seems to be perpetually involved in conflict. Instead of looking abroad for an explanation, Bacevich perceives the crisis is “of our own making” (6). It stems from America’s supposed providential duty to spread freedom. “Freedom is the altar at which Americans worship, whatever their nominal religious persuasion,” Bacevich asserts (6). Conversely, that freedom comes at great cost. As Americans pursued freedom, they generated a penchant for empire. Consequently, they racked up obligations and debts that make it increasingly difficult for the United States to operate within the world. While the country increased its commitments abroad, it has not sacrificed at home. Our appetites for consumption continue to grow. Demand for cheap products and our sense of entitlement because of American power have led the United States to a set of interlocking crises—economic, political, and military—that put America’s domestic health at risk. The Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts exacerbate a problem that has been building since the end of World War II. Yet it is those conflicts that may serve as a wake-up call for the United States to get its political house in order.¶ In the next three chapters, Bacevich chronicles these interlocking crises. The first crisis is profligacy. Bacevich asserts that if there is one word that currently characterizes American identity, it is the word “more” (16). Similar to Hodgson, Bacevich traces this profligacy crisis to the 1970s. Over the past forty years, the average American’s pursuit of happiness has been found in what she or he consumes, while shedding any civic constraint that might interfere with this consumption. The foreign policy implication for this consumption has “given birth to a condition of profound dependency” (16). Americans have not lost the ethic of hard work, but our current way of life outstrips our domestic capacity to satisfy our consumption. Accordingly, Republican and Democratic presidents expand our international [End Page 359] commitments, engagements, and skirmishes to assure our way of life. All the while, Americans have never been called upon to sacrifice. Correspondingly, Bacevich opines that “Americans have yet to realize that they have forfeited command of their own destiny. The relationship between expansionism, abundance, and freedom—each reinforcing the other—no longer exists. If anything, the reverse is true: Expansionism squanders American wealth and power, while putting freedom at risk” (65–66).¶ In chapter 2, Bacevich identifies the political crisis the United States faces. This crisis stems primarily from three areas. First, over the past sixty years the United States has created an ideology of national security. This ideology asserts that America, as the embodiment and herald of freedom, must pursue an international agenda where freedom must prevail everywhere, thus ensuring America’s way of life. The ideology does not prescribe any specific action, but it has become hard-wired into America’s psyche, compelling the United States to act because it believes it has a providential duty to do so. That duty led to America’s involvement in places it never should have gone. A second area that created this crisis has been the expansion of a national security apparatus. The United States spends billions of dollars and has millions of personnel working in some way, shape, or form to maintain a huge presence around the world. The apparatus has grown so large and entrenched that the United States appears compelled to maintain a constant military presence so the apparatus does not shrink, lest it cost hundreds of thousands of Americans their jobs. Finally, presidents have increasingly relied on a series of “wise men” to help them make foreign policy, offering advice that supports an expansion of America’s presence abroad and that often has led the United States to pursue foreign policy adventures that become too costly, in blood and treasure, to bear.¶ Chapter 3 identifies America’s military crisis. Bacevich maintains that Americans have over-appraised the utility of American military power. This over-appraisal comes from three illusions. First, Americans became convinced that our use of force in the 1980s was more precise, discriminating, and potentially humane than ever before. Second, America’s civilian and military leaders subscribed to a set of principles that promised to prevent any recurrence of Vietnam. Finally, the military and American society patched up the differences that became apparent during the Vietnam years. These illusions led the United States to pursue a series of small wars that perpetuated a sense of invincibility about America’s military might. The failure to achieve quick or decisive victories in Iraq and Afghanistan, he argues, suggests that [End Page 360] we have not fully learned the lessons of the past and thus have continued to pursue the same policies over the past thirty years.¶ Despite these crises, Bacevich argues that the failure in Iraq might finally wake up America’s politicians and people. He asserts that to cure these crises the United States must accept limits upon its power. It must give up its penchant for unilateralism and negotiate with its partners. It must abandon the idea that it can tutor anyone, including the Muslim world, on the matters of freedom. As he puts it, “[T]he principle informing policy should be this: Let Islam be Islam. In the end, Muslims will have to discover for themselves the shortcomings of political Islam, much as the Russians discovered the defects in Marxism-Leninism and the Chinese came to appreciate the flaws in Maoism” (177). For Bacevich, the current notion of American exceptionalism—that the United States must spread freedom around the world and pursue any policy it wants—is doomed to fail. Instead, the United States must approach the world for how it is and not how it wants it to be. It must obey the rules that apply to other countries. If not, any exceptional nature that America has left will surely see its end.

#### The belief of a mandate from heaven is the imperial hubris that has collapsed previous hegemons

Walt 2011[Stephen M. Walt, an FP contributing editor, is Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international affairs at Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government NOVEMBER 2011, Foreign Policy, “The Myth of American Exceptionalism” http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/10/11/the\_myth\_of\_american\_exceptionalism]

Confidence is a valuable commodity for any country. But when a nation starts to think it enjoys the mandate of heaven and becomes convinced that it cannot fail or be led astray by scoundrels or incompetents, then reality is likely to deliver a swift rebuke. Ancient Athens, Napoleonic France, imperial Japan, and countless other countries have succumbed to this sort of hubris, and nearly always with catastrophic results.¶ Despite America's many successes, the country is hardly immune from setbacks, follies, and boneheaded blunders. If you have any doubts about that, just reflect on how a decade of ill-advised tax cuts, two costly and unsuccessful wars, and a financial meltdown driven mostly by greed and corruption have managed to squander the privileged position the United States enjoyed at the end of the 20th century. Instead of assuming that God is on their side, perhaps Americans should heed Abraham Lincoln's admonition that our greatest concern should be "whether we are on God's side."

### Framework 2NC (Short)

#### Discourses of energy policy determine the solutions that we attempt

Laura Nader University of California, Berkeley Anthropological Quarterly 77.4 (2004) 771-791 “The Harder Path—Shifting Gears” Project Muse

I came to realize that energy discourses were often one of "no option." The inevitablity syndrome I called it. Whatever path was being proposed was a "have to path." For example, "we have to push nuclear because there are no alternatives." Such a coercive frame was limiting to say the least, especially [End Page 775] since other options were what was being examined. Method was also part of the problem. For example, growth models—that took for granted increasing per capita energy consumption—were disabling when economists (even Nobel economists) were examining less is more options. Also striking was the omnipresent model of unilinear development (a concept that anthropologists had left in the dust decades earlier), with little general understanding of macro-processes. For example, the recognition that civilizations arise but that they also collapse was missing from the thinking about the present. Prevalent was the nineteenth century belief that technological progress was equivalent to social progress. In such a progressivist evolutionary frame science too could only rise and not fall or wane. Furthermore, the possibility that experts might be part of the problem was novel to the expert who thought that he stood outside of the problem. The idea that the energy problem had human dimensions, that it was a human problem, slowly began to sink in, although such realization was rarely attributed to social science sources. Many of my commentaries were adamantly opposed in those years, to put it mildly. Colleagues rejected the idea that the science bureaucracies had a limiting effect on definitions and solutions, and also a framing effect on cultural outlook. This view was adamantly opposed by directors at Lawrence Livermore Laboratory, and by those who believe that science is autonomous and culture free.

#### We are intellectuals not policymakers- this means you should think more about the academic content than the political ramifications-Now is the key time to question exceptionalism- we have to make a decision about our future course

Edwards 2012 [Jason A. is Assistant Professor of Communication Studies at Bridgewater State University in Massachusetts.¶ Rhetoric & Public Affairs¶ Volume 15, Number 2, Summer 2012 “An Exceptional Debate:¶ The Championing of and Challenge to American Exceptionalism” Project Muse]

The hullabaloo over Obama’s rhetoric is symptomatic of a larger debate in the United States concerning its exceptionalist ethos, which is fundamental to questions concerning who we are as Americans, where we are going, and how we relate to the world around us.7 American exceptionalism is the belief that the United States is unique among, if not superior to, other nation-states. It is the fundamental agent that has underwritten arguments concerning America’s destiny.8 Currently, our exceptionalist ethos is in flux, partly because of the drumbeat of American decline that has become a constant refrain in American politics. Accordingly, the nature of American exceptionalism and how we enact that exceptionalism is under debate. A number of recent works have spoken to how American exceptionalism has manifested itself in U.S. history, how it can be restored, and how it endangers the United States. Read together, these works demonstrate the power and seduction that American exceptionalism still holds in U.S. politics and culture. My [End Page 352] aim in this review essay is to outline the contours of the debate concerning American exceptionalism, while providing insight into its specific flashpoints, champions, and challengers. Ultimately, the books reviewed here point to present and future self-reflection Americans must have about who they are and how they interact with the outside world.

### A2 Perm

#### Exceptional discourse pervades and interferes in every American discourse

Edwards 2012 [Jason A. is Assistant Professor of Communication Studies at Bridgewater State University in Massachusetts.¶ Rhetoric & Public Affairs¶ Volume 15, Number 2, Summer 2012 “An Exceptional Debate:¶ The Championing of and Challenge to American Exceptionalism” Project Muse]

I begin this review essay with Sylvia Söderlind and James Taylor Carson’s edited collection American Exceptionalisms, which chronicles how exceptionalism has manifested itself throughout U.S. history. These essays, according to the introduction, illustrate “both the history and the pervasiveness of the assumptions underlying the political debate about the role of the United States in the world. Our premise is that exceptionalism . . . inflects every discourse involving relations between the United States and its—internal as well as external—others and that even dissenting counterdiscourses rely on the commonality of assumptions underlying the national ethos” (9). Through 11 chapters and an afterword, Söderlind and Carson have gathered together a group of scholars who have a common desire to “understand how and why the rhetoric of exceptionalism has shaped, and continues to shape, the writing of history and culture in the United States” (9). I highlight four representative chapters.

#### Americans have a tendency to overestimate our benefits to the world- prevents effective policy

Walt 2011[Stephen M. Walt, an FP contributing editor, is Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international affairs at Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government NOVEMBER 2011, Foreign Policy, “The Myth of American Exceptionalism” http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/10/11/the\_myth\_of\_american\_exceptionalism]

Bottom line: Americans take too much credit for global progress and accept too little blame for areas where U.S. policy has in fact been counterproductive. Americans are blind to their weak spots, and in ways that have real-world consequences. Remember when Pentagon planners thought U.S. troops would be greeted in Baghdad with flowers and parades? They mostly got RPGs and IEDs instead.

Aff cannot be divorced from its poor linear modeling- takes out the aff

Steven Bernstein et al (Richard Ned Lebow, Janice Gross Stein, and Steven Weber, University of Toronto, Ohio State, and Berkeley) 2000 “God Gave Physics the Easy Problems: Adapting Social Science to an Unpredictable World” European Journal of International Relations vol 43 No 6

This vision has been largely lost From the vantage point of the 21st century it is sadly apparent that the founding fathers of the behavioral revolution failed to transmit as clearly the value commitments that motivated their ‘scientific’ study of international relations. For many of their students and grand-students. the ‘scientific means’ has become more an end in itself and. the ‘science’ of the social a jeu d’esprit, like chess. In the worst instances, researchers choose problems to investigate because the problems are thought to be tractable, not because they are important. They evaluate solutions in terms of the elegance of the logic rather than actual evidence. Meanwhile, on the other extreme, those who do study policy problems frequently do so in isolation from those working seriously with theory. Both communities are thus impoverished. The founders of the scientific study of international relations would bemoan the separation of theory from evidence and of logic from data.’ Most of all, the founders would reject the separation of theory from policy and its relative failure to address practical problems of the political world. A deep irony is embedded in the history of the scientific study of international relations. Recent generations of scholars separated policy rom theory to gain an intellectual distance from decision-making, in the belief that this would enhance the ‘scientific’ quality of their work. But five decades of well-funded efforts to develop theories of international relations have produced precious little in the way of useful, high confidence results. Theories abound, but few meet the most relaxed ‘scientific’ tests of validity. Even the most robust generalizations or laws we can state – war is more likely between neighboring states, weaker states are less likely to attack stronger states – are close to trivial, have important exceptions, and for the most part stand outside any consistent body of theory. A generation ago, we might have excused our performance on the grounds that we are a young science still in the process o defining problems, developing analytical tools and collecting data. This excuse is nether credible nor suficielt: there is no reason to suppose that another 50 years of well-funded research would result in anything resembling a valid theory in the Popperian sense. We suggest that the nature, goals, and criteria for judging social science theory should be rethought. , if theory s to e more helpful in understanding the real world. We begin by justifying our pessimism, both conceptually and empirically, and argue that the quest for predictive theory rests on a mistaken analogy between physical and social phenomena. Evolutionary biology is a more productive analogy for social science. We explore the value of this analogy in its ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ versions, and examine the implications of both for theory and research in international relations. We develop the case for forward ‘tracking’ of international relations on the basis of local and general knowledge as an alternative to backward-looking attempts to build deductive, nomothetic theory. We then apply this strategy to some emerging trends in international relations. This article is not a nihilistic diatribe against ‘modern’ conceptions of social science. Rather, it is a plea for constructive humility in the current context of attraction to deductive logic, falsifiable hypothesis and large – n statistical ‘tests’ of narrow propositions. We propose a practical alternative for social scientists to pursue in addition, and in a complementary fashion, to ‘scientific’ theory-testing. Physical and chemical laws make two kinds of predictions. Some phenomena – the trajectories of individual planets – can be predicted with a reasonable degree of certainty. Only a few variables need to be taken into account and they can be measured with precision. Other mechanical problems, like the break of balls on a pool table, while subject to deterministic laws are inherently unpredictable because of their complexity. Small differences in the lay of the table, the nap of the felt, the curvature of each ball and where they make contact, amplify the variance of each collision and lead to what appears as a near random distribution of balls. Most predictions in science are probabilistic, like the freezing point of liquids, the expansion rate of gases and all chemical reactions. Point predictions appear possible only because of the large number of units involved in interactions. In the case of nuclear decay or the expansion of gases, we are talking about trillions of atoms and molecules. In international relations, even more than in other domains of social science, it is often impossible to assign metrics to what we think are relevant variables (Coleman, 1964: especially Chapter 2). The concepts of polarity, relative power and balance of power are among the most widely used independent variables, but there are no commonly accepted definitions or measures for them. Yet without consensus on definition and measurement, almost every statement or hypothesis will have too much wiggle room to be ‘tested’ decisively against evidence. What we take to be dependent variables fare little better. Unresolved controversies rage over the definition and evaluation of deterrence outcomes, and about the criteria for democratic governance and their application to specific countries at different points in their history. Differences in coding for even a few cases have significant implications for tests of theories of deterrence or of the democratic peace (Lebow and Stein 1990; Chan, 1997). The lack of consensus about terms and their measurement is not merely the result of intellectual anarchy or sloppiness – although the latter cannot be entirely dismissed. Fundamentally, it has more to do with the arbitrary nature of the concepts themselves. Key terms in physics, like mass, temperature, and velocity, refer to aspects of the physical universe that we cannot directly observe. However, they are embedded in theories with deductive implications that have been verified through empirical research. Propositions containing these terms are legitimate assertions about reality because their truth-value can be assessed. Social science theories are for the most part built on ‘idealizations’, that is, on concepts that cannot be anchored to observable phenomena through rules of correspondence. Most of these terms (e.g. rational actor, balance of power) are not descriptions of reality, but implicit ‘theories’ about actors and contexts that do not exist (Hempel, 1952; Rudner, 1966; Gunnell, 1975; Me, 1979; Searle, 1995: 68-72). The inevitable differences in interpretation of these concepts lead to diferent predictions in some contexts, and these outcomes may eventually produce widely varying futures (Taylor, 1985: 55). If problems of definition, measurement and coding could be resolved, we would still find it difficult, if not impossible, to construct large enough samples of comparable cases to permit statistical analysis. It is now almost generally accepted that in the analysis of the causes of wars, the variation across time and the complexity of the interaction among putative causes makes the likelihood of a general theory extraordinarily low. Multivariate theories run into the problem of negative degrees of freedom, yet international relations rarely generates data sets in the high double digits, where larger samples do exist, they often group together cases that differ from one another in theoretically important ways. Complexity in the form of multiple causation and equifinality can also make simple statistical comparisons misleading. But it is hard to elaborate more sophisticated statistical tests until one has a deeper baseline understanding o the nature of the phenomenon under investigation, as well as the categories and variables that make up candidate causes (Geddes, 1990: 131-50; Lustick, 1996: 505-18; Jervis, 1997). Wars – to continue with the same example – are similar to chemical and nuclear reactions in that they have underlying and immediate causes. Even when all the underlying conditions are present, the processes generally require a catalyst to begin. Chain reactions are triggered b the decay of atomic nuclei. Some of the neutrons they emit strike other nuclei prompting them to fission and emit more neutrons, which strike still more nuclei. Physicists can calculate how many kilograms of Uranium 235 or Plutonium at given pressures are necessary to produce a chain reaction They can take it for granted that if a ‘critical mass’ is achieved, a chain reaction will follow. This is because trillions o atoms are present, and at any given moment enough fo them will decay to provide the neutrons needed to start the reactions. In a large enough sample, catalysts will be present in a statistical sense. Wars involve relatively few actors, unlike the weak force responsible or nuclear decay, their catalysts are probably not inherent properties of the units. Catalysts may or may not be present, and their potentially random distribution relative to underlying causes makes it difficult to predict when or if an appropriate catalyst will occur. If in the course of time underlying conditions change, reducing basic incentives for one or more parties to use force, catalysts that would have triggered war will no longer do so. This uncertain and evolving relationship between underlying and immediate causes makes point prediction extraordinarily difficult. It almost makes more general statements about the causation of war problematic, since we have no way of knowing what wars would have occurred in the presence of appropriate catalysts. It is probably impossible to define the universe of would be wars or to construct a representative sample of them. Statistical inference requires knowledge about the state of independence of cases, but in a practical sense that knowledge is often impossible to obtain in the analysis of international relations. Molecules do not learn from experience. People do, or think they do. Relationships among cases exist in the minds of decision-makers, which makes it very hard to access that information reliably and for more than just a very small number of cases. We know that expectations and behavior are influenced by experience, one’s own and others. The deterrence strategies pursued by the United States throughout much of the Cold War were one kind of response to the failure of appeasement to prevent World War II. Appeasement was at least in part a reaction to the belief of British leaders that the deterrence policies pursued by the continental powers earlier in the century had helped to provoke World War I. Neither appeasement nor deterrence can be explained without understanding the context in which they were formulated; that context is ultimately a set of mental constructs. We have descriptive terms like ‘chain reaction’ or ‘contagion effect’ to describe these patterns, and hazard analysis among other techniques in statistics to measure their strength. But neither explains how and why these patterns emerge and persist. The broader point is that the relationship between human beings and their environment is not nearly so reactive as with inanimate objects. Social relations are not clock-like because the values and behavioral repertoires of actors are not fixed; people have memories, learn from experience and undergo shits in the vocabulary they use to construct reality. Law-like relationships – even if they existed – could not explain the most interesting social outcomes, since these are precisely the outcomes about which actors have the most incetive to lear and adapt their behavior. Any regularizes would be ‘soft’; they would be the outcome of processes that are embedded in history and have a short-half-life. They would decay quickly because of the memories, creative searching and learning by political leaders. Ironically, the ‘findings’ o social science contribute to this decay (Weber, 1969; Almond and Genco, 1977: 496-522; Gunnell, 1982: Ch. 2; Ball, 1987: Chy. 4; Kratochwil, 1989; Rorty, 1989; Hollis, 1994: Ch. 9) Beyond these conceptual and empirical difficulties lies a familiar but fundamental difference of purpose. Boyle’s Law, half-lives, or any other scientific principle based on probability, says nothing about the behavior of single units such as molecules. For many theoretical and practical purposes this is adequate. But social science ultimately aspires – or should aspire – to provide insight into practical world problems that are generally part of a small or very small n. In international relations, the dynamics and outcomes o single cases are often much more important than any statistical regularities. The conception of causality on which deductive-nomological models are based, in classical physics as well as social science, requires empirical invariance under specified boundary conditions. The standard form of such a statement is this – Given A, B, and C, if X then (not) Y. This kind of bounded invariance can be found in closed systems. Open systems can be influence by external stimuli, and their structure and causal mechanism evolve as a result. Rules that describe the functioning of an open system at time T do not necessarily do so at T+1 or T+2. The boundary conditions may have changed, rendering the statement irrelevant Another axiomatic condition may have been added, and the outcome subject to multiple conjuncural causation. There is no way to know this a priori from the causal statement itself. Nor will complete knowledge (if it were possible) about the system at time T necessarily allow us to project its future course of development. In a practical sense, all social systems (and many physical and biological systems) are open. Empirical invariance doe not exist in such systems, and seemingly probabilistic invariances may be causally unrelated (Harre and Secord, 1973; Bhaskar, 1979; Collier, 1994; Patomaki, 1996; Jervis, 1997). As physicist readily admit, prediction in open systems, especially non-linear ones, is difficult, and often impossible. The risk in saying that social scientists can ‘predict’ the value of variables, in past history is that the value of these variables is already known to us, and thus we are not really making predictions. Rather, we are trying to convince each other of the logic that connects a statement of theory to an expectation about the value of a variable that derives rom that theory. As long as we can establish the parameters within which theoretical statement is valid, which is a prerequisite of generating expectations in any case, this ‘theory-testing’ or ‘evaluating’ activity is not different in a logical sense when done in past or future time. Consider how this plays out in evolutionary biology, the quintessential open system. Evolution is the result of biological change and natural selection. The former is a function of random genetic mutation and mating. The latter depends on the nature and variety of ecological ‘niches’ and the competition for them. These are in turn shaped by such factors as continental drift, the varying output of the sun, changes in the earth’s orbit, and local conditions difficult to specify,. Biologists recognize that all the primary causes of evolution are random, or if not, interact in complex, nonlinear ways, and make prediction impossible. Certain kind of outcomes can be ‘ruled out’ in a probabilistic sense, but almost never absolutely. Biologists have attempted to document the course of evolution and explain the ways in which natural selections works. Historical and theoretical work has resulted in a robust theory of evolution that permits scientific reconstruction of the past in the context of a logic that explains why things turned out the way they did.

# Rd 6 Neg v JCCC

## 1NC

### Off

#### The aff should advocate increasing energy production

#### The subject: central government- the USFG.

#### The verb: increase- to make greater. Or reduce to make smaller

#### The objects -Financial incentives means loans/grants

**UNCTAD, 4** - UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT (“INCENTIVES”

http://unctad.org/en/docs/iteiit20035\_en.pdf

There is no uniform definition of what constitutes an “investment incentive”. (Box I.1. contains a list of commonly used incentives.) The only major international instrument that contains a partial definition is the SCM Agreement (see below). Governments use three main categories of investment incentives to attract FDI and to benefit more from it:

· financial incentives, such as outright grants and loans at concessionary rates;

· fiscal incentives such as tax holidays and reduced tax rates;

· other incentives, including subsidized infrastructure or services, market preferences and regulatory concessions, including exemptions from labour or environmental standards.

#### Restrictions are prohibitions

Words & Phrases 2004 v37A p410

N.D.Okla. 1939. "Restriction," as used in the statutes concerning restriction on alienation of lands inherited from deceased Osage allottees, is synonymous with "prohibition." Act April J8, 1912. §§ 6, 7, 37 Stat. 87, 88.—U.S. v. Mullendore, 30 F.Supp. 13, appeal dismissed 111 F.2d 898.— Indians 15(1).

#### The direct object is energy production

Rombouts 2006 Is Cumulative Fossil Energy Demand a Useful Indicator for the Environmental Performance of Products? M A R K A . J ., \* HUIJBREGTS , † L I N D A J . A . R O M B O U T S , † S T E F A N I E H E L L W E G , ‡ R O L F F R I S C H K N E C H T , § A . J A N H E N D R I K S , † D I K V A N D E M E E N T , † , | A D M . J . R A G A S , † L U C A S R E I J N D E R S , ⊥ A N D J A A P S T R U I J S | Department of Environmental Science, Institute for Wetland and Water Research, Faculty of Science, Radboud University Nijmegen, P.O. Box 9010, NL-6500 GL Nijmegen, The Netherlands, Institute for Chemical- and Bioengineering, Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zu¨rich, CH-8093 Zu¨rich, Switzerland, Ecoinvent Centre, Ueberlandstrasse 129, CH-8600 Duebendorf, Switzerland, Laboratory for Ecological Risk Assessment, National Institute of Public Health and the Environment, P.O. Box 1, NL-3720 BA, Bilthoven, The Netherlands, and Institute for Biodiversity and Ecosystem Dynamics, University of Amsterdam, Nieuwe Achtergracht 166, NL-1018 WV, Amsterdam, The Netherlands 2006 American Chemical Society VOL. 40, NO. 3, 2006 / ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY 9 641 http://pubs.acs.org/doi/pdf/10.1021/es051689g

The appropriateness of the fossil Cumulative Energy Demand (CED) as an indicator for the environmental performance of products and processes is explored with a regression analysis between the environmental life-cycle impacts and fossil CEDs of 1218 products, divided into the product categories “energy production”, “material production”, “transport”, and “waste treatment”. Our results show that, for all product groups but waste treatment, the fossil CED correlates well with most impact categories, such as global warming, resource depletion, acidification, eutrophication, tropospheric ozone formation, ozone depletion, and human toxicity (explained variance between 46% and 100%). We conclude that the use of fossil fuels is an important driver of several environmental impacts and thereby indicative for many environmental problems. It may therefore serve as a screening indicator for environmental performance. However, the usefulness of fossil CED as a stand-alone indicator for environmental impact is limited by the large uncertainty in the product-specific fossil CEDbased impact scores (larger than a factor of 10 for the majority of the impact categories; 95% confidence interval). A major reason for this high uncertainty is nonfossil energy related emissions and land use, such as landfill leachates, radionuclide emissions, and land use in agriculture and forestry.

#### Links

#### 1. The SUBJECT of the action is the AFF team, not the USFG.

#### 2. The OBJECT of the action is the judge, not energy.

#### 3. Their use of the double and/or makes the plan totally incoherent and proves it could mean any one of 12 things and negate any or all of the others.

#### Vote neg-

#### Infinite regression—disregarding resolutional syntax produces an endless regression to small, trivial plans. For example, an aff only about the subject opens the door to ANY philosophy that speaks to ‘being.’

#### The impact to that is decisionmaking—debate over a controversial point of action creates argumentative stasis—that’s key to avoid a devolution of debate into competing truth claims

Steinberg, lecturer of communication studies – University of Miami, and Freeley, Boston based attorney who focuses on criminal, personal injury and civil rights law, ‘8

(David L. and Austin J., Argumentation and Debate: Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making p. 45)

Debate is a means of settling differences, so there must be a difference of opinion or a conflict of interest before there can be a debate. If everyone is in agreement on a tact or value or policy, there is no need for debate: the matter can be settled by unanimous consent. Thus, for example, it would be pointless to attempt to debate "Resolved: That two plus two equals four," because there is simply no controversy about this statement. (Controversy is an essential prerequisite of debate. Where there is no clash of ideas, proposals, interests, or expressed positions on issues, there is no debate. In addition, debate cannot produce effective decisions without clear identification of a question or questions to be answered. For example, general argument may occur about the broad topic of illegal immigration. How many illegal immigrants are in the United States? What is the impact of illegal immigration and immigrants on our economy? What is their impact on our communities? Do they commit crimes? Do they take jobs from American workers? Do they pay taxes? Do they require social services? Is it a problem that some do not speak English? Is it the responsibility of employers to discourage illegal immigration by not hiring undocumented workers? Should they have the opportunity- to gain citizenship? Docs illegal immigration pose a security threat to our country? Do illegal immigrants do work that American workers are unwilling to do? Are their rights as workers and as human beings at risk due to their status? Are they abused by employers, law enforcement, housing, and businesses? I low are their families impacted by their status? What is the moral and philosophical obligation of a nation state to maintain its borders? Should we build a wall on the Mexican border, establish a national identification can!, or enforce existing laws against employers? Should we invite immigrants to become U.S. citizens? Surely you can think of many more concerns to be addressed by a conversation about the topic area of illegal immigration. Participation in this "debate" is likely to be emotional and intense. However, it is not likely to be productive or useful without focus on a particular question and identification of a line demarcating sides in the controversy. To be discussed and resolved effectively, controversies must be stated clearly. Vague understanding results in unfocused deliberation and poor decisions, frustration, and emotional distress, as evidenced by the failure of the United States Congress to make progress on the immigration debate during the summer of 2007.¶ Someone disturbed by the problem of the growing underclass of poorly educated, socially disenfranchised youths might observe, "Public schools are doing a terrible job! They are overcrowded, and many teachers are poorly qualified in their subject areas. Even the best teachers can do little more than struggle to maintain order in their classrooms." That same concerned citizen, facing a complex range of issues, might arrive at an unhelpful decision, such as "We ought to do something about this" or. worse. "It's too complicated a problem to deal with." Groups of concerned citizens worried about the state of public education could join together to express their frustrations, anger, disillusionment, and emotions regarding the schools, but without a focus for their discussions, they could easily agree about the sorry state of education without finding points of clarity or potential solutions. A gripe session would follow. But if a precise question is posed—such as "What can be done to improve public education?"—then a more profitable area of discussion is opened up simply by placing a focus on the search for a concrete solution step. One or more judgments can be phrased in the form of debate propositions, motions for parliamentary debate, or bills for legislative assemblies. The statements "Resolved: That the federal government should implement a program of charter schools in at-risk communities" and "Resolved: That the state of Florida should adopt a school voucher program" more clearly identify specific ways of dealing with educational problems in a manageable form, suitable for debate. They provide specific policies to be investigated and aid discussants in identifying points of difference.¶ To have a productive debate, which facilitates effective decision making by directing and placing limits on the decision to be made, the basis for argument should be clearly defined. If we merely talk about "homelessness" or "abortion" or "crime'\* or "global warming" we are likely to have an interesting discussion but not to establish profitable basis for argument. For example, the statement "Resolved: That the pen is mightier than the sword" is debatable, yet fails to provide much basis for clear argumentation. If we take this statement to mean that the written word is more effective than physical force for some purposes, we can identify a problem area: the comparative effectiveness of writing or physical force for a specific purpose.¶ Although we now have a general subject, we have not yet stated a problem. It is still too broad, too loosely worded to promote well-organized argument. What sort of writing are we concerned with—poems, novels, government documents, website development, advertising, or what? What does "effectiveness" mean in this context? What kind of physical force is being compared—fists, dueling swords, bazookas, nuclear weapons, or what? A more specific question might be. "Would a mutual defense treaty or a visit by our fleet be more effective in assuring Liurania of our support in a certain crisis?" The basis for argument could be phrased in a debate proposition such as "Resolved: That the United States should enter into a mutual defense treatv with Laurania." Negative advocates might oppose this proposition by arguing that fleet maneuvers would be a better solution. This is not to say that debates should completely avoid creative interpretation of the controversy by advocates, or that good debates cannot occur over competing interpretations of the controversy; in fact, these sorts of debates may be very engaging. The point is that debate is best facilitated by the guidance provided by focus on a particular point of difference, which will be outlined in the following discussion.

#### Decisionmaking is the most portable skill—key to all facets of life and advocacy

Steinberg, lecturer of communication studies – University of Miami, and Freeley, Boston based attorney who focuses on criminal, personal injury and civil rights law, ‘8

(David L. and Austin J., Argumentation and Debate: Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making p. 9-10)

After several days of intense debate, first the United States House of Representatives and then the U.S. Senate voted to authorize President George W. Bush to attack Iraq if Saddam Hussein refused to give up weapons of mass destruction as required by United Nations's resolutions. Debate about a possible military\* action against Iraq continued in various governmental bodies and in the public for six months, until President Bush ordered an attack on Baghdad, beginning Operation Iraqi Freedom, the military campaign against the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein. He did so despite the unwillingness of the U.N. Security Council to support the military action, and in the face of significant international opposition.¶ Meanwhile, and perhaps equally difficult for the parties involved, a young couple deliberated over whether they should purchase a large home to accommodate their growing family or should sacrifice living space to reside in an area with better public schools; elsewhere a college sophomore reconsidered his major and a senior her choice of law school, graduate school, or a job. Each of these\* situations called for decisions to be made. Each decision maker worked hard to make well-reasoned decisions.¶ Decision making is a thoughtful process of choosing among a variety of options for acting or thinking. It requires that the decider make a choice. Life demands decision making. We make countless individual decisions every day. To make some of those decisions, we work hard to employ care and consideration; others seem to just happen. Couples, families, groups of friends, and coworkers come together to make choices, and decision-making homes from committees to juries to the U.S. Congress and the United Nations make decisions that impact us all. Every profession requires effective and ethical decision making, as do our school, community, and social organizations.¶ We all make many decisions even- day. To refinance or sell one's home, to buy a high-performance SUV or an economical hybrid car. what major to select, what to have for dinner, what candidate CO vote for. paper or plastic, all present lis with choices. Should the president deal with an international crisis through military invasion or diplomacy? How should the U.S. Congress act to address illegal immigration?¶ Is the defendant guilty as accused? Tlie Daily Show or the ball game? And upon what information should I rely to make my decision? Certainly some of these decisions are more consequential than others. Which amendment to vote for, what television program to watch, what course to take, which phone plan to purchase, and which diet to pursue all present unique challenges. At our best, we seek out research and data to inform our decisions. Yet even the choice of which information to attend to requires decision making. In 2006, TIMI: magazine named YOU its "Person of the Year." Congratulations! Its selection was based on the participation not of ''great men" in the creation of history, but rather on the contributions of a community of anonymous participants in the evolution of information. Through blogs. online networking. You Tube. Facebook, MySpace, Wikipedia, and many other "wikis," knowledge and "truth" are created from the bottom up, bypassing the authoritarian control of newspeople. academics, and publishers. We have access to infinite quantities of information, but how do we sort through it and select the best information for our needs?¶ The ability of every decision maker to make good, reasoned, and ethical decisions relies heavily upon their ability to think critically. Critical thinking enables one to break argumentation down to its component parts in order to evaluate its relative validity and strength. Critical thinkers are better users of information, as well as better advocates.¶ Colleges and universities expect their students to develop their critical thinking skills and may require students to take designated courses to that end. The importance and value of such study is widely recognized.¶ Much of the most significant communication of our lives is conducted in the form of debates. These may take place in intrapersonal communications, in which we weigh the pros and cons of an important decision in our own minds, or they may take place in interpersonal communications, in which we listen to arguments intended to influence our decision or participate in exchanges to influence the decisions of others.¶ Our success or failure in life is largely determined by our ability to make wise decisions for ourselves and to influence the decisions of others in ways that are beneficial to us. Much of our significant, purposeful activity is concerned with making decisions. Whether to join a campus organization, go to graduate school, accept a job oiler, buy a car or house, move to another city, invest in a certain stock, or vote for Garcia—these are just a few of the thousands of decisions we may have to make. Often, intelligent self-interest or a sense of responsibility will require us to win the support of others. We may want a scholarship or a particular job for ourselves, a customer for out product, or a vote for our favored political candidate.

#### Limits—resolutional limits encourage AFF innovation, predictive research on a designated topic, and clash—a precursor to productive education. Also, the inherent value of arguments within limits is greater, which link turns education arguments.

#### Unbridled affirmation makes research impossible and destroys dialogue in debate

Hanghoj 8

http://static.sdu.dk/mediafiles/Files/Information\_til/Studerende\_ved\_SDU/Din\_uddannelse/phd\_hum/afhandlinger/2009/ThorkilHanghoej.pdf¶ Thorkild Hanghøj, Copenhagen, 2008 ¶ Since this PhD project began in 2004, the present author has been affiliated with DREAM (Danish¶ Research Centre on Education and Advanced Media Materials), which is located at the Institute of¶ Literature, Media and Cultural Studies at the University of Southern Denmark. Research visits have¶ taken place at the Centre for Learning, Knowledge, and Interactive Technologies (L-KIT), the¶ Institute of Education at the University of Bristol and the institute formerly known as Learning Lab¶ Denmark at the School of Education, University of Aarhus, where I currently work as an assistant¶ professor.

Debate games are often based on pre-designed scenarios that include descriptions of issues to be debated, educational goals, game goals, roles, rules, time frames etc. In this way, debate games differ from textbooks and everyday classroom instruction as debate scenarios allow teachers and students to actively imagine, interact and communicate within a domain-specific game space. However, instead of mystifying debate games as a “magic circle” (Huizinga, 1950), I will try to overcome the epistemological dichotomy between “gaming” and “teaching” that tends to dominate discussions of educational games. In short, educational gaming is a form of teaching. As mentioned, education and games represent two different semiotic domains that both embody the three faces of knowledge: assertions, modes of representation and social forms of organisation (Gee, 2003; Barth, 2002; cf. chapter 2). In order to understand the interplay between these different domains and their interrelated knowledge forms, I will draw attention to a central assumption in Bakhtin’s dialogical philosophy. According to Bakhtin, all forms of communication and culture are subject to centripetal and centrifugal forces (Bakhtin, 1981). A centripetal force is the drive to impose one version of the truth, while a centrifugal force involves a range of possible truths and interpretations. This means that any form of expression involves a duality of centripetal and centrifugal forces: “Every concrete utterance of a speaking subject serves as a point where centrifugal as well as centripetal forces are brought to bear” (Bakhtin, 1981: 272). If we take teaching as an example, it is always affected by centripetal and centrifugal forces in the on-going negotiation of “truths” between teachers and students. In the words of Bakhtin: “Truth is not born nor is it to be found inside the head of an individual person, it is born between people collectively searching for truth, in the process of their dialogic interaction” (Bakhtin, 1984a: 110). Similarly, the dialogical space of debate games also embodies centrifugal and centripetal forces. Thus, the election scenario of The Power Game involves centripetal elements that are mainly determined by the rules and outcomes of the game, i.e. the election is based on a limited time frame and a fixed voting procedure. Similarly, the open-ended goals, roles and resources represent centrifugal elements and create virtually endless possibilities for researching, preparing, presenting, debating and evaluating a variety of key political issues. Consequently, the actual process of enacting a game scenario involves a complex negotiation between these centrifugal/centripetal forces that are inextricably linked with the teachers and students’ game activities. In this way, the enactment of The Power Game is a form of teaching that combines different pedagogical practices (i.e. group work, web quests, student presentations) and learning resources (i.e. websites, handouts, spoken language) within the interpretive frame of the election scenario. Obviously, tensions may arise if there is too much divergence between educational goals and game goals. This means that game facilitation requires a balance between focusing too narrowly on the rules or “facts” of a game (centripetal orientation) and a focusing too broadly on the contingent possibilities and interpretations of the game scenario (centrifugal orientation). For Bakhtin, the duality of centripetal/centrifugal forces often manifests itself as a dynamic between “monological” and “dialogical” forms of discourse. Bakhtin illustrates this point with the monological discourse of the Socrates/Plato dialogues in which the teacher never learns anything new from the students, despite Socrates’ ideological claims to the contrary (Bakhtin, 1984a). Thus, discourse becomes monologised when “someone who knows and possesses the truth instructs someone who is ignorant of it and in error”, where “a thought is either affirmed or repudiated” by the authority of the teacher (Bakhtin, 1984a: 81). In contrast to this, dialogical pedagogy fosters inclusive learning environments that are able to expand upon students’ existing knowledge and collaborative construction of “truths” (Dysthe, 1996). At this point, I should clarify that Bakhtin’s term “dialogic” is both a descriptive term (all utterances are per definition dialogic as they address other utterances as parts of a chain of communication) and a normative term as dialogue is an ideal to be worked for against the forces of “monologism” (Lillis, 2003: 197-8). In this project, I am mainly interested in describing the dialogical space of debate games. At the same time, I agree with Wegerif that “one of the goals of education, perhaps the most important goal, should be dialogue as an end in itself” (Wegerif, 2006: 61).

#### Dialogue is critical to affirming any value—shutting down deliberation devolves into totalitarianism and reinscribes oppression

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http://www.flt.uae.ac.ma/elhirech/baktine/0521831059.pdf#page=331

Northwestern Professor, Prof. Morson's work ranges over a variety of areas: literary theory (especially narrative); the history of ideas, both Russian and European; a variety of literary genres (especially satire, utopia, and the novel); and his favorite writers -- Chekhov, Gogol, and, above all, Dostoevsky and Tolstoy. He is especially interested in the relation of literature to philosophy.

Bakhtin viewed the whole process of “ideological” (in the sense of ideas and values, however unsystematic) development as an endless dialogue. As teachers, we find it difficult to avoid a voice of authority, however much we may think of ours as the rebel’s voice, because our rebelliousness against society at large speaks in the authoritative voice of our subculture.We speak the language and thoughts of academic educators, even when we imagine we are speaking in no jargon at all, and that jargon, inaudible to us, sounds with all the overtones of authority to our students. We are so prone to think of ourselves as fighting oppression that it takes some work to realize that we ourselves may be felt as oppressive and overbearing, and that our own voice may provoke the same reactions that we feel when we hear an authoritative voice with which we disagree. So it is often helpful to think back on the great authoritative oppressors and reconstruct their self-image: helpful, but often painful. I remember, many years ago, when, as a recent student rebel and activist, I taught a course on “The Theme of the Rebel” and discovered, to my considerable chagrin, that many of the great rebels of history were the very same people as the great oppressors. There is a famous exchange between Erasmus and Luther, who hoped to bring the great Dutch humanist over to the Reformation, but Erasmus kept asking Luther how he could be so certain of so many doctrinal points. We must accept a few things to be Christians at all, Erasmus wrote, but surely beyond that there must be room for us highly fallible beings to disagree. Luther would have none of such tentativeness. He knew, he was sure. The Protestant rebels were, for a while, far more intolerant than their orthodox opponents. Often enough, the oppressors are the ones who present themselves and really think of themselves as liberators. Certainty that one knows the root cause of evil: isn’t that itself often the root cause? We know from Tsar Ivan the Terrible’s letters denouncing Prince Kurbsky, a general who escaped to Poland, that Ivan saw himself as someone who had been oppressed by noblemen as a child and pictured himself as the great rebel against traditional authority when he killed masses of people or destroyed whole towns. There is something in the nature of maximal rebellion against authority that produces ever greater intolerance, unless one is very careful. For the skills of fighting or refuting an oppressive power are not those of openness, self-skepticism, or real dialogue. In preparing for my course, I remember my dismay at reading Hitler’s Mein Kampf and discovering that his self-consciousness was precisely that of the rebel speaking in the name of oppressed Germans, and that much of his amazing appeal – otherwise so inexplicable – was to the German sense that they were rebelling victims. In our time, the Serbian Communist and nationalist leader Slobodan Milosevic exploited much the same appeal. Bakhtin surely knew that Communist totalitarianism, the Gulag, and the unprecedented censorship were constructed by rebels who had come to power. His favorite writer, Dostoevsky, used to emphasize that the worst oppression comes from those who, with the rebellious psychology of “the insulted and humiliated,” have seized power – unless they have somehow cultivated the value of dialogue, as Lenin surely had not, but which Eva, in the essay by Knoeller about teaching The Autobiography of Malcolm X, surely had. Rebels often make the worst tyrants because their word, the voice they hear in their consciousness, has borrowed something crucial from the authoritative word it opposed, and perhaps exaggerated it: the aura of righteous authority. If one’s ideological becoming is understood as a struggle in which one has at last achieved the truth, one is likely to want to impose that truth with maximal authority; and rebels of the next generation may proceed in much the same way, in an ongoing spiral of intolerance.

#### If our interpretation is net-beneficial it means there’s no reason to vote affirmative. If the case is true then it de-justifies the resolution. Teams are still signified by ‘AFF’ and ‘NEG’, so the resolution is a required measurement for ‘affirmation.’ There is no “MU” version on the ballot- affirming their advocacy means voting against the negative- that disrupts the whole buddist ethic, which is a double turn independent of T

### Off

#### The aff’s focus on the being mystifies the material roots of profit in the exploitation of labor rather than nature

DeFazio 12 (Kimberly, English Professor at University of Wisconsin Lacrosse, Winter/Spring 12, Machine-Thinking and the Romance of Posthumanism, http://redcritique.org/WinterSpring2012/machinethinkingandtheromanceofposthumanism.htm)

In the 21st century, global capitalism's commodification of all aspects of life has reached new heights, requiring new modes of explaining away the material roots. From cloning and bioengineered food, to ever-newer forms of human-technological hybrids, to overfishing and industrialization of slaughterhouses, to the privatization of public sources of water and the selling of "hot air" (which makes it possible for rich nations to avoid lowering emissions), to the "synthetic biology" by which biocapitalists like J. Craig Venter hope new living creatures will be produced to substitute fossil fuels—there is no aspect of social or natural life that is immune from the market. Capital's endless and inherently crisis-ridden drive to accumulate profit has, on the one hand, led to a new scramble among nations of the global North to privatize the world's dwindling natural resources regardless of the human and ecological consequences. What this competitive drive has lead to, among other things, is the scientific explorations of new bio-horizons: what Venter calls a "new industrial revolution" (Pollack). On the other hand, the most recent effects of capitalist crisis—beginning with the 2007 housing market crash—have been used to justify further privatization of social resources, leading to historically unprecedented cuts in wages, employment and social programs throughout the global North.¶ It is not surprising, then, that cultural theory has become more and more concerned with the relation between human and non-human life and with the instrumentalities used by the former to control the latter. Broadly characterized by a "posthuman" displacement of humanist priorities of reason, rationality and Cartesian dualism, at the center of which is a human subject constructed as fundamentally different from and superior to non-human animals and life and capable of developing reliable knowledge of and control over the objective world—a wide range of cultural writing today has become concerned with the increasing subjugation of nature to human calculation and control, and call for a new inquiry into the relation of the human and its other. Some, like Giorgio Agamben, address the increasing efforts of the state to control and manage all aspects of human and non-human life (Homo Sacer; The Open). Others, like Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt, focus on the efforts by corporations to privatize the knowledges, affects and technologies that have been developed through the collective energies of what they call the multitude: the efforts to enclose the digital commons in the interests of a powerful few (Commonwealth). Graham Harman goes so far as to suggest that the "being" of tools is constitutive of all being in the contemporary moment (Tool-Being), while Peter Menzel and Faith D'Alusio celebrate the displacement of homo sapiens by the notion of robo sapiens (Robo Sapiens). Among one of the most popular developments in contemporary posthumanist theory, animal studies, writers like Cary Wolfe, Donna Haraway, Kelly Oliver, and Matthew Calarco, taking their cue from Derrida's later writings (i.e., The Animal That Therefore I Am), address what is for them the instrumentalizing and unethical discourses of humanism, which justifies its violence toward non-human species by its epistemological centering of the human: the "anthropological machine" (Agamben, The Open).¶ But what drives the "new industrial revolution" (Venter) is what drove the "old" one: the use of technology to appropriate surplus labor (the source of profit) at the point of production. Profit is not derived from "nature" but labor: in order for nature to become a commodifiable resource, it must become transformed by human labor, which is itself a dialectical outcome of nature. This is another way of saying that the commodification of life on such a planetary scale today is only possible on the basis of the commodification of human labor power. Biocapitalism is first and foremost a regime of wage labor.¶ Contemporary cultural theory's concern with the effects of capitalism on non-human life, however, has mystified capital's material roots, and one of the central means by which this has been accomplished is what I call machine-thinking.

#### Capitalism’s preoccupation with endless accumulation will result in total ecological destruction and extinction

Foster 11,[John Bellamy ] Dec. 2011, Capitalism and the Accumulation of Catastrophe, Monthly Review, Vol. 63 Issue 07, <http://monthlyreview.org/2011/12/01/capitalism-and-the-accumulation-of-catastrophe> (Aug 2012)

Yet, the continued pursuit of Keynes’s convenient lie over the last eight decades has led to a world far more polarized and beset with contradictions than he could have foreseen. It is a world prey to the enormous unintended consequences of accumulation without limits: namely, global economic stagnation, financial crisis, and planetary ecological destruction. Keynes, though aware of some of the negative economic aspects of capitalist production, had no real understanding of the ecological perils—of which scientists had already long been warning. Today these perils are impossible to overlook. Faced with impending ecological catastrophe, it is more necessary than ever to abandon Keynes’s convenient lie and espouse the truth: that foul is foul and fair is fair. Capitalism, the society of “après moi le déluge!” is a system that fouls its own nest—both the human-social conditions and the wider natural environment on which it depends. The accumulation of capital is at the same time accumulation of catastrophe, not only for a majority of the world’s people, but living species generally. Hence, nothing is *fairer*—more just, more beautiful, and more necessary—today than the struggle to overthrow the regime of capital and to create a system of substantive equality and sustainable human development; a socialism for the twenty-first century.

#### The alternative is to reject capitalism through revolutionary action

Herod ‘4 James Herod author of several books on capitalism and social activist since 1968 Getting Free 2004 <http://site.www.umb.edu/faculty/salzman_g/Strate/GetFre/06.htm>

 It is time to try to describe, at first abstractly and later concretely, a strategy for destroying capitalism. This strategy, at its most basic, calls for pulling time, energy, and resources out of capitalist civilization and putting them into building a new civilization. The image then is one of emptying out capitalist structures, hollowing them out, by draining wealth, power, and meaning out of them until there is nothing left but shells. This is definitely an aggressive strategy. It requires great militancy, and constitutes an attack on the existing order. The strategy clearly recognizes that capitalism is the enemy and must be destroyed, but it is not a frontal attack aimed at overthrowing the system, but an inside attack aimed at gutting it, while simultaneously replacing it with something better, something we want. Thus capitalist structures (corporations, governments, banks, schools, etc.) are not seized so much as simply abandoned. Capitalist relations are not fought so much as they are simply rejected. We stop participating in activities that support (finance, condone) the capitalist world and start participating in activities that build a new world while simultaneously undermining the old. We create a new pattern of social relations alongside capitalist relations and then we continually build and strengthen our new pattern while doing every thing we can to weaken capitalist relations. In this way our new democratic, non-hierarchical, non-commodified relations can eventually overwhelm the capitalist relations and force them out of existence. This is how it has to be done. This is a plausible, realistic strategy. To think that we could create a whole new world of decent social arrangements overnight, in the midst of a crisis, during a so-called revolution, or during the collapse of capitalism, is foolhardy. Our new social world must grow within the old, and in opposition to it, until it is strong enough to dismantle and abolish capitalist relations. Such a revolution will never happen automatically, blindly, determinably, because of the inexorable, materialist laws of history. It will happen, and only happen, because we want it to, and because we know what we�re doing and know how we want to live, and know what obstacles have to be overcome before we can live that way, and know how to distinguish between our social patterns and theirs. But we must not think that the capitalist world can simply be ignored, in a live and let live attitude, while we try to build new lives elsewhere. (There is no elsewhere.) There is at least one thing, wage-slavery, that we can�t simply stop participating in (but even here there are ways we can chip away at it). Capitalism must be explicitly refused and replaced by something else. This constitutes War, but it is not a war in the traditional sense of armies and tanks, but a war fought on a daily basis, on the level of everyday life, by millions of people. It is a war nevertheless because the accumulators of capital will use coercion, brutality, and murder, as they have always done in the past, to try to block any rejection of the system. They have always had to force compliance; they will not hesitate to continue doing so. Nevertheless, there are many concrete ways that individuals, groups, and neighborhoods can gut capitalism, which I will enumerate shortly. We must always keep in mind how we became slaves; then we can see more clearly how we can cease being slaves. We were forced into wage-slavery because the ruling class slowly, systematically, and brutally destroyed our ability to live autonomously. By driving us off the land, changing the property laws, destroying community rights, destroying our tools, imposing taxes, destroying our local markets, and so forth, we were forced onto the labor market in order to survive, our only remaining option being to sell, for a wage, our ability to work. It�s quite clear then how we can overthrow slavery. We must reverse this process. We must begin to reacquire the ability to live without working for a wage or buying the products made by wage-slaves (that is, we must get free from the labor market and the way of living based on it), and embed ourselves instead in cooperative labor and cooperatively produced goods. Another clarification is needed. This strategy does not call for reforming capitalism, for changing capitalism into something else. It calls for replacing capitalism, totally, with a new civilization. This is an important distinction, because capitalism has proved impervious to reforms, as a system. We can sometimes in some places win certain concessions from it (usually only temporary ones) and win some (usually short-lived) improvements in our lives as its victims, but we cannot reform it piecemeal, as a system. Thus our strategy of gutting and eventually destroying capitalism requires at a minimum a totalizing image, an awareness that we are attacking an entire way of life and replacing it with another, and not merely reforming one way of life into something else. Many people may not be accustomed to thinking about entire systems and social orders, but everyone knows what a lifestyle is, or a way of life, and that is the way we should approach it. The thing is this: in order for capitalism to be destroyed millions and millions of people must be dissatisfied with their way of life. They must want something else and see certain existing things as obstacles to getting what they want. It is not useful to think of this as a new ideology. It is not merely a belief-system that is needed, like a religion, or like Marxism, or Anarchism. Rather it is a new prevailing vision, a dominant desire, an overriding need. What must exist is a pressing desire to live a certain way, and not to live another way. If this pressing desire were a desire to live free, to be autonomous, to live in democratically controlled communities, to participate in the self-regulating activities of a mature people, then capitalism could be destroyed. Otherwise we are doomed to perpetual slavery and possibly even to extinction. The content of this vision is actually not new at all, but quite old. The long term goal of communists, anarchists, and socialists has always been to restore community. Even the great peasant revolts of early capitalism sought to get free from external authorities and restore autonomy to villages. Marx defined communism once as a free association of producers, and at another time as a situation in which the free development of each is a condition for the free development of all. Anarchists have always called for worker and peasant self-managed cooperatives. The long term goals have always been clear: to abolish wage-slavery, to eradicate a social order organized solely around the accumulation of capital for its own sake, and to establish in its place a society of free people who democratically and cooperatively self-determine the shape of their social world.

### Case

#### Re-embracing modernist struggle overcomes passive nihilism.

**Berman, 1983** (Marshall Berman, “All that is solid melts into air: the experience of modernity” p. 34-36)

Do we act politically, overthrow tyrannies, make revolutions, create constitutions to establish and protect human rights? Mere "juridical regression" from the feudal ages, because constitutions and bills of rights are merely "the forms that [make] an essentially normalizing power acceptable"26 Do we use our minds to unmask oppression--as Foucault appears to be trying to do? Forget it, because all forms of inquiry into the human condition "merely refer individuals from one disciplinary authority to another," and hence only add to the triumphant discourse of power." Any criticism rings hallow, because the critic himself or herself is "in the panoptic machine, invested by its effects of power, which we bring to ourselves, since we are part of its mechanism."27 After being subject to this for a while, we realize that there is no freedom in Foucault's world, because his language forms a seamless web, a cage more airtight than anything Weber ever dreamed of, into which no life can break. The mystery is why so many of today's intellectuals seem to want to choke in there with him. The answer, I suspect, is that Foucault offers a generation of refugees from the 1960s a world-historical alibi for the sense of passivity and helplessness that gripped so many of us in the 1970s. There is no point in trying to resist the oppressions and injustices of modern life, since even our dreams of freedom only add more links to our chains; however, once we grasp the total futility of it all, at least we can relax. In this bleak context, I want to bring the dynamic and dialectical modernism of the nineteenth century to life again. A great modernist, the Mexican poet and critic Octavio Pza, has lamented that modernity is "cut off from the past and continually hurling forward at such a dizzy pace that it cannot take root, that it merely survives from one day to the next: it is unable to return to its beginnings and thus recover its powers of renewal."28 The argument of this book is that, in fact, the modernisms of the past can give us back a sense of our own modern roots, roots that go back two hundred years. They can help us connect our lives with the lives of millions of people who are living through the trauma of modernization thousands of miles away, in societies radically different from our own--and with millions of people who lived through it a century or more ago. They can illuminate the contradictory forces and needs that inspire and torment us: our desire to be rooted in a stable and coherent personal and social past, and our insatiable desire for growth--not merely for economic growth but for growth in experience, in pleasure, in knowledge, in sensibility--growth that destroys both the physical and social landscapes of our past, and our emotional links with those lost worlds; our desperate allegiances to ethnic, national, class and sexual groups which we hope will give us a firm "identity," and the internationalization of everyday life--of our clothes and household goods, our books and music, our ideas and fantasies--that spreads all our identities all over the map; our desire for clear and solid values to live by, our desire to embrace the limitless possibilities of modern life and experience that obliterate all values; the social and political forces that propel into explosive conflicts with other people and other peoples, even as we develop a deeper sensitivity and empathy toward our ordained enemies and come to realize, sometimes too late, that they are not so different from us after all. Experiences like these unite us with the nineteenth-century modern world: a world where, as Marx said, "everything is pregnant with its contrary" and "all that is solid melts into air"; a world where, as Nietzsche said, "there is danger, the mother of morality--great danger . . . displaced onto the individual, onto the nearest and dearest, onto the street, onto one's own child, one's own hear, one's own innermost secret recesses of wish and will." Modern machines have changed a great deal in the years between the nineteenth-century modernists and ourselves; but modern men and women, as Marx and Nietzsche and Baudelaire and Dostoesvsky saw them then, may only now be coming fully into their own. Marx, Nietzsche and their contemporaries experienced modernity as a whole at a moment when only a small part of the world was truly modern. A century later, when the processes of modernization have cast a net that no one, not even in the remotest corner of the world, can escape, we can learn a great deal from the first modernists, not so much about their age as about our own. We have lost our grip on the contradictions that they had to grasp with al their strength, at every moment in their everyday lives, in order to live at all. Paradoxically, these first modernists may turn out to understand us--the modernization and modernism that constitute our lives--better than we understand ourselves. If we can make their visions our own, and use their perspectives to look at our own environments with fresh eyes, we will see that there is more depth in our lives than we thought. We will free our community with people all over the world who have been struggling with the same dilemmas as our own. And we will get back in touch with a remarkably rich and vibrant modernist culture that has grown out of these struggles: a culture that contains vast resources of strength and health, if only we come to know it as our own. It may turn out, then, that going back can be a way to go forward: that remembering the modernisms of the nineteenth century can give us the vision and courage to create the modernisms of the twenty-first. This act of remembering can help us bring modernism back to its roots, so that it can nourish and renew itself, to confront the adventures and dangers that lie ahead. To appropriate the modernities of yesterday can be at once a critique of the modernities of today and an act of fait in the modernities--and in the modern men and women--of tomorrow and the day after tomorrow.

#### Suffering is not inevitable

####  A) the most severe forms can be prevented

Jessica,**Weinhold 2004** “Help your congregation do something about violence,” Fall http://www.pcusa.org/ideas/2004fall/violence.htm ]

It is important to note that different forms of suffering permeate our personal and corporate contexts. Thus, not all forms can be equated or responded to uniformly. In the case of domestic and sexual violence, this suffering is not inevitable (like natural disasters, for example); it is intentional and above all else unnatural. Therefore, this form of violence must be addressed on its own terms. It must be distinguished as a particular form of suffering that occasions a unique form of grief and demands a uniquely definitive response from clergy and congregation.

#### Suffering is not part of the human condition but a result of circumstances. Even if some suffering is inevitable there are degrees

Jennifer **Eagen 2004** “Philisophical interests” September 9 http://home.earthlink.net/~jeagan/id3.html

Suffering is the theme of two of my published papers, which both examine the question of how philosophy should respond to suffering. Suffering is a mode of living one's body that usually takes into account the ontic features that impact the body. Social and political events are often the cause of suffering, even if the event is painted as natural (example, famine, cancer whose causes are usually greater than just natural). Suffering is often where the body and the social-liguistic order that Foucault talks about meet. Many of the examples that Foucault talks about are examples of suffering, even though he dispassionately displays it without showing the effects of the individual consciousness. Maybe Foucault with a touch more phenomenology is what I'm after. Also, many of the cases of oppression and human rights violations that I deal with in my teaching are examples of suffering to greater or lesser degrees. One challenge that I face as I continue to try to define suffering is how to give an account of suffering and what constitutes suffering. Will the criteria be subjective or objective? Is suffering relative (say between the West and the developing world)? Can we legitimately compare the suffering of different individuals or groups? All good questions. I could argue along with Adorno that suffering is not natural nor is it a permanent feature of the human condition, but is primarily caused by social and political events and conditions. However, I might want to argue something like there are some seemingly permanent features of this social-political landscape that cause everyone to suffer, but to different degrees (e.g., gender). I'm looking forward to exploring this further.

#### Life is better than it has ever been because of pro-active political solutions. The alternatives pessimism creates a negatively slanted view of reality that forecloses real solutions to the worlds problems

Jeff **Carreira 2004** The Progress of Paradox: How Life Gets Better While People Feel Worse http://www.wie.org/j26/reviews.asp

Practically everything is getting better. This is the bold assertion that starts Gregg Easterbrook's optimistic assault on postmodern cynicism. For example: health care is better for more people on Earth than ever before; the incidence of armed conflict is declining worldwide; crime rates are dropping in urban America; smallpox, polio, and other fatal diseases have been eradicated; and one-third fewer people die of hunger than two decades ago. Wait a minute, you might be thinking: “What about global warming? What about species extinction?” But Easterbrook isn't denying our problems—he's simply saying that our fear-obsessed culture negatively slants our view of reality and will never give us the will, the drive, or the determination to find solutions. The book's relentless onslaught of good news shows that by almost every measurable standard, life today is better than it ever has been. In fact, in the developed world, the average person enjoys a standard of living that far exceeds that of any king or queen in centuries past. Yet in spite of our outrageously good fortune, Easterbrook says, we seem to be sinking more deeply into negativity and pessimism, popping Prozac to fight depression, committing suicide at escalating rates, and generally feeling despondent about the possibility of making any real difference. Easterbrook examines many sociological and psychological reasons for this paradox, but one seems particularly vital to consider: Hopelessness lets us off the hook. It allows us to feel incapable of and unaccountable for meeting the tremendous challenges we do face. And he won't let us get away with it. As the most affluent people who have ever inhabited planet Earth, he insists that we have an obligation to assume that nothing is impossible and that it's never too late to change the world. This very intelligent and meticulously researched book isn't offering solutions, but the shift it points to—into a higher and more optimistic context—just might be the only real solution there is.

#### Rejection of politics and the idea of world-changing denies life. Attempts at changing the world are not only prerequisites to life celebration but also lead to new forms of life celebration that their evidence doesn’t assume

Todd **May** (professor of philosophy at Clemson University) **2005** “To Change the World, To Celebrate Life” Philosophy and Social Criticism, Sage Publications

And what happens from there? From the meetings, from the rallies, from the petitions and the teach-ins? What happens next? There is, after all, always a next. If you win this time – end aid to the contras, divest from apartheid South Africa, force debt-forgiveness by technologically advanced countries – there is always more to do. There is the de-unionization of workers, there are gay rights, there is Burma, there are the Palestinians, the Tibetans. There will always be Tibetans, even if they aren’t in Tibet, even if they aren’t Asian. But is that the only question: Next? Or is that just the question we focus on? What’s the next move in this campaign, what’s the next campaign? Isn’t there more going on than that? After all, engaging in political organizing is a practice, or a group of practices. It contributes to making you who you are. It’s where the power is, and where your life is, and where the intersection of your life and those of others (many of whom you will never meet, even if it’s for their sake that you’re involved) and the buildings and streets of your town is. This moment when you are seeking to change the world, whether by making a suggestion in a meeting or singing at a rally or marching in silence or asking for a signature on a petition, is not a moment in which you don’t exist. It’s not a moment of yours that you sacrifice for others so that it no longer belongs to you. It remains a moment of your life, sedimenting in you to make you what you will become, emerging out of a past that is yours as well. What will you make of it, this moment? How will you be with others, those others around you who also do not cease to exist when they begin to organize or to protest or to resist? The illusion is to think that this has nothing to do with you. You’ve made a decision to participate in world-changing. Will that be all there is to it? Will it seem to you a simple sacrifice, for this small period of time, of who you are for the sake of others? Are you, for this moment, a political ascetic? Asceticism like that is dangerous. Freedom lies not in our distance from the world but in the historically fragile and contingent ways we are folded into it, just as we ourselves are folds of it. If we take Merleau-Ponty’s Being not as a rigid foundation or a truth behind appearances but as the historical folding and refolding of a univocity, then our freedom lies in the possibility of other foldings. Merleau-Ponty is not insensitive to this point. His elusive concept of the invisible seems to gesture in this direction. Of painting, he writes: the proper essence of the visible is to have a layer of invisibility in the strict sense, which it makes present as a certain absence . . . There is that which reaches the eye directly, the frontal properties of the visible; but there is also that which reaches it from below . . . and that which reaches it from above . . . where it no longer participates in the heaviness of origins but in free accomplishments.9 Elsewhere, in The Visible and the Invisible, he says: if . . . the surface of the visible, is doubled up over its whole extension with an invisible reserve; and if, finally, in our flesh as the flesh of things, the actual, empirical, ontic visible, by a sort of folding back, invagination, or padding, exhibits a visibility, a possibility that is not the shadow of the actual but its principle . . . an interior horizon and an exterior horizon between which the actual visible is a partitioning and which, nonetheless, open indefinitely only upon other visibles . . .10 What are we to make of these references? We can, to be sure, see the hand of Heidegger in them. But we may also, and for present purposes more relevantly, see an intersection with Foucault’s work on freedom. There is an ontology of freedom at work here, one that situates freedom not in the private reserve of an individual but in the unfinished character of any historical situation. There is more to our historical juncture, as there is to a painting, than appears to us on the surface of its visibility. The trick is to recognize this, and to take advantage of it, not only with our thoughts but with our lives. And that is why, in the end, there can be no such thing as a sad revolutionary. To seek to change the world is to offer a new form of life-celebration. It is to articulate a fresh way of being, which is at once a way of seeing, thinking, acting, and being acted upon. It is to fold Being once again upon itself, this time at a new point, to see what that might yield. There is, as Foucault often reminds us, no guarantee that this fold will not itself turn out to contain the intolerable. In a complex world with which we are inescapably entwined, a world we cannot view from above or outside, there is no certainty about the results of our experiments. Our politics are constructed from the same vulnerability that is the stuff of our art and our daily practices. But to refuse to experiment is to resign oneself to the intolerable; it is to abandon both the struggle to change the world and the opportunity to celebrate living within it. And to seek one aspect without the other – life-celebration without world-changing, world-changing without life-celebration – is to refuse to acknowledge the chiasm of body and world that is the wellspring of both. If we are to celebrate our lives, if we are to change our world, then perhaps the best place to begin to think is our bodies, which are the openings to celebration and to change, and perhaps the point at which the war within us that I spoke of earlier can be both waged and resolved. That is the fragile beauty that, in their different ways, both Merleau- Ponty and Foucault have placed before us. The question before us is whether, in our lives and in our politics, we can be worthy of it.

#### No impact to the Ego– threat construction doesn’t cause wars

Kaufman, Prof Poli Sci and IR – U Delaware, 2009

(Stuart J, “Narratives and Symbols in Violent Mobilization: The Palestinian-Israeli Case,” *Security Studies* 18:3, 400 – 434)

Even when hostile narratives, group fears, and opportunity are strongly present, war occurs only if these factors are harnessed. Ethnic narratives and fears must combine to create significant ethnic hostility among mass publics. Politicians must also seize the opportunity to manipulate that hostility, evoking hostile narratives and symbols to gain or hold power by riding a wave of chauvinist mobilization. Such mobilization is often spurred by prominent events (for example, episodes of violence) that increase feelings of hostility and make chauvinist appeals seem timely. If the other group also mobilizes and if each side's felt security needs threaten the security of the other side, the result is a security dilemma spiral of rising fear, hostility, and mutual threat that results in violence.

A virtue of this symbolist theory is that symbolist logic explains why ethnic peace is more common than ethnonationalist war. Even if hostile narratives, fears, and opportunity exist, severe violence usually can still be avoided if ethnic elites skillfully define group needs in moderate ways and collaborate across group lines to prevent violence: this is consociationalism.17 War is likely only if hostile narratives, fears, and opportunity spur hostile attitudes, chauvinist mobilization, and a security dilemma.

#### Doing nothing negates life – The apocalyptic scenario planning of the affirmative is key to motivate change

Gerald **Keaney 2006** “comments on Hakim Bey” http://brisbaneanarchy.org/node/86

We can begin with his position that we should not take an interest in, and so not write, apocalyptic literature. **Apocalyptic literature is an ancient biblical genre that describes the end of the world**, often in lurid terms. The Book of Revelations is probably the best-known example of this genre. **Bey argues that interest in, and the writing of, apocalyptic literature is life negative**. This means that instead of encouraging the virtues of joy de vive and free-spiritedness, life negativity encourages the kind of death fixation that leads to such vices as warmongery, Puritanism and mindless, life wasting work. The position on apocalyptic literature was risible even before Bey’s rise to fame. Mainly this is because it seems that if we took Bey’s advice, we would condone the nuclear weapons issue being swept under the mat as it has been since the staged and premature celebrations surrounding the collapse of the Berlin Wall. Further Bey’s position on apocalyptic literature **also** laughably suggests we should eschew speculation about the effects of space-based weapons and realistic global warming scenarios. Though it is odd to suggest these topics can really make anything, including Hakim Bey, seem funny, the reason Bey’s position on apocalypse takes on the air of the ridiculous is because nothing seems more negative to life than to ignore imminent threat to that life. Let us then consider other assumptions Bey’s work, in order to find out how he may otherwise justify his strange position. Now we would usually think apocalyptic literature can use fear and dread to encourage people to change the world because it might come TRUE. For Bey this motivation is obviously problematic, and I would suggest the reason why is a way of thinking associated with the term “post-modernism.” Bey himself gestures in this direction. For this way of thinking it does not matter so much (or at all) if something is true or not. Rather we should be more interested in what the agenda of the writer or speaker might be, or how a piece of writing or a genre can be cross referenced to some other discourse. This severely limits the way a text (or what have you) might be used. In contrast to this position, more traditionally it has been thought that by making good arguments a text can lay claim to being true **(even if the claim the text makes should be up for contest by other good arguments)** and therefore can change people’s minds and the world. Bey does not give us a decent reason to reject this traditional position (in fact I am yet to read one anywhere); but he is happy enough to jump on the band wagon of assuming it is false. This leaves Bey’s position on apocalyptic literature unsupported. Of course apocalyptic literature does not have to be convincing. Outside a few occult freaks, the odd fundamentalist Christian and some characters in horror movies, (all of whom may well be life negative) no-one seriously believes that The Book of Revelations will come true. But contemporary **devastation scenarios are different. For instance a nuclear exchange** can, and some point probably will, occur unless we abolish nuclear weapons. Literature that gets at truths like this should not be dismissed on post modern grounds, but encouraged, written, praised for honesty, and critiqued where it pulls punches or justifies the unjustifiable.

#### We create meaning for our own lives regardless of other’s judgements

Keith **Augustine** (Executive Director and Scholarly Paper Editor, Internet Infidels) **2000** “Death and the Meaning of Life” http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/features/2000/augustine1.html

These considerations show that we must create our own meaning for our lives regardless of whether or not our lives serve some higher purpose. Whether our lives are meaningful to us depends on how we judge them. The absence or presence of greater purpose is as irrelevant as the finality of death. The claim that our lives are 'ultimately' meaningless does not make sense because there is no sense in which they could be meaningful or meaningless outside of how we regard them. Questions about the meaning of life are questions about values. We attribute values to things in life rather than discovering them. There can be no meaning of life outside of the meaning we create for ourselves because the universe is not a sentient being that can attribute values to things. Even if a sentient God existed, the value that he would attribute to our lives would not be the same as the value that we find in living and thus would be irrelevant. What makes our lives meaningful is that we find the activities we engage in to be worthwhile. Our determination to carry out projects we have created for ourselves gives our lives meaning. We feel that life is meaningless when most of our desires which we regard as important are frustrated. Whether we regard life as meaningful or meaningless depends on the degree to which our important desires are frustrated. The judgments that we make about our lives on these points are the same regardless of whether one's life is eternal or not or whether it is part of a greater purpose or not. Perhaps the secret to a meaningful life is to focus on those desires which we can fulfill and diminish those which we cannot--provided that we know the difference between the two.

#### Human life is inherently valuable

Melinda Penner (Director of Operations – STR, Stand To Reason) 2005 “End of Life Ethics: A Primer”, Stand to Reason, http://www.str.org/site/News2?page=NewsArticle&id=5223

Intrinsic value is very different. Things with intrinsic value are valued for their own sake. They don’t have to achieve any other goal to be valuable. They are goods in themselves. Beauty, pleasure, and virtue are likely examples. Family and friendship are examples. Something that’s intrinsically valuable might also be instrumentally valuable, but even if it loses its instrumental value, its intrinsic value remains. Intrinsic value is what people mean when they use the phrase "the sanctity of life." Now when someone argues that someone doesn’t have "quality of life" they are arguing that life is only valuable as long as it obtains something else with quality, and when it can’t accomplish this, it’s not worth anything anymore. It's only instrumentally valuable. The problem with this view is that it is entirely subjective and changeable with regards to what might give value to life. Value becomes a completely personal matter, and, as we all know, our personal interests change over time. There is no grounding for objective human value and human rights if it’s not intrinsic value. Our legal system is built on the notion that humans have intrinsic value. The Declaration of Independence: "We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that each person is endowed by his Creator with certain unalienable rights...." If human beings only have instrumental value, then slavery can be justified because there is nothing objectively valuable that requires our respect. There is nothing other than intrinsic value that can ground the unalienable equal rights we recognize because there is nothing about all human beings

 that is universal and equal. Intrinsic human value is what binds our social contract of rights. So if human life is intrinsically valuable, then it remains valuable even when our capacities are limited. Human life is valuable even with tremendous limitations. Human life remains valuable because its value is not derived from being able to talk, or walk, or feed yourself, or even reason at a certain level. Human beings don’t have value only in virtue of states of being (e.g., happiness) they can experience. The "quality of life" view is a poison pill because once we swallow it, we’re led down a logical slippery slope. The exact same principle can be used to take the life of human beings in all kinds of limited conditions because I wouldn't want to live that way. Would you want to live the life of a baby with Down’s Syndrome? No? Then kill her. Would you want to live the life of an infant with cerebral palsy? No? Then kill him. Would you want to live the life of a baby born with a cleft lip? No? Then kill her. (In fact, they did.) Once we accept this principle, it justifies killing every infant born with a condition that we deem a life we don’t want to live. There’s no reason not to kill every handicapped person who can’t speak for himself — because I wouldn’t want to live that way. This, in fact, is what has happened in Holland with the Groningen Protocol. Dutch doctors euthanize severely ill newborns and their society has accepted it.

#### Extinction outweighs – as long as there is some life there’s only a risk they retain ontological capacity

Hans Jonas (Former Alvin Johnson Prof. Phil. – New School for Social Research and Former Eric Voegelin Visiting Prof. – U. Munich) 1996 “Morality and Mortality: A Search for the Good After Auschwitz”, p. 111-112)

With this look ahead at an ethics for the future, we are touching at the same time upon the question of the future of freedom. The unavoidable discussion of this question seems to give rise to misunderstandings. My dire prognosis that not only our material standard of living but also our democratic freedoms would fall victim to the growing pressure of a worldwide ecological crisis, until finally there would remain only some form of tyranny that would try to save the situation, has led to the accusation that I am defending dictatorship as a solution to our problems. I shall ignore here what is a confusion between warning and recommendation. But I have indeed said that such a tyranny would still be better than total ruin; thus, I have ethically accepted it as an alternative. I must now defend this standpoint, which I continue to support, before the court that I myself have created with the main argument of this essay. For are we not contradicting ourselves in prizing physical survival at the price of freedom? Did we not say that freedom was the condition of our capacity for responsibility—and that this capacity was a reason for the survival of humankind?; By tolerating tyranny as an alternative to physical annihilation are we not violating the principle we established: that the How of existence must not take precedence over its Why? Yet we can make a terrible concession to the primacy of physical survival in the conviction that the ontological capacity for freedom, inseparable as it is from man's being, cannot really be extinguished, only temporarily banished from the public realm. This conviction can be supported by experience we are all familiar with. We have seen that even in the most totalitarian societies the urge for freedom on the part of some individuals cannot be extinguished, and this renews our faith in human beings. Given this faith, we have reason to hope that, as long as there are human beings who survive, the image of God will continue to exist along with them and will wait in concealment for its new hour. With that hope—which in this particular case takes precedence over fear—it is permissible, for the sake of physical survival, to accept if need be a temporary absence of freedom in the external affairs of humanity. This is, I want to emphasize, a worst-case scenario, and it is the foremost task of responsibility at this particular moment in world history to prevent it from happening. This is in fact one of the noblest of duties (and at the same time one concerning self-preservation), on the part of the imperative of responsibility to avert future coercion that would lead to lack of freedom by acting freely in the present, thus preserving as much as possible the ability of future generations to assume responsibility. But more than that is involved. At stake is the preservation of Earth's entire miracle of creation, of which our human existence is a part and before which man reverently bows, even without philosophical "grounding." Here too faith may precede and reason follow; it is faith that longs for this preservation of the Earth (fides quaerens intellectum), and reason comes as best it can to faith's aid with arguments, not knowing or even asking how much depends on its success or failure in determining what action to take. With this confession of faith we come to the end of our essay on ontology.

## 2NC

### Materialism Cards

#### The affirmatives attempt to just change the way that we relate to nature will fail- the alternative is better

Barnhizer 2006 David Barnhizer (Professor of Law at Ohio State University, Articles Editor of the Ohio State Law Journal and then served as a Reginald Heber Smith Community Lawyer Fellow in Colorado Springs Legal Services Office, a Ford Urban Law Fellow, and a Clinical Teaching Fellow at the Harvard Law School, Senior Advisor to the International Program of the Natural Resources Defense Council, a Senior Fellow for Earth Summit Watch, and General Counsel for the Shrimp Tribunal. He has served as Executive Director of The Year 2000 Committee) 2006 “waking from sustainability’s “impossible dream”” Georgetown environmental law review

Prophetic Malthusian analyses as provided by Hardin, Brown, and the Club of Rome are replete with warnings of systemic collapse, exhaustion of resources, resource-based wars over water, food, and energy, and societal degradation. While there have been overstatements and misstatements, there are important truths contained in the "doomsday" declarations. We will increasingly face [\*617] serious problems without adequate preparation and without adaptive strategies to buffer the severe effects our selfish actions will impose on those who lack the ability or resources to protect themselves. 54 The fact that the timing of our modern "prophets of doom" has been off and that new technologies and natural events may have delayed or ameliorated some of the effects does not mean the trends they describe related to energy depletion, global warming, population growth, pollution, desertification, urban decay, poverty, and species loss are not serious. Some will prove catastrophic for large segments of the planet's population. It is axiomatic that those holding wealth and power are nearly always able to escape the consequences of their actions, while others are left behind to suffer the effects. Yet it is those holding that wealth and power who are setting the policies and making the political, legal, and economic decisions that affect the lives of others.¶ Many of the solutions that are being suggested to deal with the problems ignore or fail to understand the reality of human systems. The "solutions" far too frequently depend on achieving fundamental changes in institutional and personal behaviors of the kind that simply are not going to occur--if at all--without us experiencing some substantial degree of crisis and collapse that actually impacts on decisionmakers to the extent they come to fear for their jobs or worse. Even when crises do occur in sufficient intensity and on a scale where people demand responses, any changes will be grudging at best, always partial, and will require a significant amount of governmentally-mandated and enforced compulsion to be even partially effective. Because we operate in the short-term in the political sphere, the point at which action is taken will be sufficiently far along in the process of harm and systemic degradation that for many of the sufferers it will be "too little, too late." 55

#### The affirmatives approach to the environment ensures failure- it doesn’t account for the way that actual humans interact with the environment- material action is key

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Medieval alchemists sought unsuccessfully to discover the process that would enable them to turn base metal into gold--assigning the name "Philosopher's Stone" to what they sought. The quest was doomed to failure. Just as a "sow's ear" cannot become a "silk purse," a base metal cannot become gold. Sustainability is impossible for the same reasons. It asks us to be something we are not, both individually and as a political and economic community. It is impossible to convert humans into the wise, selfless, and nearly omniscient creatures required to build and operate a system that incorporates sustainability. Even if it were ultimately possible (and it is not), it would take many generations to achieve and we are running out of time.¶ There is an enormous gap among what we claim we want to do, what we actually want to do, and our ability to achieve our professed goals. I admit to an absolute distrust of cheap and easy proclamations of lofty ideals and commitments to voluntary or unenforceable codes of practice. The only thing that counts is the actor's actual behavior. For most people, that behavior is shaped by self-interest determined by the opportunity to benefit or to avoid harm. In the economic arena this means that if a substantial return can be had without a high risk of significant negative consequences, the decision will be made to seek the benefit. It is the reinvention of Hardin's Tragedy of the Commons. 1¶ This essay explores the nature of human decisionmaking and motivation within critical systems. These systems include business and governmental decisionmaking with a focus on environmental and social areas of emerging crisis where the consequence of acting unwisely or failing to act wisely produces large-scale harms for both human and natural systems. The analysis begins by suggesting that nothing humans create is "sustainable." Change is inevitable and [\*597] irresistible whether styled as systemic entropy, Joseph Schumpeter's idea of a regenerative "creative destruction," or Nikolai Kondratieff's "waves" of economic and social transformation. 2¶ Business entities and governmental decisionmakers play critical roles in both causing environmental and social harms and avoiding those consequences. Some have thought that the path to avoiding harm and achieving positive benefits is to develop codes of practice that by their language promise that decisionmakers will behave in ways consistent with the principles that have come to be referred to as "sustainability." That belief is a delusion--an "impossible dream." Daniel Boorstin once asked: "Have we been doomed to make our dreams into illusions?" 3 He adds: "An illusion . . . is an image we have mistaken for reality. . . . [W]e cannot see it is not fact." 4 Albert Camus warns of the inevitability of failing to achieve unrealistic goals and the need to become more aware of the limited extent of our power to effect fundamental change. He urges that we concentrate on devising realistic strategies and behaviors that allow us to be effective in our actions. 5¶ As companies are expected to implement global codes of conduct such as the U.N. Global Compact and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development's (OECD) Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, 6 and governments [\*598] and multilateral institutions supposedly become more concerned about limiting the environmental and social impacts of business decisionmaking, it may be useful to consider actual behavior related to corporate and governmental responses to codes of practice, treaties, and even national laws. Unfortunately, business, government, and multilateral institutions have poor track records vis-a-vis conformity to such codes of practice and treaties.¶ Despite good intentions, empty dreams and platitudes may be counterproductive. This essay argues that the ideal of sustainability as introduced in the 1987 report of the Brundtland Commission and institutionalized in the form of Agenda 21 at the 1992 Rio Earth Summit is false and counterproductive. The ideal of sustainability assumes that we are almost god-like, capable of perceiving, integrating, monitoring, organizing, and controlling our world. These assumptions create an "impossible" character to the "dream" of sustainability in business and governmental decisionmaking.¶ Sustainability of the Agenda 21 kind is a utopian vision that is the enemy of the possible and the good. The problem is that while on paper we can always sketch elegant solutions that appear to have the ability to achieve a desired utopia, such solutions work "if only" everyone will come together and behave in the way laid out in the "blueprint." 7 Humans should have learned from such grand misperceptions as the French Enlightenment's failure to accurately comprehend the quality and limits of human nature or Marxism's flawed view of altruistic human motivation that the "if only" is an impossibly utopian reordering of human nature we will never achieve. 8¶ [\*599] A critical defect in the idea of sustainable development is that it continues the flawed assumptions about human nature and motivation that provided the foundational premises of Marxist collectivism and centralized planning authorities. 9 Such perspectives inject rigidity and bureaucracy into a system that requires monitoring, flexibility, adaptation, and accountability. But, in criticizing the failed Marxist-Leninist form of organization, my argument should not be seen as a defense of supposed free market capitalism. Like Marxism, a true free market capitalism does not really exist.¶ The factors of greed and self interest, limited human capacity, inordinate systemic complexity, and the power of large-scale driving forces beyond our ability to control lead to the unsustainability of human systems. Human self-interest is an insurmountable barrier that can be affected to a degree only by effective laws, the promise of significant financial or career returns, or fear of consequences. The only way to change the behavior of business and governmental decisionmakers is through the use of the "carrot" and the "stick." 10 Yet even this approach can only be achieved incrementally with limited positive effects.

#### The affirmatives move to attempt to just change the epistemology/ontology of our engagement with the environment is insufficient- people will pay lip service and continue the squo

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Although this essay covers a wide range of topics, it is necessary to state a major premise in this initial section: voluntary codes of behavior are nearly always meaningless and often counterproductive. They merely offer business and governments the opportunity to appear as though they are behaving according to the terms of the codes when in fact they are engaging in "impossible dreams" and public relations games.¶ The observation that "the road to Hell is paved with good intentions" applies in the context of the utility and consequences of voluntary codes of practice. Sustainability is a kind of "fabricated fiction." 11 By posing it as an ideal we convince ourselves, and others, that we stand for something noble and grand. An impossible or illusory ideal aggravates problems rather than helping to generate workable solutions. When we place our hopes in unworkable schemes we fail to come to grips with the real characteristics and dimensions of the challenges. 12¶ It has become common for social activists and international organizations to spend enormous amounts of time and institutional resources developing codes of practice and voluntary pledges to behave in benign ways that claim to protect resources, human rights, and social justice. The International Labour Organization's [ILO] Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises [\*601] and Social Policy offers one example of how the illusions are crafted to make it seem as if effective action is being taken. 13 Such agreements do not even rise to the level of "paper tigers" because they do not bother to incorporate fake teeth and claws. There are no real obligations, mandates, or consequences for failing to comply.¶ The ILO Declaration does not require acceptance by countries that are members or by business enterprises. Nor does it contain provisions for monitoring or reporting. It is therefore ironic to consider the ILO's admission:¶ Fundamentally, a code of conduct depends on its credibility: the extent to which it is taken seriously by industry, unions, consumers and governments. Credibility, in turn, depends on monitoring, enforcement and transparency: the extent to which foreign contractors and subcontractors, workers, the public, nongovernmental organisations and governments are aware of the code's existence and meaning. 14¶ Twenty years ago it was "suggested" that business enterprises should put in their annual corporate reports the fact that they support the ILO Declaration's principles. Governments were "invited to report periodically" on the effect they gave to the ILO Declaration. If governments do happen to submit a report, the ILO's Governing Body Subcommittee on Multinational Enterprises is "called upon to examine" the material, but the Subcommittee does not even receive the material until it has been analyzed by a Working Group. 15¶ The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises are equally toothless. 16 They "recommend" that business enterprises "indicate publicly their acceptance of the Guidelines, preferably in their annual reports." 17 The OECD's Committee on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises "shall periodically or at the request of an adhering country hold exchanges of views on matters covered by the Guidelines and the experience gained in their application." 18 Actual authority is carefully limited and special emphasis is given to enterprise independence. It is emphasized that: "The Committee shall not reach conclusions on the [\*602] conduct of individual enterprises." 19¶ Even supposedly "legal" requirements are of limited consequence to the extent they lack the systems and standards essential to make them work. As discussed in greater detail in the essay's analysis of business decisionmaking, businesses will never honor voluntary codes of practice or treaties that impose no duties, contain no monitoring and investigation systems, and lack effective sanctions and enforcement mechanisms. Although complex statutory and treaty schemes are enacted and negotiated that on the surface seem to address the conditions, virtually all such efforts are a form of naive delusion or cynical pretense. They allow their creators to claim they have taken action to deal with the "problem" even while the underlying situations worsen due to laws, treaties, and codes of practice that are ignored or contain no real enforcement, monitoring, or sanction penalties of a kind sufficient to alter behavior. Such codes, laws, and treaty "obligations" tend to be nothing more than public relations ploys. They aim at making it seem as if the actors are "good guys" committed to values and behaviors considered positive by enlightened society. In fact these schemes are cynical masks behind which the ongoing conduct of business-as-usual is hidden.¶

### Cap Alienates us From Being

#### Alienates millions from the fruits of their labor

**Zizek and Daly 2k4** (Slavoj and Glyn, Conversations with Zizek page 14-16)

For Zizek it is imperative that we cut through this Gordian knot of postmodern protocol and recognize that our ethico-political responsibility is to confront the constitutive violence of today’s global capitalism and its obscene naturalization / anonymization of the millions who are subjugated by it throughout the world. Against the standardized positions of postmodern culture – with all its pieties concerning ‘multiculturalist’ etiquette – Zizek is arguing for a politics that might be called ‘radically incorrect’ in the sense that it break with these types of positions 7 and focuses instead on the very organizing principles of today’s social reality: the principles of global liberal capitalism. This requires some care and subtlety. For far too long, Marxism has been bedeviled by an almost fetishistic economism that has tended towards political morbidity. With the likes of Hilferding and Gramsci, and more recently Laclau and Mouffee, crucial theoretical advances have been made that enable the transcendence of all forms of economism. In this new context, however, Zizek argues that the problem that now presents itself is almost that of the opposite fetish. That is to say, the prohibitive anxieties surrounding the taboo of economism can function as a way of not engaging with economic reality and as a way of implicitly accepting the latter as a basic horizon of existence. In an ironic Freudian-Lacanian twist, the fear of economism can end up reinforcing a de facto economic necessity in respect of contemporary capitalism (i.e. the initial prohibition conjures up the very thing it fears).This is not to endorse any kind of retrograde return to economism. Zizek’s point is rather that in rejecting economism we should not lose sight of the systemic power of capital in shaping the lives and destinies of humanity and our very sense of the possible. In particular we should not overlook Marx’s central insight that in order to create a universal global system the forces of capitalism seek to conceal the politico-discursive violence of its construction through a kind of gentrification of that system. What is persistently denied by neo-liberals such as Rorty (1989) and Fukuyama (1992) is that the gentrification of global liberal capitalism is one whose ‘universalism’ fundamentally reproduces and depends upon a disavowed violence that excludes vast sectors of the world’s populations. In this way, neo-liberal ideology attempts to naturalize capitalism by presenting its outcomes of winning and losing as if they were simply a matter of chance and sound judgment in a neutral market place. Capitalism does indeed create a space for a certain diversity, at least for the central capitalist regions, but it is neither neutral nor ideal and its price in terms of social exclusion is exorbitant. That is to say, the human cost in terms of inherent global poverty and degraded ‘life-chances’ cannot be calculated within the existing economic rationale and, in consequence, social exclusion remains mystified and nameless (viz. the patronizing reference to the ‘developing world’).

### 2NC Cap Outweighs Death Bad

#### Existence is a prerequisite to ontological questioning

Wapner 2003 Paul Wapner (associate professor and director of the Global Environmental Policy Program at American University) Winter 2003 “Leftist criticism of” http://www.dissentmagazine.org/article/?article=539

THE THIRD response to eco-criticism would require critics to acknowledge the ways in which they themselves silence nature and then to respect the sheer otherness of the nonhuman world. Postmodernism prides itself on criticizing the urge toward mastery that characterizes modernity. But isn't mastery exactly what postmodernism is exerting as it captures the nonhuman world within its own conceptual domain? Doesn't postmodern cultural criticism deepen the modernist urge toward mastery by eliminating the ontological weight of the nonhuman world? What else could it mean to assert that there is no such thing as nature? I have already suggested the postmodernist response: yes, recognizing the social construction of "nature" does deny the self-expression of the nonhuman world, but how would we know what such self-expression means? Indeed, nature doesn't speak; rather, some person always speaks on nature's behalf, and whatever that person says is, as we all know, a social construction. All attempts to listen to nature are social constructions-except one. Even the most radical postmodernist must acknowledge the distinction between physical existence and non-existence. As I have said, postmodernists accept that there is a physical substratum to the phenomenal world even if they argue about the different meanings we ascribe to it. This acknowledgment of physical existence is crucial. We can't ascribe meaning to that which doesn't appear. What doesn't exist can manifest no character. Put differently, yes, the postmodernist should rightly worry about interpreting nature's expressions. And all of us should be wary of those who claim to speak on nature's behalf (including environmentalists who do that). But we need not doubt the simple idea that a prerequisite of expression is existence. This in turn suggests that preserving the nonhuman world-in all its diverse embodiments-must be seen by eco-critics as a fundamental good. Eco-critics must be supporters, in some fashion, of environmental preservation.

### Method

#### Method is the foremost political question- whoever has the best explanation for exploitation should win because they are the ones with the most effective strategy for engagement

Tumino ‘1

[Stephen, Prof English at Pitt, ““What is Orthodox Marxism and Why it Matters Now More than Ever”, Red Critique, p. online]

Any effective political theory will have to do at least two things: it will have to offer an integrated understanding of social practices and, based on such an interrelated knowledge, offer a guideline for praxis. My main argument here is that among all contesting social theories now, only Orthodox Marxism has been able to produce an integrated knowledge of the existing social totality and provide lines of praxis that will lead to building a society free from necessity. But first I must clarify what I mean by Orthodox Marxism. Like all other modes and forms of political theory, the very theoretical identity of Orthodox Marxism is itself contested—not just from non-and anti-Marxists who question the very "real" (by which they mean the "practical" as under free-market criteria) existence of any kind of Marxism now but, perhaps more tellingly, from within the Marxist tradition itself. I will, therefore, first say what I regard to be the distinguishing marks of Orthodox Marxism and then outline a short polemical map of contestation over Orthodox Marxism within the Marxist theories now. I will end by arguing for its effectivity in bringing about a new society based not on human rights but on freedom from necessity. I will argue that to know contemporary society—and to be able to act on such knowledge—one has to first of all know what makes the existing social totality. I will argue that the dominant social totality is based on inequality—not just inequality of power but inequality of economic access (which then determines access to health care, education, housing, diet, transportation, . . . ). This systematic inequality cannot be explained by gender, race, sexuality, disability, ethnicity, or nationality. These are all secondary contradictions and are all determined by the fundamental contradiction of capitalism which is inscribed in the relation of capital and labor. All modes of Marxism now explain social inequalities primarily on the basis of these secondary contradictions and in doing so—and this is my main argument—legitimate capitalism. Why? Because such arguments authorize capitalism without gender, race, discrimination and thus accept economic inequality as an integral part of human societies. They accept a sunny capitalism—a capitalism beyond capitalism. Such a society, based on cultural equality but economic inequality, has always been the not-so-hidden agenda of the bourgeois left—whether it has been called "new left," "postmarxism," or "radical democracy." This is, by the way, the main reason for its popularity in the culture industry—from the academy (Jameson, Harvey, Haraway, Butler,. . . ) to daily politics (Michael Harrington, Ralph Nader, Jesse Jackson,. . . ) to. . . . For all, capitalism is here to stay and the best that can be done is to make its cruelties more tolerable, more humane. This humanization (not eradication) of capitalism is the sole goal of ALL contemporary lefts (marxism, feminism, anti-racism, queeries, . . . ). Such an understanding of social inequality is based on the fundamental understanding that the source of wealth is human knowledge and not human labor. That is, wealth is produced by the human mind and is thus free from the actual objective conditions that shape the historical relations of labor and capital. Only Orthodox Marxism recognizes the historicity of labor and its primacy as the source of all human wealth. In this paper I argue that any emancipatory theory has to be founded on recognition of the priority of Marx's labor theory of value and not repeat the technological determinism of corporate theory ("knowledge work") that masquerades as social theory.

### A2: Perm

Yatusami evidence says that the aff means there is nothing left to be done- that is obvi a link to cap

#### The aff attempts to sanitize capitalism by suggesting that you can find contentment within it- even if continuing that system prevents others from finding contentment

Ebert and Zavarzadeh in 2008(Teresa L., English, State University of New York, Albany, Mas’ud, prolific writer and expert on class ideology, “Class in Culture”, p. 36-38)

**The** cultural **activism of capital against labor**, however, **was not limited to conservative thinkers. It also** energetically **recruited Left intellectuals and "socialists of the** heart." The defense of free enterprise from the Left has always been of great cultural value to capitalism. **When Left intellectuals defend the market directly-in the guise, for example, of "market socialism"** *(Market Socialism: The Debate among Socialists,* ed. Oilman; *Why Market Socialism? Voices from Dissent,* ed. Roosevelt and Belkin)--**or denounce the enemies of capital as totalitarian, as violators of human rights, and for repressing the play of cultural meanings and thus singularity and heterogeneity** (e.g., Sidney **Hook**, Emesto **Laclau**, Jean-Francois **Lyotard**, Jacques **Derrida**), **their discourses seem more authoritative and sound more credible coming from the supposed critics of capital than do the discourses of conservative authors.** To put it precisely: **the Left has been valuable to capitalism because it has played a double role in legitimating capitalism. It has criticized capitalism as a culture, but has normalized it as an economic system** (e.g., Deleuze and Guat-tari, *Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia;* Duncombe, ed., *Cultural Resistance Reader;* Kraus and Lotringer, eds., *Hatred of Capitalism).* **It** has **complained about capitalism's** so-called corporate **culture**, **but** has **normalized it as a system of wage-labor that** is **grounded on exchange-relations and produces the corporate culture**. **The normalization of capitalism by the Left takes many forms**, **but** all **involve the justification of exploitation, which the Left represents as redemptive. They are** all **versions**-with various degrees of conceptual complexity- -**of** Nicholas D. **Kristof's argument in** his "In **Praise of the Maligned Sweatshop**." **He writes that** the sweatshops in Africa set up by capitalists of the North are in fact "opportunities" and advises that "**anyone who cares about** fighting **poverty should campaign in favor of sweatshops**." His argument is summed up by two sentences printed in boldface and foregrounded in his essay: **"What's worse than being exploited? Not being exploited**" *(The New York Times,* 6 June 2006, A-21). **What** has **made this** double **role** of postwar Left writers **so effective for capitalism is the way their** innovative **writing**, unorthodox **uses of language, and** captivating **arguments have generated** intellectual **excitement**. Jean-Paul **Sartre**, Theodor **Adorno,** Jean-Francais **Lyotard**, Jacques **Derrida**, Judith **Butler**, Jean **Baudrillard**, Jacques **Lacan**, Michel **Foucault**, Gilles **Deleuze**, Giorgio **Agamben**, Slavoj **Zizek**, **and** Stuart **Hall**, to name the most familiar authors, **have each used** quite **different**, **but** still **intellectually intriguing idioms**, **to de-historicize capitalism**. In highly subtle and nuanced arguments, **they have translated capitalism's Authoritarian economic practices**-which quietly force workers to concede to the exploitation of their labor-**into cultural values of free choice and self-sovereignty** (at the same time that they question traditional subjectivity). **Their most effective contributions to capitalism and its economic institutions have been to represent capitalism as a discursive system of meanings and** thus **divert attention away from its economic violence to its semantic transgressions-its homogenizing of meanings** in, for example, popular culture **or its erasure of difference** in cultural lifestyles. **They** have **criticized capitalism**, in other words, **for its** cultural **destruction of human imagination, but** at the same time, they **have condoned its logic of exploitation by dismantling** almost all **the conceptual apparatuses and analytics that offer a materialist understanding of capitalism as an economic system**. More specifically, **they have discredited any efforts to place class at the center of understanding and to grasp the extent and violence of labor practices**. They have done so, in the name of the "new" and with an ecstatic joy bordering on religious zeal (Ronell, *The Telephone Book;* Strangelove, *The Empire of Mind: Digital Piracy and the Anti-Capitalist Movement;* Gibson-Graham, *A Postcapitatist Politics).* **Left thinkers,** for example**, have argued that "new" changes in capitalism**-**the shift**, they claim, **from production to consumption**-**have triggered "a revolution in human thought around the idea of 'culture" which**, under new conditions, **has** itself **become material, "primary and constitutive"** (Hall, "The Centrality of Culture" 220, 215), **and is no** longer secondary and **dependent on** such outside **matters as relations of production**. Consequently, Hall and **others have argued that the analytics of base/superstructure has become irrelevant to sociocultural interpretations because the "new" conditions have rendered such concepts as objectivity, cause and effect, and materialism questionable.** "**The** old **distinction**" **between "**economic **'base' and** the ideological **'superstructure**" therefore **can no longer be sustained because the new culture is** what Fredric Jameson calls **"mediatic**" *(Postmodernism* 68). According to Hall, "media both form a critical part of the material infrastructure ... and are the principal means by which ideas and images are circulated" (Hall 209) . . . The logic of Hall's argument is obtained by treating the "material" as materialist. Media, however, are "material" only in a very trivial sense, they have a body of matter, and are a material vehicle (as a "medium"), but **media are not "materialist**" because, as we argue in our theory of materialism below, **they do not produce "value" and are not "productive." They distribute values produced at the point of production**. The un-said of Hall's claim is that **production and consumption/distribution are no longer distinguishable and more significantly, labor has itself become immaterial-**which is now a popular tenet in the cultural turn (Hardt and Negri, *Multitude).* But, even Paul Thompson, who is not without sympathy for the tum to culture, argues that **"labour is never immaterial. It is not the content of labour but its commodity form that gives 'weight' to an object or idea in a market economy,"** and, he adds, **While it is true that production has been deterritorialised** to an extent, **network firms are not a replacement for the assembly line and do not substitute horizontal for vertical forms of coordination**. Network firms are a type of extended hierarchy, based, as Harrison observes, on concentration without centralisation: 'production may be decentralised, while power finance, distribution, and control remain concentrated among the big firms' *(Lean and Mean: The Changing Landscape of Corporate Power in the Age of Flexibility,* 1994: 20). **Internal networks do not exist independently of these relations of production.** and forms of cooperation, such as teams, are set in motion and monitored by management rather than spontaneously formed. ("Foundation and Empire: A Critique of Hardt and Negri" 84) **Relations of production have shaped and will continue to shape the cultural superstructure. Changes in its phenomenology-**the textures of everyday lifestyles, whether one listens to music in a concert hall, on the radio, or through an iPod-**should not lead to postmodern** Quixotic **fantasies about the autonomy of culture from its material base** [Ebert, *Cultural Critique (with an attitude)].* As Marx writes, the Middle Ages could not live on Catholicism, nor could the ancient world on politics. On the contrary, **it is the manner in which they gained their livelihood which explains why in one case politics, in the other case Catholicism, played the chief part** .... And then **there is** Don **Quixote who long ago paid the penalty for wrongly imagining that knight errantry was compatible with all economic forms of society**. (Marx, *Capital* l, 176).

#### Interconnectedness prevents us from opposing the capitalists- we need the binary of bourgeoisie and proletariat for the alternative to succeed

DeFazio 12 (Kimberly, English Professor at University of Wisconsin Lacrosse, Winter/Spring 12, Machine-Thinking and the Romance of Posthumanism, http://redcritique.org/WinterSpring2012/machinethinkingandtheromanceofposthumanism.htm)

A broader point that needs to be made here is that, while for Heidegger the problem is the subject/object binary, and for posthumanists it is the human/animal distinction, what they all reject as metaphysical thinking is the logic of the "binary" which is the structuring principle of class society. Class societies, in which a few control the labor and products of others and thus have control over the lives of the majority, necessarily create cultural and conceptual divisions which codify these class relations. Conceptual divisions have their material roots not in the mind but in the world which the mind reflects, through more or less complex mediations. This is one of the basic principles of materialism: ideas are not the product of the (individual) mind; rather, social consciousness is shaped by social existence. Therefore changing how people think and thus act (whether to oneself, other humans, animals or the environment) requires changing the material divisions that produce othering. Philosophy which simply does away with conceptual distinctions in thinking, as Heidegger and other romantics do, not only gets rid of the very concepts (like "class," "exploitation," "determination") needed to understand the structuring principles of class society, but, in effect, displaces material change of objective conditions onto the subjective change of the individual. This is the essential politico-cognitive work that neoromantic theory does for capital. Whether through such concepts as Keats' "negative capability" Kant's "sublime," Heidegger's "Being" or "the question of the animal" that is the more recent focus of such writers as Derrida, Wolfe, and Calarco, romantic machine-thinking celebrates the dissolution of boundaries: between self and other, subject and object, philosophy and poetry, rich and poor, the social (as city) and nature. It constructs a post-rational linguistic realm of higher values which exceed restricting social codes and conventions. Boundaries, in romanticism, are viewed as the imposition of cultural codes and linguistic conventions that rigidly delineate, not as material (as effects of labor relations). It is through the replacement of "mechanical" concepts with speculative ones that romanticism blurs social boundaries and epistemological distinctions in an effort, not to transform capitalism, but to find a freer mode of thinking within it. As Wordsworth puts it in his Preface to Lyrical Ballads, it involves taking familiar incidents and "throw[ing] over them a certain colouring of imagination"—or, in the updated idiom of posthumanism, a "revolution in language and thought" (Calarco, Zoographies 6).¶ Heideggerian pre-reflective experience, like "the question of the animal," isBy blurring lines, romantic theory seeks, as Heidegger puts it, "the liberation of language from grammar" ("Letter on Humanism" 218), rather than social transformation. To liberate language from grammar is of course to free up thinking (from cultural bounds), to suspend the social structures of language and, according to Heidegger, to come closer to understanding Being. Grammarless language is thus the fantasy of the plentitude of meaning outside of the social. No matter how adamantly posthumanism co in short the space in which "abstract" binaries like class (not to mention other social differences) evaporate. ndemns Heidegger's human-centered thinking, the very de-essentializing strategies it deploys to challenge human-animal distinctions are informed by the (Heideggerian) desire to escape existing social conventions, through the relay of the animal.

### 2NC Alt

#### An encountering of material reality is necessary to open up critical discourses to achieve enlightenment

Noumoff, prof @ McGill University, 1

(Sam, “Globalization and Marginalization,” Labour, Capital, and Society, Vol. 34, Issue 1, p51-91)

¶ **Exploitation is an inevitable consequence of unequal power. The challenge is to systematically reduce it as¶ the prerequisite to systemic transformation**. **The central strategic question is how to combine the struggle for¶ authentic national independence with the struggle for workers' rights**. Clearly, the sheet is not blank, but¶ neither is it replete with predetermined answers. **The major lesson is to face the objective situation with¶ principle and integrity. This requires a comprehensive analytic discourse which compares the reality on the¶ ground with an alternative vision of society**. In other words, a **strategic reassessment of objective reality, and¶ a creative exploration of elastic responses which test its limits.**

#### The aff cannot just “change our relationship to things” materialism is a better explanation for how we relate to the systems that oppress us

Rowland Keshena, 2008 <http://radicalprofeminist.blogspot.com/2008/12/marxism-vs-indigenism-anti-critique-of.html> Marxism vs. Indigenism: An Anti-Critique of Ward Churchill

¶ The primary concept behind Marx's theory of historical materialism is that all of history is based on, and driven by, material realities rather than mysterious forces. Another way of putting this is that it is not so much the ideas we have that determine our existence as much as it is the factors of our material existence that determine our ideas. This does not mean that ideas have absolutely no effect on the course of history, rather just that they only have effect when put into material action.¶ ¶ The Marxist model of historical materialism looks for the various causes of developments and changes in human societies in the way in which humans collectively make the means to live, thus giving an emphasis, through economic analysis, to everything that co-exists with the economic base of society. But what is meant by economics in this context? We often hear the term “mode of production” get thrown around alot, e.g., capitalism is a mode of production. If we break down, humans need to eat, drink, sleep, etc and in order to do these things they have to produce things, in one fashion or another, and the “mode” is how the production is organized and carried out. Like all other factors, this organization to is intrinsically social and its impact and been seen and felt on all other aspects of society, including: culture, politics, the state, and law. To put it simply, our social relations of production play a major role in how our social relations are organized in general.¶ ¶ However, any given mode of production that a society utilizes does not appear out of thin air and and neither do things like culture and ideas. The fact is that these develop together, and develop because of the course of human actions and interactions. However, importantly, the behaviours and courses of action taken by people are determined by the possibilities, limits, and imperatives of historical conditions.

## 1NR

#### C. Studies prove—depth is better than breadth.

**Arrington 09** (Rebecca, UVA Today, “Study Finds That Students Benefit From Depth, Rather Than Breadth, in High School Science Courses” March 4)

A recent study reports that high school students who study fewer science topics, but study them in greater depth, have an advantage in college science classes over their peers who study more topics and spend less time on each. Robert Tai, associate professor at the University of Virginia's Curry School of Education, worked with Marc S. Schwartz of the University of Texas at Arlington and Philip M. Sadler and Gerhard Sonnert of the Harvard-Smithsonian Center for Astrophysics to conduct the study and produce the report. "Depth Versus Breadth: How Content Coverage in High School Courses Relates to Later Success in College Science Coursework" relates the amount of content covered on a particular topic in high school classes with students' performance in college-level science classes. The study will appear in the July 2009 print edition of Science Education and is currently available as an online pre-print from the journal. "As a former high school teacher, I always worried about whether it was better to teach less in greater depth or more with no real depth. This study offers evidence that teaching fewer topics in greater depth is a better way to prepare students for success in college science," Tai said. "These results are based on the performance of thousands of college science students from across the United States." The 8,310 students in the study were enrolled in introductory biology, chemistry or physics in randomly selected four-year colleges and universities. Those who spent one month or more studying one major topic in-depth in high school earned higher grades in college science than their peers who studied more topics in the same period of time. The study revealed that students in courses that focused on mastering a particular topic were impacted twice as much as those in courses that touched on every major topic.

#### “Resolved” expresses intent to implement the plan

American Heritage Dictionary 2000

[www.dictionary.com/cgi-bin/dict.pl?term=resolved](http://www.dictionary.com/cgi-bin/dict.pl?term=resolved)

To find a solution to; solve …

To bring to a usually successful conclusion